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DOES PRIVATE SCHOOL COMPETITION IMPROVE PUBLIC SCHOOL 




In developed countries, the evidence on the impact of school type on student performance 
is mixed. Researchers are also interested in finding out the effect of private school competition 
on educational outcomes.  The evidence on this for developed countries is mixed as well. What is 
the effect in developing countries? There are not sufficient studies for developing countries to 
reach one conclusion. Using data from the survey of the Ministry of Education, Nepal-2005 for 
School Leaving Certificate Exam (SLC), this dissertation attempts to seek answers to the above 
two issues for the case of Nepal. The first part of this study analyzes private and public school 
performance using OLS and logistic models. The study adopts the propensity score matching 
technique to account for the selection bias problem. The second part of this dissertation attempts 
to explore the impact of private school competition on public school performance using the 
number of private schools in the neighborhood as a continuous measure of competition. A binary 
measure of competition is also used where school is defined to face competition if there is more 
than one private school in the vicinity of the sample public school. However, in this analysis, 
there exists an identification problem because private school enrollment is likely to be correlated 
with public school performance. To address this problem, the study uses the existence of a 
motorable road within an hour’s walking distance from the sample school as an instrument for 
number of private schools in the neighborhood.  
  
 
The results from the OLS and logistic estimation on the effect of school type on student 
performance show that public schools consistently have a negative relationship with student 
performance. On the impact of private school competition on public school performance, the 
OLS results show no significant relationship using both continuous and binary measures of 
competition.  In contrast, the IV method indicates a positive and significant impact of private 
school competition on public school performance, which holds true for both types of measures of 
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 The issue of private versus public education has been of great significance both to the 
developed as well as developing countries. Further, the study of the dynamics that occur between 
public and private schools is attracting educational researchers around the world. The definition 
of public and private schools vary depending on who owns, manages and/or finances education. 
The concept of private and public may also vary depending on different education systems; and, 
for the purposes of comparisons it should be defined in a broad sense (Walford, 1999).  In its 
pure form, we define public schools as those which are owned managed and financed by the 
state. On the other hand, private schools are those owned, managed and financed by parents’ 
association, business, non-profit organization or a religious institution and sometimes by the 
government. However, schools need not be categorized as fully public or fully private; and could 
be a combination of both. For example, community managed schools are schools funded by the 
government, but managed by some non-government body, such as a community. The inclination 
of any school towards a particular system (public or private) depends on the degree of i) the 
prevailing provision (or management) and ii) financing of education. When one of these 
dimensions is not under total government control, and responsibilities between public and private 
sectors over education are shared, we say that public education is privatized. One common 





example of this initiative is the government voucher schemes or subsidies to finance student’s 
education in private schools (see Friedman, 1962). 
Recent trends around the world also show that many developed and developing countries 
are seeking partnerships between the public and private sector to share costs and improve the 
provision of education. Governments in these countries are looking for alternative mechanisms 
of education delivery and financing outside of the public realm. These initiatives are promoted 
by budgetary stringencies and a greater reliance on the market to correct inefficiencies (Cuellar-
Marchelli, 2003). Another important aspect of public-private school dynamics is the growing 
competition in the private sector, and its impact on school and student performance. Along with 
the study of public and private school performance, this dissertation focuses on the impact of 
private school competition on public school performance for the case of Nepal using data from 
the School Leaving Certificate (SLC) exam1. A background on the country and a discussion on 
the education system in Nepal, including the SLC exam are discussed in the second chapter of 
this dissertation.  
 
Motivation of this study 
 
 Though Nepal’s education system has progressed significantly over the last few decades2, 
it continues to face huge challenges amidst its prolonged political instability. For example, the 
NER for primary students in 1980 was just around 16 percent, but by 2003, it had risen to 83.5 
percent (MOES, 2005a). Similarly, the number of schools and colleges has risen exponentially 
                                                 
1 This is equivalent to 10th grade final examination, and the exam is administered by the government of Nepal every 
year. 
2 Recent educational statistics on Nepal is presented in chapter 2.  





over the last few decades. The retention of students, especially at the primary level, has always 
posed a big challenge to this country of 28 million. Still, 19 percent of the total school age 
population (age 5 to 16) are not in school. At the secondary level, the figure is even more 
alarming with 40 percent out of school (MOE, 2008). There is a very low participation rate in the 
upper stages of schooling. The literacy rate was only 55.6 percent in 2009 (MOE, 2010).  
Disparities in gender, ethnic and economic groups, and locations are increasing year by year. For 
example, only 43.3 percent of Nepal’s women are literate, compared to 70.7 percent of men 
(MOE, 2010). Schooling quality in public schools interpreted in terms of achievement rates is 
found to be very low. In addition, the public schools are left behind, and there is much disparity 
between the private and public schools in terms of quality and student performance. For 
example, based on the 2004 SLC results, compared to an average pass rate of 85 percent for 
private schools, the pass rate of public schools was only 38 percent. Similarly, while an 
overwhelming majority of private schools had pass rates in the 80–100 percent range, less than 7 
percent of the public schools had such high pass rates. Furthermore, the average SLC score of 
private schools was around 39 percent above that of public schools (Bhatta, 2004).  Given this 
consistent low performance of public school performance, private school competition is 
increasing day by day, especially in the urban areas. This increase in private school competition 
can also be attributed to various other reasons such as the ease of establishing a private school, 
the profitability of private schools, and the absence of limiting regulations on these schools by 
the government. In such a scenario, in addition to comparing private and public school 
performance, it is interesting to pose a question if private school competition has any impact on 
public school performance. In this regard, although there are many studies with data from 
developed countries, there is hardly any study in the case of developing countries. So far, to the 





best of my knowledge, there has not been a single study on this topic that uses data from Nepal. 
This study attempts to fill this gap in the literature using data from the Nepalese Ministry of 




There are two main research questions in this study: 
i) Do private school students perform better than their public school counterparts after 
controlling for student, family, school and teacher characteristics? 
ii) Keeping other things constant, does private school competition have any impact on 
public school performance in the case of Nepal?  
The empirical models associated with the first and the second research questions are 
presented in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively.  
 
Significance of the Study 
 
The study of private versus public schooling is a topic of great interest at the present time. 
The topic is more interesting in the case of developing countries where demand for a better 
education system is rising day by day. In such a situation, a genuinely comparative study on the 
performance of private and public education becomes crucial to both education researchers and 
the policy makers. In addition, given the new movements of privatization of education in 
developing countries, the study of the effect of private school competition on educational 
outcomes is of even more importance. 





This study is unique in several ways. First, the data for this study come from Nepal, a focus 
of very few Economics of Education researchers. Many people around the world have been 
taking a keen interest in Nepal, which has taken some significant turns over the years: from 
autocratic regimes to a democratic kingdom, to a Federal Democratic Republic. Nepal is at a 
turning point in its political history. It needs good information for both policy makers and the 
general public. Education is a crucial sector and the delivery of good education is very critical 
for the development of this poor nation. Unfortunately, very little literature is available that 
examines educational developments and their dynamics in Nepal. The Nepalese population has 
been shifting to private schools without clear evidence of their superiority and with great 
financial sacrifice for the majority of the population. In this context, this dissertation explores 
public and private schooling and examines the public-private linkages in the education sector. 
Thus, it can help fill this gap in the literature. Secondly, School Leaving Certificate (SLC) 
examinations are, by far, the most important school-level exams for the majority of Nepalese 
(Bhatta, 2005). This study uses data on the SLC examination collected by the SLC study team 
under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Education, which is one of the most comprehensive data 
sets collected so far in Nepal relating to SLC examinations. In Nepal, there are just a few studies 
that explore private and public school performance, and they lack systematic empirical evidence. 
Even among those that use empirical models, they fail to take account of the selection bias 
problem that usually cripples such an analysis. By this I refer to the fact that the two groups of 
schools do not enroll the same types of students. For example, private schools have more 
resources and certainly have students from families with higher socio-economic status for peer 
effects.  These are omitted variables or non-observables.  Thus, it is very likely that these 
differences account for the overall differential in achievement between public and private 





schools rather than the sponsorship. This study adopts the propensity score matching and 
instrumental variable method to address such problems. This makes the study richer as compared 
to those that do not account for such serious methodological issues. Moreover, this study is one 
of the first empirical studies on the impact of private school competition on public school 
performance in a developing county. Therefore, in addition to Nepal, this study may also provide 
some insights for other countries that share similar characteristics in the education sector. 
The rest of the dissertation is organized in the following way. Chapter 2 presents an 
overview of education system in Nepal. The chapter discusses historical developments in the 
field of education in Nepal, features of public and private schooling in Nepal, and a description 
of School Leaving Certificate (SLC) exam. Chapter 3 deals with the data source, the missing 
data problem, method used to address this, and a description of the study variables. Chapter 4 
presents a comparative analysis of private and public school performance. The chapter includes 
the guiding theoretical framework, the relevant literature, the model and identification strategy, 
and the study findings. Chapter 5 addresses the second research question, and studies the impact 
of private school competition on public school performance. Similar to the structure of Chapter 
4, this chapter discusses the relevant background, the previous literature, the model and 
identification strategy and the empirical results. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes with a discussion 





















Nepal is a tiny landlocked country in Asia located between India and China with 
population of about 28 million. After the overthrow of King Gyanendra in 2005 by the people’s 
movement, the country became a Federal Democratic Republic. Geographically, the country is 
divided into five development regions, 14 zones and 75 districts3. The five development regions 
are: Eastern, Central, Western, Mid -Western, and Far-Western. Kathmandu, the capital of the 
country, and the only metropolitan city of the nation, is located in the Central region. In terms of 
ecological belts, it is divided into three regions: Mountain, Hill and the Plains, where the 
Mountain region lies in the north sharing a boarder with Tibet, and the Plains shares a boarder 
with India in the south. The hilly region is the central region that includes the Kathmandu 
Valley4, which has a population of around 1.5 million. 
The majority of the population in Nepal belongs to the Hindu religion. According to the 
2001 Census, Hindus comprise 88.87 percent and Buddhists 8.59 percent of the total population, 
whereas the rest of the population belongs to other religions (CBS, 2002). The Hindu system is 
further categorized into four castes: Brahmin, Chhetri, Vaisyas (Newars) and Sudra (Dalits), 
where Brahmin is the highest caste, and Dalits are the lowest and most disadvantaged caste. 
Besides this, there are ethnic groups (Janjatis) that belong to the community which have their 
                                                 
3 Map of Nepal with 5 development regions and 75 districts is given in Figure 2.1 
4 Note that Kathmandu Valley consists of three major districts: Lalitpur, Bhaktapur and Kathmandu. The capital of 
the country refers to Kathmandu district. 





own mother tongues and traditional cultures, and yet do not fall under the conventional four-fold 
Hindu hierarchical caste structure. Historically, many of these Janajati groups used to occupy a 
particular habitat or territory, and thus many of them claim that they are the true “first settlers” 
(Adivasi) of Nepal. As per the census report of 2001, of the total population, 65 percent belong to 
the Hindu caste system, 31 percent belong to Janjatis (ethnic groups), and 4 percent belong to 
the other caste/ethnicity. There are at least 92 languages spoken as mother tongues in various 
parts of the country (CBS, 2002). 
Although Nepal is known to the world as land of the Himalayas, and is very rich in 
biodiversity, cultural and linguistic diversity, it is still one of the poorest countries in the world. 
As shown in Table 2.1 that reports the basic national indicators for Nepal5, its poverty rate6 is 
30.8 percent with GDP per capita of only $473 (CBS, 2010). Life expectancy at birth is 64.1 
years, and the literacy rate for citizens15 years and older is 55.6 percent, 70.7 for males and 43.3 
for females (CBS, 2010). According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 
2010), the human development index (HDI) ranks Nepal at 144 out of 169 countries with an HDI 
value of 0.428. The country’s economy has suffered badly due to prolonged political 
disturbances in the country, especially the Maoist guerrilla war that spanned the years from 1996 
to 2005. Although the war has now ended, the country is not still able to recuperate from the 
damage sustained in all sectors of the economy. The education sector is also one of the most 
affected. The sections below discuss Nepal’s educational history and the education system at 
present including the description of the SLC examination. 
 
                                                 
5 Also presented in Table 2.1 is Statistics on South Asia for comparison purpose.  
6 The poverty rate is around 55 percent using the international definition of those earning $1.25 a day. 






The Educational History 
 
 
Nepal has come a long way in the education sector. Modern education in Nepal is 
believed to have begun with the establishment of the first school in 1853. However, this school 
was confined only to the ruling families and their courtiers. The general population gained access 
to education only after 1951 when a popular movement overthrew an autocratic family regime 
and initiated a democratic system. In 1951-52, the adult literacy rate (15 +) of the country was 
just 5 per cent with about 10,000 students in just 300 schools and two colleges (CBS, 2003). 
With the introduction of a comprehensive Education Plan in 1971, the education sector 
began to expand. The National Education Sector Plan (NESP) of 1971, financed by USAID, 
attempted to create a single unified system of public education in order to empower district 
education offices to run schools. However, under this law there was no inclusion of School 
Management Communities (SMCs). Due to this situation, only elite groups who utilized SMCs 
benefited from public education, and local communities were left out. As centralized rural 
development initiatives failed, there was demand for decentralization of state services. As a 
result, the Decentralization act of 1982 and its by-Laws from 1984 tried to empower local 
panchayats
7  by giving them functional responsibilities in various central political programs 
(Carney & Bista, 2009). By the late 1980s, the need for urgent reform in schooling was felt and 
hence a comprehensive US- funded study was undertaken called ‘Improving Efficiency of 
Educational Systems’ (IEES). This study identified systematic management weaknesses in the 
central educational bureaucracy and recommended renewed decentralization of educational 
management (MOEC/ USAID, 1988). 
                                                 
7  A village council in Nepal, India and Southern Pakistan is referred as Panchayat. 





After the people’s movement of 1990 established a democracy in the country, education 
development was realized more successfully and more rapidly. A simple example was seen in 
the rapid rise of the Net Enrollment Ratio (NER). The NER for primary students in 1980 was just 
around 16 percent, but by 2003 it had risen to 83.5 percent (MOES, 2005a). Yet, the quality of 
public schools still remained very poor and; the demand for private schools increased rapidly. 
The private sector started to expand in size dominated by resource- rich families. By 1998, there 
was a significant growth in the private sector due to the prevailing school liberalization policy 
(Carney & Bista, 2009). The problems arising from this expansion were rampant fee charge and 
considerable variability in the quality of private schools. Eventually, the Government’s poor 
performance and laissez-faire approach was aggravated by Maoist activists keen to bring changes 
to the country. In spite of the fact that Maoists had ended the war and joined the mainstream 
politics after the people’s movement in 2005, political instability and disturbances continue to 
cripple most of the key sectors of the country, including the education sector. 
 
 
The Present Education System 
 
The structure of the present education system constitutes six sections: Pre-primary (below 
Grade 1); Primary (Grade 1 to 5); Lower Secondary (Grade 6 to 8); Secondary (Grade 9 and 10); 
Higher Secondary (Grade 11 and 12); and Higher Education (University level) (MOE, 2010). 
Table 2.2 gives the present number of total schools by school level, school type and development 
region in the country. As shown in the table, there are presently 31,655 primary schools, 11,341 
lower secondary schools, 6,928 secondary schools, and 2,512 higher secondary schools in the 





country. Out of these, the central region has 9,538 schools, the highest among all the regions, 
with 2,213 schools in the Kathmandu valley alone.  
In terms of school type, as figure 2.2 shows, presently there are 41,959 public schools and 
10, 477 private schools in the country, with predominance in the number of 31,655 primary 
schools.  In percentage terms, public schools constitute around 80 percent of these schools and 
private schools only 20 percent. At the secondary grades (9th and 10th), there are 4,715 public 
schools and 2,213 private schools. In higher education, there are five universities with 834 
constituent and affiliated campuses. In total, including all levels of education, there are 7.9 
million students and 251,805 teachers involved in this teaching learning process. Table 2.3 
reports the percentage of enrollment of the total enrollment in public and private schools. In the 
secondary grade, the percentage of public and private school enrollment of the total enrollment is 
83.1 percent and 16.9 percent, respectively. 
 
Figure 2.2. Number of Schools by School-Type and Level 
 






















Source: MOE (2010) 
 





Table 2.4 shows the gross enrollment ratio and net enrollment ratio by school levels8. As 
shown in the table, in 2009, the combined gross enrollment ratio (GER)9 was 98.6 percent, with 
141.4 percent, 88.7 percent and 65.7 percent enrollment at the primary, lower secondary and 
secondary levels, respectively. The combined net enrollment rate (NER) was 65.9 percent, with 
93.7 percent, 63.2 percent and 40.8 percent enrolled in primary, lower secondary and secondary 
levels, respectively.   
 







 Female Male Total Female Male Total 
Primary 146.1 137.1 141.4 92.6 94.7 93.7 
LS 89.3 88.2 88.7 61.9 64.3 63.2 
Secondary 64.5 66.8 65.7 40.1 41.4 40.8 
HS 24.6 22.6 23.6 6.8 6.8 6.8 
Combined 100.0 97.4 98.6 64.9 66.8 65.9 
Source: MOE (2010) 
Note: Combined is for Primary, Lower Secondary and Secondary Grades 
 
 
Education Administration and Governance in Nepal 
 
 The Ministry of Education (MOE), established in the country after the dawn of 
democracy in 1951, is the supreme body of all educational organizations and responsible for the 
                                                 
8 The Gross Enrollment Ratio (GER) is given by the ratio of actual students enrolled to the number of potential 
students enrolled. The Net Enrollment Ratio (GER) is given by enrollment of the official age group for a given level 
of education expressed as a percentage of the corresponding population. 
9 Combined is for primary, lower secondary and secondary grades. 





overall development of education in the country. In 2002, it was renamed the Ministry of 
Education and Sports. Again in 2008, with the decision of the cabinet, it was renamed as the 
Ministry of Education and has remained so until the present. A Cabinet Minister at the political 
level heads the Ministry whereas two secretaries head the MOE at the bureaucratic level (MOE, 
2010).  
The Ministry is responsible for formulating educational policies and plans, and managing 
and implementing them across the country through the institutions under its jurisdiction. For 
example, the Central Level Agencies (CLAs) under the Ministry are responsible for designing 
and implementing programs and monitoring them. Five regional Education Directorates (REDs) 
are responsible for monitoring the programs undertaken by the district level organizations. There 
are 75 District Education Offices (DEOs) at the district level and 1,091 Resource Centers (RCs) 
at the sub- district level as the main implementing agencies for the educational policies, plans 
and programs at the local levels. At the function level, the Ministry oversees the following four 
divisions, each headed by a joint secretary who is a gazetted first class officer: i) An 
administrative division ii) A higher education and educational management division iii) A 
planning division, and iv) A monitoring, evaluation and inspection division. The main functions 
of the administration division are personal management and development. It is responsible for 
recruitment, transfers, promotions and capacity building of the staff as well as procurement and 
property management. The major areas of work of higher education and educational 
management division are related to school education scholarship and higher and technical 
education. The planning division assumes responsibility for policy development and analysis. 
This division is the entry point for donor agencies in the education sector and coordinates foreign 
aid for designated for implementing programs and projects in education. The monitoring, 





evaluation and supervision division carries out monitoring activities in conjunction with program 
implementation and maintains a database on educational statistics (MOE, 2010).  
 The Ministry of Education has undertaken many programs and projects since its 
establishment. Among the completed projects are the following. With the help of the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), it completed the Teacher Education Project (TEP) that was 
implemented from 2002 to 2009 with the total budget of US $24.1 million. The main objectives 
of the project were i) to conduct quality pre-service, in-service and refresher training for primary 
teachers ii) improve institutional capacity to conduct training programs, and iii) improve the 
participation of women and disadvantaged groups in teaching careers. Another project named the 
School Management Transfer and Incentive Program was implemented from 2003 to 2008. With 
the assistance of the World Bank, the total budget of the project was US$ 5.11 million. The 
objectives of the project were i) to increase parent’s participation in the management of 
community schools ii) improve the access, quality and capacity of students in the community 
school, and iii) make all stakeholders accountable by increasing the transparency of functions of 
the community school. In the area of secondary education, the Ministry, with the help of grant 
from Denmark and a loan from the Asian Development Bank (total budget US $ 75 million) 
completed a program entitled Secondary Education Support Program (SESP). The aim of the 
program were i) to improve the quality and relevance of public secondary schooling ii) to 
improve access to public secondary schooling, with a particular emphasis on girls, students with 
disabilities and students from poor and disadvantaged groups and districts, and iii) to develop 
institutional capacity and management of central and district education institutions and public 
secondary schools based upon a decentralized system of planning and management. Another 
widely known program is Education for All (EFA). This was implemented from 2004 to 2009 





with the help of multiple international organizations and donor nations and with a total budget of 
US$ 814.5 million. The major objectives of this program were to: i) ensure access and equity in 
primary education ii) enhance the quality and relevance of primary education iii) improve 
efficiency and institutional capacity. With the partnership of the World Food Program (WFP), 
the MOE also undertook Food for Education Program (FEP) from 2002 to 2011 with the total 
budget of US$ 224.25 million. The objective of the program was to increase access to basic 
primary education and improve the nutrition and health of children within regions with food 
deficits and low access to education. Partnering with the United Nation Population Fund, the 
MOE undertook the Population Education Program over the period 2008 to 2010 with the total 
budget of US$ 2.2 million. The goals of the program were to i) include reproductive health issues 
in school curriculum ii) develop policy programs for gender equity, and iii) increase national 
support for gender equity.  
 There are many programs that are on-going. For example, with the partnership of the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Ministry has been implementing the Skills for Employment 
Project (SEP) since 2005 with a total budget of US$ 25 million. The project’s specified aims are 
to: i) increase access to market oriented short-term skills training particularly for women, Dalits 
(oppressed caste) and the disadvantaged ii) strengthen training for providers to enhance access 
and improve the relevance and quality of training, and iii) develop and articulate a new national 
policy to achieve greater integration, relevance and efficiency in the Technical Education and 
Vocational Training (TEVT) sector. Another ongoing project being implemented since 2007 and 
with the assistance of the World Bank is the Second Higher Education Project (SHEP). The 
project has a total budget of US$ 60 million with goals to: i) enhance the quality and relevance of 
higher education and research through a set of incentives for promoting effective management 





and financial sustainability of academic institutions, and ii) improve access for academically 
qualified under-privileged students, including girls, Dalits and educational disadvantaged Janjati 
to higher education through financial assistance and enhancing the capacity of higher secondary 
schools. Another big and important project that the MOE has been implementing since 2009 with 
the help of the World Bank, ADB, Denmark and Norway is the School Sector Reform Program 
(SSRP). With a total budget of US$ 2,626 million, the project aims to: i) strengthen the policy- 
making process in education ii) reform the educational sector through an integrated approach and 
iii) expand and consolidate the concept of Education for All (EFA) best practices and lesson 
learnt, and iv) build the capacity of stakeholders. 
There are various agencies under MOE at the central, regional, district and local levels 
that help in the functioning of these efforts to achieve the Ministry’s objective and goals. This is 
presented in Table A.1 of the appendix section. 
 
Department of Education 
One of the principle agencies under the MOE is the Department of Education (DOE). The DOE 
was established in 1999 to institutionalize and regularize activities related to the Basic and 
Primary Education Program (BPEP). After the establishment of the Department, most of the 
activities performed by the BPEP were shifted to the Department and the BPEP as a project 
ceased to function. Due to this, basic and primary education related activities carried out by the 
Department were also referred to as BPEP II. Presently, the Department, with its direct line of 
command with the regional and district offices and with full administrative and financial 
authority takes the responsibility off implementing and monitoring educational programs in the 
country. The Department is headed by the Director General, a gazetted first class senior officer 





belonging to education service cadre. The five Regional Education Directorates (REDs) and 75 
District Education Offices (DEOs) fall under DOE and perform their tasks to meet the 
Department’s objectives.  The Department has the following three divisions each headed by a 
director, a gazetted first class officer: i) An administration division ii) A planning and monitoring 
division, and iii) An educational management division. The main role of the administrative 
division is to take responsibility relating to general and personnel administration, financial 
administration, educational materials distribution and physical services. The planning and 
monitoring division is in charge of planning, monitoring, research and development. Finally, the 
educational management division is entrusted with the responsibility relating early childhood 
education, basic and primary education, women’s education, special education and educational 
statistics. The roles of the Department of Education as specified by the Ministry of Education 
include: i) providing equal access to education ii) developing quality reforms iii) improving 
internal and external efficiencies, and iv) developing education as a development-friendly 
venture. Soon after the establishment of the Department of Education, a few important programs 
were put forth. For basic and primary education, these programs included improvements of 
access to primary education, school management, and the upgrading of teachers’ standards at the 
primary level. In terms of increasing women’s access to education, the programs included 
increasing female enrollment, encouraging greater numbers of educated women to go into 
teaching as a profession, increasing the competition rate of the primary education of female 
students, and providing scholarships to female students at various levels. Finally, to improve 
general literacy levels, a campaign was instituted to eliminate illiteracy altogether (MOE, 2010). 
According to the education regulations of the DOE, public or government-aided schools 
are managed by School Management Committees (SMCs). The compositions of SMCs, 





academic content, textbooks, and examination systems are uniform throughout the country. The 
DOE is also responsible for appointing the teachers, including the head-teachers. In addition, the 
DOE nominates the District Education Committee (DEC) which in turn nominates the SMCs. 
The government District Office, within the DEC, is headed by a District Education Officer in all 
of the 75 districts in the country. In fact, this is the most influential unit that designates tasks for 
each school to implement. It is the responsibility of the DEC to set the school calendar, provide 
teacher salaries, organize teacher training programs, perform supervisions, and audit the school 
accounts (MOE, 2010).  
 
Other Agencies under the Ministry of Education 
There are other important agencies that were established to help the MOE set its 
objectives. For example, National Center for Educational Development (NCED) was established 
in 1993 along with the nine Primary Teacher Training Center (PTTCs) in various parts of the 
country at the recommendation of the National Education Commission, 1992. Since 2004, the 
NCED has been the main body under the MOE that is responsible for human resource 
development in the education sector. Presently, the NCED conducts training programs through 
its 34 Educational Training Centers (ETCs) established at different strategic locations of the 
country. Another important academic institution under MOE is the Curriculum Development 
Center (CDC), which was established in 1997 with an aim of designing curricula and textbooks 
along with other instructional materials for school education. This center conducts annual as well 
as periodical discussions, interactions and dissemination programs on the usefulness of the 
instructional materials. In addition, it also conducts research-oriented programs to make 
education relevant, practical and competitive.   





The Office of the Controller of Examinations (COE) established as the secretariat of the 
SLC board in 1934 operates and manages the School Leaving Certificate (SLC) examinations in 
the country. Although the OCE mainly conducts the SLC examinations, it also organizes short-
term trainings, workshops, seminars and carries out researches related to school level evaluation 
system. In the non formal sector, Non Formal Education Center (NFEC) was established in 1951 
along with Adult Education Section within the MOE in order to carry out adult literacy programs 
in the country. The center has been taking the responsibility of all non-formal education 
programs, primarily the basic literacy program as the only scheme for reducing illiteracy in the 
country.  The agency under the MOE that keeps the record of public school teachers is called 
School Teacher Record Office (STRO). Established in 1998, the major functions of the STRO is 
keeping and provision of necessary data and information related to the permanent teachers of the 
community (public) schools. It also helps to facilitate delivery of post-service benefits to retired 
teachers like pension benefits, gratuities, family allowances, education allowances and children’s 
allowances. The Teacher Service Commission (TSC) was established in 1999 to make 
recommendations to the government for the permanent appointment and promotion of the 
teachers of public schools. The commission provides the teaching license necessary to the 
candidates for securing the post of a teacher, and also provides suggestions on the issues related 
to service terms and conditions and facilities for the teachers.  
With the introduction of the New Education System Plan (NESP) in 1971, the Regional 
Education Directorate (REDs) was established with the purpose of enhancing the efficiency of 
educational administration processes as well as to bring these closer to the people and the school. 
The five REDs are located in the 5 development regions of the country and are responsible for 
bringing out uniformity in district level programs and for coordinating, monitoring and 





supervising the school level teaching learning as well as development activities within the 
region. For the district level offices in the educational administration, the District Education 
Offices (DEOs) are established in each of the 75 districts of the country. With a major role to 
facilitate the task of school administration and supervision, each district is sub-divided into 
different supervision clusters ranging from 3 to 27 on the basis of school population and 
geographic locations. A Resource Center (RC) is established in each of the cluster with a 
Resource Person (RP) to provide professional support and services to the schools within the 
cluster. RPs are selected among the teachers of RC catchments areas. Presently, there are al- 
together 1,053 RCs through out the country, which are supervised, evaluated and monitored by a 
School Supervisor.  
The Higher Secondary Education Board (HSEB) is responsible for the 10+2 education 
system in the country. Established in 1989 under the Higher Secondary Education Act, the board 
works towards the needs for addressing middle level manpower requirements and for importing 
necessary knowledge and skills to those students who want to continue their education at the 
undergraduate level. In the higher education division, the supreme body is the university senate, 
which is responsible for making policy decisions. The University Grants Commission (UGC) 
established under the University Grants Commission Act 1993 assists the government in 
managing the fiscal aspects and funding policies of higher education. The commission’s major 
role is the proper allocation of grants obtained from different sectors for the management and 
development of the Universities in the country. Tribhuvan University, established in 1959 is the 
first university in the country. It was only after the establishment of this University that higher 
education within the country was available to the general Nepalese people. Presently there are 
five other universities located in different parts of the country. The main institution for 





conducting educational research in Nepal is the Center for Educational Research, Innovation, 
and Development (CERID), which is affiliated with Tribhuwan University. The CERID is 
headed by an Executive director and undertakes educational research projects, including 
collaborations with several foreign institutions. Likewise, commissions like the Nepal National 
Commission for UNESCO, established in 1954 that functions under the chairmanship of the 
education minister has been serving the Ministry in establishing mutual relationships amongst 
the member states of the UNESCO. The commission also advises the government of Nepal in the 
field of education, science, culture, social and communications that is within the jurisdiction of 
UNESCO (MOE, 2010). 
In the private sector, the Private and Boarding Schools' Organization, Nepal (PABSON) 
is an active and widespread umbrella organization of Private and Boarding Schools in Nepal. It 
was established in 1991AD and registered with the Government (the then HMG) of Nepal. 
PABSON is guided by its own constitution and acts as an umbrella organization for all its 
member schools. It performs its functions through various central, regional and district 
committees, sub-committees and departments, duly elected as per the provisions of its 
constitution. The PABSON is also acting as a nodal agency in coordinating with various 
government agencies, non-government agencies and other stake holders on all matters pertaining 
to school education, especially those concerned with private sector education. In addition, the 
other functions of the PABSON are i) coordinating with all education stake holders in trying to 
resolve all issues relating to private schools including framing policies to control private schools 
ii) determining criteria for basic fees structuring iii) protecting private investment in schools iv) 
safe guarding the interests of employees, and iv) ensuring the discharge of social 
responsibilities by private schools. 







Education Expenditure and Finance in Nepal 
 
   
 The government of Nepal has specified that the educational budget is distributed in the 
schools across the countries in the following ways (SMAERC, 2009). The first and the most 
usual method is called ‘incrimination’. In this method, the budgeting decisions (increase or 
decrease) in education or some particular sub-sector for a particular year is done on the basis of 
the previous year. The second is called ‘formula funding’. The kind of budgeting is based on 
some rationale so it is distributed only on the basis of some specified objective principle with 
emphasis on equitable opportunity, responsibility and accountability. The third is called 
‘program budgeting’ with a special focus on a specific program. In this type of budgeting, the 
budget is allocated in such a way that it is sufficient to cover all expenditures required by the 
specified program. The fourth is the hybrid or mixed strategy, where resources are managed and 
mobilized in more than one way.  
From 1975-1990, Nepal spent about 10 percent of its annual budget on education and this 
increased to 13 percent in the Eighth Five-Year Plan during 1992-1997. As a percentage of the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), this spending ranged between 1.3 percent and 2.0 percent 
between 1975 and 1990 (MOF, 2004). After 1990, these figures improved to a significant level. 
Table 2.5 reports data on the educational budget from 2000 to 2010. As seen in the table, the 
national effort on education (percent share of education in GDP) has slowly been increasing over 
the years. For example, in 2000, it was 2.5 percent and it was 3.8 percent in 2010. The 
percentage of the government budget allocated to the education sector has been 15.3 percent on 
average in the last decade.  At present, 16.3 percent of government budget is allocated to the 





education sector. The growth rate of the educational budget is also constantly increasing over the 
years with the ten-year average being 16.81 percent. The subsector distribution is dominated by 
primary education, which is more than 60 percent of the total education budget.  
 
 

















2000 77238226 10176074 2.5 13.17 - 
2001 91621335 11749579 2.8 12.82 15.5 
2002 99792219 14072847 3.0 14.1 19.8 
2003 96124796 14402421 3.1 14.98 2.3 
2004 102400000 15613274 3.1 15.25 8.4 
2005 111689900 18059654 3.5 16.17 15.7 
2006 126885100 21250447 3.6 16.75 17.7 
2007 143912300 23005525 3.7 15.99 8.3 
2008 168995600 28390000 3.6 16.8 23.4 
2009 236015897 39086407 3.7 16.56 37.7 
2010 285930000 46616672 3.8 16.30 19.3 
Source: MOE (2010), EFSF (2009)          
Note: AGR= Annual Growth Rate 
 
 
The major portion of government expenditures for school education in Nepal is usually 
spent on teacher and staff salaries and fringe benefits. For example, a study by Center for 
Educational Research, Innovation, and Development in mid- nineties found that in public 
primary schools, the expenditure on teacher and staff salaries was 86 percent, as compared to 63 
percent in private primary schools. In public secondary schools, this expenditure on salaries was 
found to be 76 percent in the public sector as compared to only 52 percent in the private sector 
(CERID, 1996). A more recent paper by Ministry of Education by EFSG (2009) has stated that 
out of the total grants that a public school receives in an academic year, around 80 percent goes 





to teacher salary and construction support. The study also points out that the expenditure on 
teaching learning materials, capacity development of teachers, library development and computer 
education is very small.   
 
Financing of Education in Nepal 
The first modern school, Durbar High School was established in Nepal during the Rana 
regime in 1853. The school was initiated with the view to providing education mostly to the 
children of the ruling class, but was not for the common people. School education was financed 
mostly by the national treasury and partly by community households. Besides this school-based 
education, the practice of home-based tutoring was also established where this would be financed 
by the households alone. This system still seems to be in practice, though in a somewhat 
modified way.  
 When the democracy was established in the country in 1951, the financing of education 
evolved in two ways: i) community financing in the case of schools established by the public, 
and ii) through a system of joint financial contribution – shared by the community (parents) as 
well as the government, in the case of government supported schools (SMAERC, 2009).  The 
National Education System Plan was introduced in 1971. After this, schools that were 
established and run by community financing were transformed into government-owned entities, 
and were financed mostly by the government and partially by the parents through the tuition fees. 
However after 1980s, a more liberal approach was established by the government where new 
schools were allowed to open as a result of the efforts of the community or by private initiatives. 
Hence, with the introduction of the private schools in the country, there was a clear distinction on 





the two types of financing: government financing and parent/student financing. This system has 
remained in practice to the present time.  
 There are basically two types of financial assistance organized by the government and 
provided to public (community) schools. The first is earmarked grants. This includes teachers’ 
salary, free textbooks (only for primary level), scholarships, remuneration for early childhood 
development programs and pre-primary classes. The second type involves block grants, which 
include the school’s cost of administrative expenses, expenditures related to infrastructure 
development (based on school improvement program) and educational materials. Out of the total 
number of grants that a school receives in an academic year, around 80 percent goes to teacher 
salary and construction support. The private schools do not get any sort of financial assistance 
from the government.  
The educational budget in Nepal is financed by two sources: the government of Nepal 
and foreign aid, which is received as grants or loans. There is a donor harmonization process in 
place as well for supporting the educational sector in Nepal. The development partners 
supporting the education sector have formed a consortium with pool and non-pool donors. 
Presently, there are 11 external donor partners involved in pool and two other donors (JICA and 
UNICEF) are involved in parallel funding. Table 2.6 provides data on foreign aid in the 
education sector in Nepal from 2000 to 2010. In 2010, 69 percent of the educational budget was 
financed by the government and the remaining 31 percent was financed by foreign aid.  In the 
primary education budget alone, the foreign donations contributed to around 35 percent 
financing. Within the total foreign aid for education, 77 percent was grant funding and 23 
percent was in the form of a loan. The growth rate of foreign aid in education has been 
increasing over the years, except in 2001 and 2002 where the growth rates were negative. In 





2009, the annual growth rate of foreign aid was as high as 42 percent. The table also indicates 
that the percent of foreign aid in education improved from the low twenties to the high twenties 
after 2004 with the present share being as high as 30 percent. This shows that Nepal is still 
financially dependent on foreign donors for its educational budget. Unfortunately, this has 
undermined self-sustenance, increased foreign debt with heavy interest payments, and led to 




Table 2.6. Foreign Aid in Education 
 
Year Total FA in 
Education 
% of FA in 
Education 
AGR FA in 
Education 
% grant % loan 
2000 2648268 26.02 - 57.70 42.30 
2001 2586095 22.01 - 2.3 65.79 34.21 
2002 2462706 17.5 - 4.8 85.17 14.83 
2003 2894966 20.1 17.6 73.06 26.94 
2004 3228318 20.68 11.5 67.31 32.69 
2005 5438077 30.11 68.4 56.49 43.51 
2006 5784145 27.22 6.4 64.51 35.49 
2007 6586495 28.63 13.9 61.12 38.88 
2008 7754090 27.31 17.7 71.56 28.44 
2009 11010323 28.17 42 73.94 26.06 
2010 14553823 31.22 18.2 76.70 23.30 
Source: MOE (2010)          
Note: AGR= Annual Growth Rate; FA = Foreign Aid 
 
 
The major international donor agencies are the Nordic countries, Japan, the UK, 
European Union, World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (Carney & Bista, 2009). The 
first major intervention in the primary education sector took place with the Basic and Primary 
Education Project (BPEP) in 1992 with the help of an international donor agency. The goal of 





this intervention was to provide better access, quality and efficient management in the education 
system. In recent years, the World Bank has been assisting Nepal in decentralizing the 
management of education and in improving the quality of education. For example, with the help 
of the World Bank’s support, the government of Nepal launched the Community School Support 
Project (CSSP) in 2003 with the aim of increasing the role of parents on school management 
communities (SMCs). Taking the initiative for this project, the government has been successfully 
transferring public schools to community managed schools10. According to the World Bank’s 
project assessment report, the number of Nepalese schools transferred by March 13, 2009 was 
8,002 (World Bank, 2009). Some of the major achievements that the report claims are an 
increased enrollment in primary schools and a reduction in numbers of out-of-school children 
between 5-15 years old in the service areas of CSSP (World Bank, 2009). 
  
Challenges and Problems in Education Finance 
There are a few important challenges related to financing of education in Nepal. With 
regards to government’s funding through grants to school, the delivery does not always occur in 
a timely fashion. Further, funding to schools does not always respond to the schools’ needs as 
expressed in their plans, and funding by local bodies is inconsistent across the country. In 
addition, there is inadequate monitoring of how schools expend their funds. For example, schools 
inflate student numbers to receive funding for students above the prescribed student teacher 
ratios (EFSG, 2009). 
                                                 
10 Community managed schools are unaided public school, which do not receive regular government grant, but runs 
with support from community, donations from other sources and school’s own resources. For more on community 
managed schooling in Nepal see World Bank (2003), Carney (2003), Carney & Bista (2009) and World Bank 
(2009). 





Besides these issues, there are several other serious concerns. The first relates to ensuring 
financial sustainability in the management of the schools. The budget allocated by the 
government is surely insufficient for running schools. The local authorities cannot levy taxes to 
support schools and primary schools are not allowed to charge fees of any kind. As a result, 
insufficient financial support has been always a big problem in public schools. Furthermore, due 
to the same financial constraint, the expansion of quality education in the public schools has been 
a huge challenge. The second challenge is tying up teacher salary and teacher performance. The 
present system does not provide teacher salary and allowances based on their performance. This 
is the reason why despite continued increases in investment in education the quality of public 
education has not improved comparably. Finally, the ‘block grant’ provided on the basis of the 
numbers of students in a school is not very scientific. This is not beneficial for those schools in 
remote areas with low number of students. In such cases, it is likely that resource poor schools 
receive fewer grants than resource rich schools (SMAERC, 2009).  
Studies thus point out that inadequate resources and low administrative efficiency are two 
major problems related to the financing of the educational system in Nepal (Bhatta, 2004; 
SMAERC, 2009). These inadequate resources have an adverse effect on physical facilities, 
teachers and equipments needed for schools. Due to this deficiency of funds, the physical 
facilities are often in dilapidated conditions. The government provides salaries to teachers and is 
also responsible for the cost of continuing teacher training programs. Therefore, upgrading the 
skills of the teachers is always a problem. In addition, the teaching and learning materials such as 
materials for on science education are always inadequate. The government provides education up 
to the 10th grade free of charge. However, many schools charge “non-tuition” fees to students to 
sustain their programs. As a result, the government’s intention to provide free education hasn’t 





been so helpful. The government also supports higher education by charging very minimal fees 
to the students. This too has added to the burden placed on governmental resources. 
Current Situation and Issues 
Although the interim constitution of Nepal 2007 has not made any direct reference to 
education financing, it mentions basic education as a fundamental right of all citizens and also 
emphasizes that every citizen shall have the right to a free education from the State up to 
secondary level. With the School Sector Reform Plan (SSRP) effective since 2009, the basic 
level of education has expanded to include grades 1 to 8. The plan lists the following 
requirements for education funding (EFSG, 2009): 
• The need for 85 percent of total education expenditure to be applied to comprehensive 
school education (0 – 12).  
• The suggestion that 4 percent of GDP and 20 percent of national expenditures be 
allocated to education. 
• The need for 76 percent of the total education expenditure to be applied to basic 
education. 
• The need for 37 percent of the cost of the SSRP to be met by donors. 
 
Nepal is moving from a unitary system to federal structure of government. In this connection, 
the service delivery approaches and modalities including education service delivery are expected 
to be reshaped corresponding to functional structure of federalism. To facilitate the discussion on 
how education should be managed and financed in a federal state, the Education and Federalism 
Support Group (EFSG) was formed with the help of UNESCO Kathmandu. Some of the major 
recommendations made by EFSG (2009) are as follows: 





• The funding of school and vocational education should be the responsibility of the 
provincial governments, and the funding of higher education needs to be the 
responsibility of the federal government.  
• Teachers should be recruited by local authorities but paid by provincial governments. 
• The federal government should fund textbooks, provide assistance to poor families, 
programs targeting increased participation and research and development. 
• With regard to revenue, provincial governments should determine education taxes. 
• Regulation of private schools should be the responsibility of provincial governments. 
• Donor coordination should be the responsibility of the federal government but should 
respond to the needs of provinces as expressed in related project plans.  
  
Public and Private Schools in Nepal 
 
In Nepal, schools that are financed, managed and regulated by government are defined as 
government or public schools, whereas schools that are financed, managed and regulated by 
parents’ association, business, non-profit organization or a religious institution are defined as 
private schools.  The Ministry of Education of Nepal  categorizes public schools into two types: 
i) Aided community (public) schools, which receive regular government grant for teacher’s 
salary and for other administrative purposes; ii) Unaided community (public) schools, which do 
not receive a regular government grants, but are financed with support from community, 
donations from other sources and school’s own resources. Private schools are defined as 
institutional schools that do not receive regular government grants. This dissertation includes 





both aided and unaided community (public schools) schools under one broad category of public 
schools.  
Public schools are commonly associated with low achievement, poor infrastructure and 
facilities, low quality teachers and weak management and regulation. Studies have shown that in 
terms of students’ cognitive development, public schools in Nepal have struggled to add value 
(Caddell, 2006; Carney, 2003). Government plans for education have continuously failed in spite 
of extensive educational intervention. The schools suffer from inadequate access, low 
participation, low retention of students (at all levels), and low levels of educational quality. 
Moreover, inequalities in various regions and social groups are increasing. The school systems 
have limited managerial capacity and inadequate institutional support and financing. Apart from 
poor teacher quality, political interference in teacher appointments and transfers have contributed 
towards the low morale and disenchantment found in the public education system (Carney, 
2003).  
Private schools in Nepal vary in terms of size, mission and influence. However one can 
find a number of common factors in such schools. Unlike private schools in the U.S., which are 
non-profit schools, private schools in Nepal (as in many developing countries) are for-profit 
schools. Apart from profit, these schools cater towards higher levels of academic achievement 
preparing for national examinations. In spite of the Education Act, which requires the Nepali 
language as the medium of instruction, these private schools use English as the primary language 
of instruction.  Most private schools adopt autocratic management systems where community 
stakeholders are kept away from discussions about how their children’s education relates to 
broader national educational goals (Carney, 2003). Private schools in Nepal, especially those in 





the Kathmandu valley, charge the fees they desire for their educational services. There does not 
seem to be any strict regulation on fees charged by these private schools in the country.  
Besides the ownership distinction, private and public schools in Nepal also vary in 
several other ways. The first is on how much resources are available and how are they employed 
in these schools. For example, an analysis of average cost per student between community school 
and institutional school based on a study of 17 schools of all five regions of the country by 
Santwona Memorial Academy Educational Research Center (SMAERC, 2008) shows that there 
is a significant gap in the cost structure between public and the private schools. Their report 
points out that on average an institutional school spends 215.3 percent higher than community 
school. According to the study, the average cost per student in public school is Rs.4, 675 while it 
is Rs.14, 739 in private school. This indicates that private schools spend much more on students' 
education besides other expenditures made on infrastructure and physical facilities as compared 
to public schools. The study argues that private schools have managed such facilities better than 
those of public schools. 
 The second feature that clearly distinguishes public schools from private schools in Nepal 
is the quality of teachers and teaching facilities used in schools. In the public school system, 
although School Teacher Record Office (STRO) is responsible for keeping the record of public 
school teachers, the monitoring and supervision of teachers is evidenced to be very poor. As a 
result, teacher absenteeism is a serious concern in public schools. In terms of teaching facilities, 
although most of the public schools seem to have their own buildings and premises they are left 
behind in terms of use of modern teaching equipment such as use of science laboratories and 
computers as compared to private schools (Bhatta, 2005; SMAERC, 2008).  





The third feature relates to the monetary and non-monetary parental contribution and 
involvement in school matters. In terms of monetary contributions, parental contributions are 
higher in private schools as they have to incur tuition fees in addition to all the other costs such 
as costs relating to books, school dress, stationeries and hostel fees where applicable. When it 
comes to non-monetary contributions, parents whose children go to private schools are usually 
more active in school matters. The private schools have do conduct parent-teacher meetings 
frequently, whereas such meetings hardly exist in case of public schools. Parents, in the case of 
private schools are more involved not only in terms of their child’s grade, but also in terms of 
their performance in class and participation in extra curricular activities.  
The fourth feature that distinguishes public and private schools are student’s 
demographic characteristics. Students in private schools are usually from richer and medium 
class family, and belong to the higher caste. Students in public schools are mostly from medium 
class or poor families. The majority of the students from the lower class and disadvantaged 
families go to public schools. In this way, when it comes to the learning aspect, the impact of 
positive peer effects is greater in the case of private schools than public schools. 
Apart from the above mentioned features, there are various immeasurable factors that 
place students from private schools in a more advantageous position than students from public 
schools in terms of educational outcomes. Some of them are as follows.  
School Management and Climate: Private schools are competitive in nature and hence school 
management is much orderly and organized. In contrast, studies show that many public schools 
are not properly managed. For example, although public schools are endowed with bigger pieces 
of land and buildings in many cases, the lack of use and wastage of resources is rampant in 
public school (SMAERC, 2008). In private schools, the school runs on its specified schedules 





and the various departments of the school usually have a teacher or person in charge that is 
responsible for ensuring the smooth functioning of the departmental activities. The teachers and 
the students follow the rules, and hence there is a proper learning environment in the schools. 
But, in most of the public schools, as teachers themselves fail to set good examples in following 
the rules and school schedules, students overlook the set rules and regulations of the school. As a 
result, the school climate is not very encouraging in public schools. Also, the grade promotion 
system in private schools is more stringent, whereas it is rather liberal in case of public schools 
(Bhatta, 2005). As a result, many weaker students in public schools do not make extra effort to 
improve their academic performance. Likewise, in terms of homework completion for students 
and course completion for students, private school management is far better as compared to 
relaxed public school management. 
Motivation and team work: Teacher salaries in public schools are based on the type of academic 
degree the teachers hold, and not on their performance. As a result, in most of the cases, teachers 
lack motivation and team-spirit to work for the betterment of the school and the students. This is 
reciprocated to the students as well, and they too lack motivation and the zeal for achieving 
higher grades. But, in the case of private schools, schools compete to place themselves in top list 
of private schools in their locality. Although private school teachers are found to be less well off 
in terms of salary and fringe benefits, the teachers still seem more connected and goal oriented. 
This could be because of better working conditions and prestige. Further, many private schools 
do pay their teachers based on their experience and performance. This creates a competitive 
market for private teachers. At the student level, the level of motivation is different in the two 
school types. As private schools use English as medium of instruction and promise parents an 





education equivalent to international standards, the goals and aspirations of private school 
students are much higher as compared to the students from public school (Caddell, 2007). 
Home and community environment: Home and community environment are another important 
factors that affect student’s academic outcome but are not necessarily measured. For example, 
private school students come from families with better socioeconomic backgrounds as compared 
to public school students. Families with better socioeconomic backgrounds have more educated 
family members, and have a lot of learning opportunities in their social life too. Likewise, 
community environment matters too. A peaceful community and a community with better 
facilities that has more schools, more libraries, more coaching centers and more educated 
neighbors definitely adds a great deal of value in student’s learning. Students who go to private 
schools seem to be exposed to these positive externalities more than students from public 
schools.  
Political influence: Finally, the incidence of political interference is another distinguishing 
feature between private and public schools in Nepal. Public schools teachers as well as students 
are more involved in politics than teachers and students from private schools. During the Maoist 
insurgency from 1996 to 2005, both types of schools were affected in different ways. However, 
public schools were directly affected to the extent that in some places the whole infrastructure of 
the schools was destroyed during the ‘people’s war’ and school principals and teachers were 
badly harassed (see Caddell, 2006; 2007).  
 These unobservables make a lot of difference and hence need to be noted while 
estimating and comparing educational outcomes of public and private school students. The 
findings, as a result of these unmeasured factors are likely to be biased in favor of private school 
students. Hence, there should be appropriate mechanisms to account for these biases. Though 





this problem is very tricky and cannot always be accounted for fully, this study makes some 
attempts to account for these factors. This is discussed in more detail in the data description 
section of Chapter 3 and methodology section of Chapter 4 of this dissertation.  
 
Private Schools: Evolution and Current Issues 
In the post 1990 period, private schooling expanded at a dramatic pace, both in terms of 
numbers and in relation to the student base it was directed at. The public took it as an opening to 
a whole new world of educational opportunities. There were many important changes happening 
in the country during this phase in the education sector. For example, most of the private schools 
started to adopt the English-medium as the mode of instruction in their schools. This not only 
made student and teachers involved in private schools feel connected and exposed to the world 
outside, but also contributed to the differentiation among the private schools themselves. Another 
striking feature of private schools as observed by many researchers was that the regulation of the 
market was missing and there was lack of controls on both the number of schools established and 
the quality of the facilities and tuition they provide (Caddell, 2007; Carney & Bista, 2009). Since 
then, there have also been many attempts to integrate private school registration into wider 
educational planning processes. Unfortunately, this has not been successful so far  
Over the last decade, especially during the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, the issue of 
relations between the state and private schools has been one of the serious political concerns at 
the national level. As the Maoists place more political pressure for tighter controls in education 
sector, private school associations were forced to sit in on discussions with the government, the 
public and directly with the Maoists. This persuaded private schools to remodel their mode of 
operation, the teaching curriculum and fees they charged. For example, after the indefinite strike 





of 2002 was called off, from the PABSON side, a fee structure for private schools was 
developed, with schools differentiated in terms of the facilities they provided and were graded A-
D accordingly. The private schools were also demanded by Maoists to cut their fees by between 
10 and 25 percent (Caddell, 2007). 
However, as years have rolled by with the Maoists entering the mainstream politics, 
things have not improved much. There has not been a reduction in the fees in the private schools. 
Moreover, to the frustration of the public, disruptions in schooling still continue. And, there has 
been no evident improvement in educational quality in the public schools. As Caddell (2007) 
puts it, the possibility of a meaningful partnership between the government and private sector 
still remains unresolved due to the difficulty of engaging with the tensions between the profit and 
service-oriented motivations for operating private schools in the country. Most of the educational 
researchers agree that these debates are masked by the vested interests of the private school 
organizations representing wealthier educational enterprises as opposed to service-oriented 
NGOs and charity institutions (see Caddell, 2007; Carney & Bista, 2009).  
Table 2.7 gives us the overall picture of SLC students who participated in the SLC exam 
of 2004.  Statistics on this year were especially chosen because the data analysis of this 
dissertation is based on the SLC exam of 2004. The table gives information on performance in 
SLC by school type and gender. Out of total students that appeared for the SLC exam in 2004, 
only 46.2 percent passed, with male and female passing rates of 40.6 and 50.2 percent 
respectively. The pass rate of private schools was 82.9 percent, where as it was only 36.4 percent 
for public schools. This clearly shows a huge difference in SLC performance between public and 
private schools, and between males and females. 





Table 2.7. Performance in SLC Exam -2004 by School-type and Gender 
 
 Total No of Students Female Male 
Tested 175418 73551 101867 
Pass 81008 29850 51158 
Pass (%) 46.2 40.6 50.2 
Public Total Female Male 
Tested 138636 58821 79815 
Pass 50511 18106 32405 
Pass (%) 36.4 30.8 40.6 
Private Total Female Male 
Tested 36782 14730 22052 
Pass 30497 11744 18753 
Pass (%) 82.9 79.7 85.0 





The teacher market in Nepal, like in most of the developing countries of South Asia, is 
different from that which prevails in developed countries. Teaching is not considered a preferred 
occupation, both in terms of economic benefit as well as social prestige. Unlike the situation in 
developed countries (for example, in the U.S), the state does not require teachers to take 
certification exams to enter the teaching profession. The teachers in the public schools are 
appointed by the government merely based on the candidate’s educational degree. With regards 
to teachers in the private sector, their appointment is made without any influence of state 
regulation. As shown in Table 2.8, the percentage of untrained teachers in private schools is 
much higher than in public schools, especially at the primary and the secondary levels. For 
example, in 2009, the percentage of untrained teachers at the secondary level in public schools 
was 4.2 whereas it is 20.1 in the private schools (MOE, 2010). There is a very limited union 





representation of private school teachers, and their positions are not stable due to short term 
contracts.  In most of the cases, private school teachers are paid more than public school 
teachers. However, in terms of benefits like pensions and job stability, in some cases, public 
school teachers are considered better-off.  In other words, compared to other qualifications, these 
private school teachers would have earned more in other professions than in the teaching 
profession. But, since there is a lack of demand for these educated people in other sectors due to 
low infrastructural development in Nepal, they don’t have any other option but to teach even 
though they are paid less in relation to their higher qualifications.  In addition, there is a high 
level of political interference in the public sector, and hence many teachers join private schools. 
Moreover, as private schools have better working conditions and are more prestigious than 
public schools, many teachers like to join private schools compared to public schools even when 
the pay is lower. As a result of a high inflow of teachers and lower student enrollments in the 
private schools, the student-teacher ratio is much lower in private schools as compared to public 
schools. Table 2.8 also shows the student-teacher ratio by school type. Here we can see that at all 
levels of education; the student-teacher ratio is higher in public schools than in the private 
schools.   
 
School Leaving Certificate (SLC) Examination 
 
The School Leaving Certificate (SLC) examination is the most important school-level 
exam in Nepal and is administered and controlled every year by the Controller of Examinations 
Division of the Ministry of Education, Nepal. This exam is equivalent to a 10th grade final exam 
and is mandatory for all the students in the country who wish to continue their higher education 





(10+2 and college). The examination consists of six mandatory subjects (English, Nepali, 
Compulsory Math and Science, Social Studies, and Health & Population Studies) and two 
elective subjects which are chosen by schools. The total score for each of these subjects is 100 
while the passing score is 32. A student has to pass in all of these eight subjects to be considered 
having ‘passed’ the SLC examination.  This exam is evaluated on a percentage basis11. Students 
who score less than 45 percent are given a ‘third division’ rating, students with a score in the 
range of 45 to 60 percentages are given a ‘second division’ rating, students with scores in the 
range of 60 to 79 percentages are given a ‘first division’ rating, and finally students with scores 
that are 80 percent and above are given a ‘distinction’ rating.   
Besides acting as a gateway for higher education, for many people this examination is 
also important as a credential for entering the labor market. Therefore, the performance of 
students in the SLC examination has been a matter of great concern to both students and parents 
alike. In addition, the SLC examination is also viewed as an indicator of school quality by both 
the general public and the government (Bhatta, 2005). As a result, these exams have also been 
influencing the pedagogical approaches and course contents in schools in the country (Singh, 
2004). For example, the questions that appear in the SLC test papers tend to guide much of the 
teaching and classroom practices in many secondary schools. The government also views this 
exam with utmost importance. Since formal public examinations are aimed at evaluating not just 
individual achievement but also the performance of individual schools and the school system as a 
whole, the SLC exams are viewed as the primary measure of success of the government’s 
educational reform efforts (DANIDA, 2003). As a result, education researchers and policy 
                                                 
11 There is no ‘grade system’ in the SLC examination yet. The grade system is used only in higher secondary and 
college level, mostly by the private institutions. 





makers who are concerned with school reform believe that improving the system of SLC 
examinations is a critical step in upgrading the quality of education in Nepal.  
Table 2.9 presents the number of students who were tested and the percentage who 
passed the SLC exam from 1990 to 2009. The table shows that the number of students appearing 
for the SLC exam has been increasing over the years. The unusually large number of SLC 
candidates in 2000 was due to decision of Office of Controller of Examinations (OCE) to allow 
all exempted students to participate as regular students during that year. This provision was made 
to facilitate the transition of the SLC curriculum and grading system from the then-exiting 900 
and 700 point systems to the current 800 point system (Bhatta, 2004). In terms of student 
performance, as seen in figure 2.3, the national trend in SLC student performance has been quite 
discouraging over the years. The data reveals that although the proportion of students passing the 
SLC exams has been fluctuating, it is limited to about 30 -40 percent for most of the years from 
1990 to 2009. The drop in pass rate of 2001 could be due to the result of the change of SLC 
format in the year 2000. Other fluctuations could also be attributed by frequent interventions in 
the education sector due to the Maoist war with the then government of Nepal. After 2006, there 
has been a little improvement with the pass percentage rising above fifty. This could be more 
likely due to the end of Maoist guerilla war in 2005. Table, 2.10 gives more detailed information 
on more recent year (for SLC year 2009). In 2009, 427,051 students sat for the SLC exam and 
64.3 percent passed in the regular type. The rate of passing the exam for males and females were 
67.6 and 64.6 percent, respectively. The drop out rate was 1.2 percent, with male and female 
drop out rates of 1.1 and 1.3 percent respectively. The table also shows that 0.7 percent of the 
results were withheld and 0.1 percent cancelled (MOE, 2010). The drop out rates has been below 
2 percent over the years.  





Although the drop out rates are not very high in the Nepalese case, high failure rates on 
the SLC exams and disparities in performance across school type are a matter of serious concern. 
Around 40 percent of the students still fail the SLC exam. This matter is discussed widely in the 
Nepali news media and other public forums, especially before and after the SLC exam every 
year. The major criticisms of the SLC exam in such forums as pointed by some research studies 
are related to: i) lack of technical quality; ii) the administration of the exams under varying 
conditions in different exam centers and in different parts of the country, and iii) systematic 
grading of the SLC exam (see CERID, 1996; Baily,1998; Bhatta, 2005). According to these 
studies, as a result of lack of properly trained test developers, the SLC exam test questions are 
weak in terms of reliability and validity. Further, the studies point out that one of the major 
factors influencing the SLC results of students is the exam grading process. Many of the 
examiners are not well trained in grading the exam, and the institutional mechanisms for assuring 
the quality of grading are not well developed. As a result, the SLC grading is not always fair and 
reliable (CERID, 1996; Bailey, 1998). 
However, from a researcher’s point of view, the SLC exam is very crucial as it gives a 
general picture of student performance at the school level. Moreover, the SLC exam is the only 
national level exam at the school level. This study capitalizes on this fact and analyzes the SLC 













Table 2.1. Basic Statistics of Nepal and South Asia 
 
 Nepal South Asia 





Population (in million) 27.5 1567.7 
Population gr. (annual %) 2.25 1.5 
Economic Indicator 
GDP per capita (in US dollars) 473 3000 
GDP gr. (annual %) 4.7 7.7 
%  share of GDP in education 3.8 2.9 
Population below poverty line (%) 55.1 40.9 
Gini Index of Income Inequality 47.3 39.3 
Human Development Statistics 
Literacy Rate (15 + years) 55.6 61.0 
Male 70.7 72.5 
Female 43.3 49.5 
Life Expectancy at Birth 64.1 64.1 
Human Development Index 0.428  
Source: CBS (2010); UNDP (2010); World Bank (2010) 
Notes: (1) GDP per capita is in US $ constant prices in 2000; (2) poverty rate is given by $1.25 a day (PPP) (% of 
population). 
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Table 2.2. Total Schools by School-Type, Level and Development Region 
 
  Public Private   
P LS S HS P LS S HS Dev. Region 
(1-5) (6-8) (9-10) (11-12) 
Public 




Eastern 5840 1801 994 348 8983 782 395 300 125 1602 10585 
Central 7247 2307 1343 517 11414 2086 1495 1203 399 5183 16597 
KV 638 378 255 85 1356 1438 1129 915 280 3762 5118 
Western 6248 1868 1136 456 9708 1027 620 456 148 2251 11959 
Mid Western 4489 1317 653 220 6679 423 239 161 39 862 7541 
Far Western 3204 1156 589 226 5175 309 143 93 34 579 5754 
Total 27928 8449 4715 1767 42859 4627 2893 2213 745 10478 53337 
Source: MOE (2010) 

















Table 2.3. Percentage of Public and Private School’s Enrollment in Total Enrollment by Level and Development Region 
 
  Public Private 
P LS S HS P LS S HS Dev. Region 
(1-5) (6-8) (9-10) (11-12) (1-5) (6-8) (9-10) (11-12) 
Eastern 90.3 91 89.2 89.6 9.7 9 10.8 10.4 
Central 81.4 75.1 71.9 75.1 18.6 24.9 28.1 24.9 
KV 30.1 36 36.6 47.3 69.9 64 63.4 52.7 
Western 82.7 83.3 82.4 75.6 17.3 16.7 17.6 24.4 
Mid Western 92.6 93.4 92.4 92.3 7.4 6.6 7.6 7.7 
Far Western 95 95 94.1 96.7 5 4.8 5.9 3 
Total 86.8 85.2 83.1 82.6 13.2 14.8 16.9 17.4 
Source: MOE (2010) 



















Table 2.8. Percentage Trained Teachers and Student-Teacher Ratio in Public and Private Schools 
 
Training Status Primary Lower Secondary Secondary 
Public Schools 
  F M Total F M Total F M Total 
Trained 82.5 77.1 79 68 56.2 58.3 84.2 84.9 84.8 
Partial 10.9 13.7 12.7 13.6 18.7 17.8 10.4 11 10.9 
Untrained 6.7 9.2 8.3 18.4 25.1 23.9 5.4 4.1 4.2 
Student- teacher 
ratio 
  36.5   48.9   36.1 
Private Schools 
  F M Total F M Total F M Total 
Trained 53 62.1 57 68 56.2 58.3 74 70.2 71.1 
Partial 15 19.9 17.2 13.6 18.7 17.8 10.3 8.3 8.8 
Untrained 32 18 25.8 18.4 25.1 23.9 15.7 21.5 20.1 
Student- teacher 
ratio 
  17.4   19.3   12.3 
Source: MOE (2010).  
Notes: F and M represent female and male respectively.  
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Table.2.9. Comparative Regular SLC Result (1990 -2009)  
 
Year Appeared % pass 
1990 64166 44.13 
1991 100382 48.47 
1992 94534 24.56 
1993 77455 31.49 
1994 79420 31.30 
1995 79588 42.97 
1996 90458 38.30 
1997 116002 36.52 
1998 113257 47.54 
1999 139202 49.20 
2000 205539 45.72 
2001 132210 31.62 
2002 152334 31.22 
2003 170389 32.05 
2004 175418 46.18 
2005 294216 46.50 
2006 347185 58.60 
2007 367041 63.70 
2008 388522 68.50 
2009 427051 64.30 





















Total 385146 64.3 1.2 0.7 0.1 
Female 179856 60.6 1.1 0.6 0 
Male 205281 67.6 1.3 0.8 0.1 
Source: MOE (2010) 
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Figure 2.1. Map of Nepal 
 
 
Source : http://www.un.org.np/reports/maps/npcgis/NatBio00004.jpg 
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 Figure 2.3. Comparative SLC Result: 1990 – 2009 
 






































































As discussed in the introductory chapter, this dissertation seeks to answer two main 
research questions:  
• Do private school students perform better than their public school counterparts after 
controlling for student, family, school and teacher characteristics? 
• Keeping other things constant, does private school competition have any impact on 
public school performance in the case of Nepal?  
The first research question is dealt with in chapter 4 and the second one is dealt with in 
chapter 5. As the data analyses in both chapters 4 and 5 use the same data sets, this chapter is 
devoted to a description of this common data set. This chapter will thus specifically include 
sections on the missing data problem and the fixing strategy, discussion on the exploratory data 
analysis, and a discussion about the study variables plus a detailed summary statistics of the 
variables used in this study. The models and the related identification problems and strategies are 
discussed in more detail in the next two chapters in accordance with the key research questions 
mentioned above. However, to provide a satisfactory context for discussing data for this chapter, 
a brief introduction to the hypothesis, models and the strategies involved in the data analyses is 
presented below.  
Chapter 4 uses the theory of the educational production function in estimating the effect 
of school type on student’s SLC performance. The approach to this section is to test the 
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hypothesis that a student from a private school performs better on the SLC examination than a 
student from a public school, holding other things constant. Symbolically, the model postulates 
that the performance of a student i, in school j is given by the following reduced form 
expression: 
 
(3.1) Yij =  ∞0   + ∞1 S(i)j + ∞ 2X'ij + µij  
 
where Yij is the aggregate SLC Test Score
12 of student i in school j, S(i)j is the key independent 
variable of interest that represents school type13 (which is a dummy variable, private if it takes 
value 1, and 0 if public), Xij is a vector of control variables representing student, family, school 
and teacher characteristics as well as exam context variables, and  µij is a random disturbance 
with a mean zero and constant variance. The dependent variable in this case is the aggregate SLC 
score of student, which is a continuous variable. The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
method is used to estimate equation 3.1. 
Chapter 4 also involves the application of the probit model of the SLC exam. In equation 
3.1, when the dependent variable is changed to a categorical variable equal to one if the student 
passed the SLC exam and zero otherwise, the model can be stated as: 
 
(3.2) Y*ij =  β0+ β1 S(i)j + β2X'ij + ʋij 
 
                                                 
12 Note that generally the SLC Score is comprised of 8 subjects- 6 compulsory (Math, Science, English, Nepali, 
Social Studies, Health & Population studies) and 2 optional subjects. But, this dissertation uses only 6 compulsory 
subjects. However, I do report results using the aggregate score to compare the data across the models. The score is 
converted to the scale of 100. 




where Y*ij is the SLC test outcome of student i in school j, and  ʋij is a random disturbance with 
a mean of zero and a constant variance. Since the SLC test outcome variable in this case is a 
categorical variable, a probit model is used, where a set of explanatory variables, including 
school type, is postulated to affect the probability that a student passes the SLC exam, as follows: 
 
(3.3) Pr (Y*ij = 1| S(i)j , Xij)  = Ф (β0+ β1 S(i)j + β2X'ij + ʋij) 
 
where Ф is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
There is a potential selection-bias problem in this estimation method as private school 
students are not same as the public school students. This study thus adopts the propensity score 
matching method (nearest neighbor matching) to address this concern. In addition to these 
empirical models for analyzing private versus public performance, chapter 4 also includes two 
supporting probit models: one regarding the language medium of the SLC exam, and the second 
on private tutoring. Both of these models are similar to the probit model concerning the SLC 
result in terms of the variable of interest (which is school type) and the covariates controlled for 
(student, family, school and teacher characteristics). 
The approach in chapter 5 is to test the hypothesis that a student of a public school that 
faces private school competition performs better on the SLC examination than a student from a 
public school that does not face private school competition, holding other things constant. 
Symbolically, the model postulates that the performance of a student i, in public school p is 
given by the following reduced form expression: 
 




where Yip is the SLC Test Score
14 of student i in public school p, C(i)p represents private school 
competition15, given by the number of private schools in the neighborhood of public school p, 
Xip  is a vector of control variables representing student, family, school, teacher, and community 
characteristics, and exam context variables, and  ηip is a random disturbance with a mean of zero 
and a constant variance.  The dependent variable in this case is the SLC score of public school 
students, which is a continuous variable. The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression method 
is used to estimate equation 3.3. This estimation is likely to suffer from the endogeneity problem 
as private school enrollment is correlated with public school performance. As a way to tackle this 
problem, this study uses the instrumental variable approach. That is, the presence of a motorable 
road within an hour’s walking distance from the sample school is used as an instrument for the 
number of private schools in the vicinity of the sample school.  A binary measure of private 
school competition is also constructed and applied to both the OLS and IV methods. 
This data set, which is cross-sectional, is one of the first comprehensive data sets 
collected so far in Nepal in the education sector. This dissertation makes use of this rich data 
source on the SLC exam. The data set contains information on the student’s SLC performance as 
well as on student, school and teacher characteristics, which are crucial for the types of analyses 
mentioned above. In addition, it also has information on exam and community context variables, 
which is essential for the analysis in chapter 5. Therefore, this data set fits well with the data 
needed to carry out the empirical analyses described in this dissertation to address the study 
questions. 
                                                 
14 Note that the SLC Score is computed only for compulsory subjects (Math, Science, English, Nepali, Social 
Studies and Health & Population studies), and is converted to a scale of 100 (total score =100). 
15 The subscript i within the parenthesis denotes that although private school competition is a school level variable, it 




Data Source and Sampling Strategy 
 
The data for this study comes from a nationwide survey of 452 schools and 22,500 
students from the School Leaving Certificate (SLC) batches of 2002, 2003, and 2004. This 
survey was conducted by the SLC study team sponsored by the Ministry of Education and Sports 
of Nepal. The survey includes 5,625 families, 452 head teachers, and 2500 teachers, with  
information on each student’s SLC performance and the student’s personal, school, and family 
characteristics that could affect the student’s educational outcome. 
The following descriptions of sampling strategy and missing data information follows 
Bhatta (2005), which is a SLC study report prepared for the Ministry of Education, Nepal based 
on MOES (2005b) data. According to this study, a multi-stage, stratified random sampling 
approach was used to select a nationally representative sample of students from 28 districts 
representing all the eco-development regions of the country and Kathmandu Valley. This survey 
was divided into four components: i) Questionnaire design ii) Sample design iii) Field work and 
iv) Data entry and management. The sample size in this data set is adequately large. For 
example, the survey covered approximately 450 schools and 22,500 students which is around 10 
percent of the secondary schools in the country and 50 students (on average) from each of the 
sample schools. To improve the representativeness of the sample, SLC results from multiple 
years (2002, 2003 and 2004) were included in the sample. Fifty percent of the sample (11,250 
students) was from the SLC batch of 2004 and an other 50 percent was from SLC batches of 
2002 and 2003 batches. The stratification scheme was based on the results of an analysis of 
school-level SLC performance data that was provided by the Office of the Controller of 
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Examinations. The sampling frame consisted of 4709 schools that participated in the 2004 SLC 
exams. Since the performance and percentage of schools varied considerably across the 
ecological regions (mountains, hills and the plains), the distribution of the schools across the 
different ecological and development regions was also analyzed. This ensured a representation of 
a broad range of schools.  Before determining the number of schools that should be selected from 
each stratum, the sampling frame was modified by dropping schools that were deemed irrelevant 
from the perspective of the study’s focus.  A total of 240 schools (around 5 percent) of the 4709 
schools with 11,052 students were removed from the original sampling frame. 
   
Information on Missing data 
 
 This data set also suffers from problems as a result of non-observation, which could have 
occurred due to many factors that arose during the data collection process. For example, many 
schools in the sample could have been closed or inaccessible during the survey period because of 
strikes (bandhs) and travel restrictions imposed by the Maoists during that time. Similarly, the 
whereabouts of many recent SLC students could be unknown because they were either out of the 
country or were associated with the insurgency. Such students were also removed from the 
sampling frame. There are various methods of handling non-observations. For this data set, it 
was handled by the substitution method. In other words, non observation units were substituted 
with similar units. This was done by considering three categories: school type, SLC class size, 
and school location. However, in this method, one needs to be aware that if the substitution is not 
similar, then the sampling method will be biased.  
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A total of 240 schools– around 5 percent of 4,709 schools with 11,052 students16 were 
removed from the original sampling frame. Of the 240 schools, seven were located in Bhutanese 
refugee camps. They were dropped since schools in the refugee camps are not in the 
government’s list of policy priorities. Sixty nine of the schools in the original sampling frame 
were simply named “private”. These schools were also dropped out because the schools with this 
name actually referred to students taking the SLC exams “as private candidates” through the 
District Education Office. Finally, schools that had very large (over 200 students) or very small 
(less than 6 students) SLC classes were also dropped since their performance was 
unrepresentative of most schools in the sense that they either had very good or very poor SLC 
results. Altogether 17 very large and 147 very small schools were removed from the list bringing 
the new sampling frame size to 4469 schools. However, the modified sampling frame seems to 
be very similar to the original sampling frame in terms of the percentage of private schools, 
average SLC class size, and pass rate as shown in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1. Original and Modified Sampling Frames 
 








27.2 36.8 46.8 
Original Sampling 
Frame 
27.3 37.3 46.2 
Source: Bhatta (2005) 
 
 
Fixing missing data problem 
                                                 
16 This is around six percent of the total number of SLC students in the original sampling frame.  
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In this sample there are 19,916 observations. The rate of missing data for some variables 
turns out to be as high as 50 percent. This is a matter of great concern, as the quality of analysis 
also depends on the quality of data. As a result, I took several steps to tackle this problem. First, 
while choosing the variables for my analysis, I used only those variables whose rate of missing 
data is less than 25 percent. For example, variables such as student’s grade 9th score, expenditure 
per student, percentage of poor in the school and teacher training were some of the variables that 
had more than 25 percent missing values. Therefore, they were dropped from the study and 
proxy variables were used in place of them. For example, student’s expected division was chosen 
as proxy for student’s precious grade score and school having a science and computer lab was 
chosen as proxy for expenditure per student. Table 3.2 lists the variables used in this study that 
have missing values in the range of 5 to 25 percent.  
 
Table 3.2. Variables Between 5 to 25 Percent Missing Values 
 







SLC_AGG SLC Total Score (8 subjects) (Out of 100) 1073 5.4 19898 
SLC_PASS 1 if passed in SLC exam, 0 otherwise 2541 12.8 19924 
School Characteristics 
PRIVATE 1 if fully private, 0 if  public (partially or fully) 
including community managed schools 
986 5.0 19928 
PCT_GIRLS Percentage of girls in school in higher secondary 
grades. 
1237 6.2 19928 
Community Context 
NUM_PRIV Number of private schools in the vicinity of the 
sample school 
3406 17.1 19921 
HQRT 1 if school is located in the district  headquarter, 0 
otherwise 
1170 5.9 19928 
MO_ROAD 1 if there is a motorable road within 1 hr. walking 
distance from the sample school, 0 otherwise 





Next, I have used the multiple imputation method to address the missing data problem. 
Wherever multiple imputation was not applicable (for example in instrumental variable 
estimation), I used the regression imputation method to first impute the data and then performed 
the estimations. The idea of multiple imputation is that instead of filling in missing values to 
create a single imputed dataset, several imputed data sets are created each of which contains 
different imputed values. The analysis of a statistical model is then conducted on each of the 
imputed data sets. This is followed by combining the multiple analyses to yield a single set of 
results. One of the major advantages of the multiple imputation method over single imputation is 
that it produces standard errors that reflect the degree of uncertainty due to the imputation of 
missing values. Generally, multiple imputation techniques require that missing observations are 
missing at random (MAR). 
The literature suggests two major approaches to multiple imputation. The first one is 
based on the joint distribution of all the variables in the imputation model, including the 
variables to be imputed and the variables to be used only for the purposes of imputing other 
variables. In this approach, the joint distribution of all variables in the imputation model is 
assumed to be multivariate normal. The other approach is based on each conditional density of a 
variable given other variables (see Rubin, 1986, 1996). In this study, I have adopted the second 
method, termed Imputation by Chained Equations (ICE), by Patrick Royston (Royston, 2004). 
The major strengths of this approach are that there is no assumption of multivariate joint 
distribution, and that it is easy to understand. In addition, this approach allows different kinds of 
weights to be used if they are supported by regression models. Unlike the multivariate normal 
approach, it may have lower sample size requirements.  However, this method is not as 
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theoretically sound as the multivariate normal approach, and conditional densities can be 
incompatible (Allison, 2002). 
 
 
Exploratory Data Analysis 
 
 
We can no longer get along without confirmatory data analysis, but we need not start 
with it (Tukey, 1977). Taking this as an inspirational point to start, after making a choice of 
variables based on rate of missing data, this study performed an exploratory data analysis. This 
was done for three major reasons: to get to know the data, to ensure quality control for mistakes 
in data entry, and to access missing data. As part of this process, first, descriptive statistics were 
checked for all the chosen variables to obtain information on the means, medians, variances, 
ranges, skewness and kurtosis of the data set. In this process itself, values that were clearly in 
error, such as out-of-range values were evident. For example, some observations for SLC score 
had values higher than the total score. Such data were removed or replaced with meaningful 
values. The mean and the standard deviations of the variables used are presented in Table 3.4.   
Then, a test of normality was performed using histograms as well as box and whisker 
plots. The histograms were plotted for each of the chosen variables to assist in carrying out a 
graphical inspection of the data whether or not the data were measured on an interval scale. The 
box and whisker plots were used to detect any outliers in the data set. In addition, these were also 
helpful in indicating whether a distribution is skewed. The box plot figures and histograms of the 
variables chosen for this study are given in the appendix section of this dissertation. Finally, the 
Shapiro-Wilk test was performed to detect if there were any departures from normality in the 
dataset.  This test calculates a W-statistic that examines whether a random sample comes from a 
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normal distribution. Both the graphical method and Shapiro-Wilk test confirmed that the 





 The dependent variable examined in the OLS model of Chapter 4 is the SLC score of a 
student. More specifically, this student outcome variable (SLC_SCORE) is a continuous variable 
that includes the aggregate score of 8 subjects, which are Math, English, Science, Nepali, Social 
Studies, Health & Population studies and two optional subjects. For this chapter, except for the 
first model, all models use SLC score on only six compulsory subjects. Further, the 
SLC_SCORE variable is converted to a scale of 100 so that it can be interpreted in percentage 
point terms17. For the probit models, the dependent variable used is whether or not the student 
passed the SLC exam. The variable takes the value equal to one if the student passed the SLC 
exam, and zero otherwise. The passing score for each subject is 32 out of 100, and a student 
needs to pass all the subjects to be declared ‘passed’. In addition, the study postulates two more 
probit models: one for language medium of exam and the other, for private tutoring. The medium 
of the exam variable is coded as one if the SLC exam medium chosen was Nepali, and zero if it 
was chosen English or mixed18. Finally, private tutoring is also a dummy variable which is coded 
as one if student took private tutoring for the SLC exam and zero otherwise.  
 The key independent variable to be examined in chapter four is school type (if private). 
This is a categorical variable equal to one if the school is private and zero if it is public19. The 
observable controls in the econometric analysis are as follows. The first set of controls include 
                                                 
17 To convert a scale with total score 800 to a scale 100, a given student’s score is divided by 8. 
18 Very few students use ‘mixed’ medium. For this study, ‘mixed medium’ is regarded as ‘English’. 
19 As discussed in chapter two, note that the community managed schools are also included as public schools for this 
dissertation.   
  
61 
student’s characteristics, which are: age (AGE); gender (FEMALE, female=1); lower caste 
(L_CASTE, lower caste =1); ethnic groups (ETH_GRPS, ethnic groups =1); other castes 
(OTHERS, other caste =1); number of friends passing SLC exam (PEERS); expected division in 
SLC exam (EXP_DIV); student having taken private tutoring for SLC exam (P_TUTOR) and, 
number of schools days absent in the school year (SCH_ABS). The mean age of students who 
appear for the SLC exam appears to be 16. The older students represent those who either have a 
record of repeating the grades too often, or those who started their education very late (some 
even in the adult stage). Hence, one can expect that older the student, the lower is the SLC score. 
Similarly, in a country like Nepal, the girls are not given as much opportunity as the boys, 
especially in the rural areas. The girls are expected to take care of the household chores and look 
after young ones. Hence, as an underprivileged group, females are associated with lower 
performance on the SLC exam. Next, a review of the data on students belonging to a particular 
caste/ethnicity is important too. This data set has information on particular student’s 
caste/ethnicity, and for the sake of simplicity in the analysis, the caste/ethnicity is recoded into 
four categories: higher caste (H_CASTE, if caste=Brahmin, Chhetri or Newar)20, lower caste 
(L_CASTE, if caste=dalits), ethnic groups (ETH_GRPS, if caste belongs to any of the ethnic 
groups), and other caste (OTHERS, other remaining caste/groups). In Nepal, student belonging 
to the higher caste are considered well off, and students from the lower caste, ethnic groups and 
other caste are under privileged. The literature suggests that peer effect is another factor that has 
a substantial impact on student achievement (for example, see Ding & Lehrer, 2004; Schneeweis 
& Winter-Ebmer, 2007). In this dissertation, this aspect of peer-effects is captured by numbers of 
close friends who passed the SLC exam. Another important variable is whether or not the student 
                                                 
20 Traditionally only Brahmin and Chhetri belong to the higher caste. But, in the present Nepalese society, Newars 
are considered quite well off in terms of socio-economic status. Therefore, for this study, I have also grouped 
Newars in the higher caste.  
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took private tutoring for the SLC exam. Interestingly, both types of students, top performers and 
lowest performers seem to be more likely as groups to take private tutoring. In this context, the 
obvious argument is that a student gets to learn more if she takes private tutoring. However, the 
causality in this case is not so simple and needs to be supported by empirical evidence before one 
can reach any concrete conclusion. Finally, the variables EXP_DIV (student’s expected division 
in SLC exam) and SCH_ABS (number of school days absent in grade 10) are used as proxy for 
student’s ability and student’s motivation, respectively.  
 A second set of controls include the student’s family characteristics. This includes: 
family size (FAMSIZE); family’s annual total expenditure in log terms (LN_FAM_EXP), 
number of SLC graduates in the family (SLC_GRADS), language spoken at home (LANG, 
Nepali=1), distance to school from home in minutes (DIST_SCH), and whether or not family 
possessed a computer (COMPUTER, computer=1). The literature gives a great importance to 
family’s socioeconomic status in influencing a student’s educational outcome (see Coleman 
report, 1966; Hanushek, 1986, 1989). Generally, families with higher socioeconomic status have 
smaller family size, bigger family expenditure, higher number of SLC graduates in the family, 
speak Nepali at home and possess a computer at home. The annual family expenditure is given in 
Nepalese Rupees and includes both educational as well as non educational expenses. Although 
father’s education and mother’s education are more widely used as family controls, in this study 
it was deemed more meaningful to use the number of SLC graduates in the family as an indicator 
of the educational status of other members of the family have an influence in student’s 
performance. Given Nepal’s diverse cultural and linguistic society (with 92 identified 
languages), it is important to control for the language student’s family speaks at home. In 
general, the family that speaks Nepali has a better socioeconomic status as compared to families 
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that speak other indigenous languages. Finally, distance from home to school is an important 
variable to control for as this factor determines how much time student spends every day 
commuting to her school.  
The third set of control includes school and teacher characteristics. This set includes 
important variables such as: school size (S_SIZE), whether the school is has a library 
(LIBRARY, having library=1), whether the school has a science lab and a computer lab 
(SC_COMP_LAB, having science and computer lab =1), the number of school days taught in a 
given school year (SCH_DAYS), the student-teacher ratio (ST_RATIO), teacher qualifications 
(TCH_QA), teacher experience (TCH_EXP) and teacher experience squared (TCH_EXP_SQ). 
Due to economies of scale, bigger schools do have better resources, but they could also be less 
productive in terms of educational outcome. Hence, in addition to school size, I have also 
included a control on student-teacher ratio in secondary grades as classroom specific 
characteristics that are important in explaining student achievement (Goldhaber & Brewer, 
1977). Percent of girls in secondary grades is also included to account for gender composition in 
the classes. The data on per-student expenditure had too many missing observations, so it was 
excluded from the analysis.  Instead, variables: LIBRARY and SC_COMP_LAB representing 
school having a library and school having a science and computer lab respectively are used as a 
proxy for school resources Although there is controversy in the advanced countries about the 
significance of the contribution of school resources towards student achievement, there is almost 
no doubt about its influence in developing countries (see Heyneman & Loxley, 1983; Hanushek, 
1995; Fuller & Clark, 1994; Scheerns, 2004). The literature also suggests that the number of 
teaching hours matters for student’s achievement. In this study, this aspect is taken into account 
by using the number of school days the school was open during the given school year. Finally, 
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since teachers are the medium for passing knowledge to students, TCH_QA (teacher 
qualification) and TCH_EXP (teacher experience) are important variables to control for any 
analysis involving student performance (see Hanushek, 2010). I have included teacher 
experience squared as well to capture any non linear behavior of the teacher experience variable 
as some teachers seemed to have been teaching for a large number of years. 
 The fourth set of controls include exam context variables. The exam context variables are 
the language medium for the SLC examination (EX_MED, Nepali=1); if student personally 
prepared food during exam (FOOD_SELF, food by self=1); whether or not the student was sick 
during the SLC exam (SICK, sick=1); whether the SLC exam was year 2002 (SLC02, SLC year 
2002=1) and whether the SLC exam year was 2003 (SLC03, SLC year 2003=1). In most of the 
public schools, the medium of instruction is Nepali. This is the reason why low performing 
students, especially students from lower caste and public schools, are more likely to use Nepali 
as the language medium for the SLC exam. The medium of instruction is not included in the 
analysis due to the high correlation of this variable with the medium of exam. The variables 
representing FOOD_SELF (student personally preparing food during exam) also serves as a 
proxy of family status and family support the student was getting during the exam period.  The 
SLC exam is taken very seriously so that many students fall sick during the SLC exam. Hence, 
controlling for whether or not the student is sick during the exam is important in order to capture 
these effects in the educational production function analysis. Finally, given the number of 
political changes that occurred in the past decade due to Maoist insurgency, it is useful to include 
the information on the year of SLC exam. As described earlier in this section, the data comprises 
50 percent observations from year 2004 and 25 percent of the observations from years 2002 and 
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2003. Hence, I created dummy variables for the year 2002 and 2003 to account for any such 
changes at the national level during those years as related to the SLC exam.   
 In chapter 5, the dependent variable used is the SLC score of only public school student 
(PUB_SCORE). This outcome variable, as before, comprises only the compulsory subjects and 
is converted in the scale of 100. In addition, chapter 5 also makes use of community context 
variables that includes information on the number of private schools in the neighborhood of the 
school (PRIV_NUM). This variable is the main variable of interest in chapter 5, and is included 
to serve as the measure of private school competition for this dissertation. The instrument 
variable used is the presence of a motorable road within an hour’s walking distance from the 
school given by (MO_ROAD, motorable road=1). The idea behind choosing this variable and the 
validity of this variable will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5. Another community context 
variable is the information whether the school is located in the district headquarter (HQRT, 




Table 3.3 presents the summary statistics of SLC performance by gender and school type. As 
seen in the table, the mean SLC score for the overall students is 47.89 out of 100. In the sample, 
78.57 percent belong to the public schools and 21.43 to private schools. The average score for 
the private and public school students are 60.97 and 44.34 respectively. The overall pass rate for 
students is 51.13 percent, while the pass rate for private and public school students are 87.20 
percent and 45.12 percent, respectively. The difference in the mean score between private and 
public school students is 16.63, and the difference in the pass rate is 42.08 percent. In terms of 
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gender composition, the sample consists of 55.23 percent of male students and 44.77 percent of 
female students. The mean SLC score (aggregate) of male and female students are 49.23 and 
46.26 respectively. By gender, the difference in mean score is 2.97 and the difference in the pass 
percentage is 9.68.  
 
Table 3.3. Mean score and pass rates in SLC by School-Type and Gender 
 






Total 100 47.9 12.44 51.13 
Public 78.57 44.34 9.9 45.12 
Private 21.43 60.97 2.08 87.2 
Difference (Private – Public) -57.14 16.63 -7.82 42.08 
Female 44.77 46.26 11.93 48.72 
Male 55.23 49.23 12.69 58.4 
Difference (Male – Female) 10.46 2.97 0.76 9.68 
Source: Author’s calculation using MOES (2005b) data.  
 
 
In addition to the above description, Table 3.4 reports the overall summary statistics for all 
the variables used in this study. On variables representing student characteristics, on average, 45 
percent of the students in the sample are female; the mean age of students appearing in SLC 
exam is 16.6 years; 66 percent belong to the higher caste (Brahmin, Chhetri or Newar), 17 
percent belong to the ethnic groups (Janjatis), two percent belong to the lower caste (Dalits) and 
14 percent belong to the other castes. The mean number of close friends who passed SLC exam 
is three; an average student expected achieving the 2nd division on the SLC exam; on average, 68 
percent of the students took private tutoring for SLC exam, and the average number of school 
days that a student remained absent in grade 10 is six.  
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As regards family related variables, the mean family size is six; the mean annual family 
expenses is N.Rs 65,138.4521; the mean number of SLC graduates in the family is two; on 
average, 75 percent of the families spoke Nepali at home; the average distance from home to 
school is 12.19 minutes and, on average, only 6.87 percent of the families posses a computer in 
their homes.  
Descriptive statistics on school and teacher related variables show that the average school 
size is 840; on average 68.6 percent of the schools have at least a library and 24.8 percent have at 
least a science and a computer lab; the average student-teacher ratio is 30.58, the average school 
days conducted in a school year is 185 days; on average, 44.7 percent of students are girls in the 
higher secondary grades; an average teacher holds a bachelor’s degree and the mean teacher 
experience is 14.65 years.  
Regarding the exam context, on average, 68 percent of the students in the sample used Nepali 
as the medium of the SLC exam, 21 percent of the students had to prepare food during the SLC 
exam and 14.65 percent were sick during exam. The average percentage of students who took the 
exam in 2002 and 2003 was 19 and 25 respectively.  
Finally, on a community context variable, the average number of private schools in the 
neighborhood of a public school under study is four. Around 74 percent of the schools, on 
average, have a motorable road to an hour’s walking distance from the school, and on average, 
26.83 percent of the schools are located in the district headquarters.  
 
Correlations 
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 report the correlations between the outcome and independent variables 
used for chapter 4 and chapter 5 respectively. The table reports only those variables which have 
                                                 
21 The exchange rate for 1US$ (for example in April 16, 2011) is equivalent to N.Rs 70.92. 
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correlation coefficient of 0.4 or higher. As seen in Table 3.5, the correlations show that for the 
variable of students being from a public school there is a negative correlation of this variable 
with the SLC score both in is aggregate form and for compulsory subjects. Also, it is interesting 
to note that students who are from public schools show a weak negative correction of this 
variable with the status of passing the SLC exam.  
The correlations presented in Table 3.6 are important given the nature of analysis in Chapter 
5. As seen in the table, there is no correlation between the outcome variable (SLC_PUB) and the 
variable representing motorable road from an hour’s walking distance from the sample school 
(MO_ROAD). Also, this variable is correlated, though weakly, with the variable representing 
private school competition (NUM_PRIV). This information will be recalled while checking the 
assumptions of the instrument variable in chapter 5.   
In summary, the data used for this study is very appropriate. However, there are few 
limitations of the data. First, there are missing observations. Although the missing values are 
tackled by using regression and multiple regression methods, the limitations of data imputations 
cannot be ruled out. This is a cross-sectional data and hence it limits us from estimating value 
added of student performance over time. Given the strengths and drawbacks of the data set, the 
next two chapters use this data set and perform analyses on private and private school 












Table 3.4 Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Description of Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev 
Dependent Variable 
SLC_AGG SLC Total Score (8 subjects)(Out of 100) 19898 47.88 12.44 
SLC_COMP SLC Score for only 6 compulsory subjects (Out of 
100) 
19897 46.9 12.6 
SLC_PASS 1 if passed in SLC exam, 0 otherwise 19924 0.54 0.5 
SLC_PUB SLC Score of public school students (only 
compulsory subjects; out of 100) 
15643 43.25 10.16 
Student Characteristics 
AGE Age when student took the most recent SLC exam 19900 16.59 1.06 
FEMALE 1 if female, 0 otherwise 19901 0.45 0.5 
H_CASTE 1 if Brahmin, Chettri or Newar, 0 otherwise    
L_CASTE 1 if lower caste (dalits), 0 otherwise 19901 0.02 0.15 
ETH_GRPS 1 if ethnic groups (indigenous), 0 otherwise 19901 0.17 0.38 
OTHERS 1 if other caste, 0 otherwise 19901 0.14 0.34 
PEERS Among student’s five closest friends, the number 
that passed the SLC exams. 
19900 3.23 1.51 
SCH_ABS No. of days absent from school in grade 10. 19900 6.8 8.24 
Expected Division in SLC exam EXP_DIV 
1= fail (failed in at least one subject) , 2 = 3rd 
division (32% and above) , 3 = 2nd division (45% 
and above) , 4 = 1st division (60% and above) 
19900 3.46 0.68 
P_TUTOR 1 = Took private tutoring for SLC exam, 0 otherwise 19900 0.68 0.47 
Family Characteristics 
FAMSIZE Number of people who ate in the same kitchen 19900 6.43 2.47 
FAM_EXP Yearly family expenditure (NRs.) 19901 65138.4 117419 
SLC_GRADS No. of SLC graduates in the family 19901 1.088 1.38 
Language spoken at home LANG 
1 if Nepali, 0 otherwise 
19901 0.74 0.43 
Distance of school  from home  DIST_SCH 
(Hours taken to commute to school daily). 
19900 0.2 0.5 




PRIVATE 1 if fully private, 0 if  public (partially or fully) 
including community managed schools 
19928 0.21 0.41 
S_SIZE School size (Total number of students in school in 
2004, divided by 100) 
19928 8.4 4.63 
PCT_GIRLS Percentage of girls in school in higher secondary 
grades. 
19928 44.71 12.67 
LIBRARY 1 if school has at least one library, 0 otherwise 19928 0.68 0.46 
SC_COMP_LAB 1 if school has at least one science lab and 1 
computer lab, 0 otherwise 
19928 0.25 0.43 
SCH_DAYS No. of school days taught in the school year 19928 185.62 30.57 
ST_RATIO Student teacher ratio in secondary grades  
 
19928 30.58 2.34 
TCH_QA Teacher qualification  
1= Intermediate, 2= Bachelors, 3 = Masters 
19928 2.19 0.62 
TCH_EXP Teacher experience (in years) 19928 14.65 8.77 
TCH_EXP_SQ Teacher experience squared 19928 291.56 333.32 
Exam Context 
EX_MED 1 if Medium of Examination is Nepali, 0 Otherwise 19928 0.68 0.47 
FOOD_SELF 1 if student prepared food by own during exam, 0 
otherwise 
19901 0.21 0.41 
SICK 1 if student was sick during exam, 0 otherwise 19901 0.15 0.36 
SLC02 1 if SLC Year is 2002, 0 otherwise 19928 0.19 0.39 
  1 if SLC Year 2003, 0 otherwise 19928 0.25 0.43 
Community Context 
NUM_PRIV Number of private schools in the vicinity of the 
sample school 
19921 3.8 4.38 
HQRT 1 if school is located in the district  headquarter, 0 
otherwise 
19928 0.27 0.44 
MO_ROAD 1 if there is a motorable road within 1 hr. walking 
distance from the sample school, 0 otherwise 
19928 0.74 0.44 








Table 3.5. Correlation Coefficient: SLC Outcome and school type 
 
 SLC_AGG SLC_COMP SLC_PASS 
SLC_AGG 1   
SLC_COMP 0.94 1  
SLC_PASS 0.65 0.67 1 
PRIVATE 0.55 0.56 0.34 




Table 3.6. Correlation Table: SLC Score and Private School Competition 
 
 SLC_PUB NUM_PRIV MO_ROAD 
SLC_PUB 1   
NUM_PRIV 0.10 1  
MO_ROAD 0.08 0.34 1 



























 A comparative study of public and private school performance has been one of the 
popular topics of research among educational researchers around the world. In the case of 
developed countries, the evidence is mixed. However, in the case of developing countries, it 
could be argued that the answer is obvious. The basic understanding is that in most of the 
developing countries the performance of public schools is consistently below the performance of 
private schools. Among the many factors that differentiate these two types of schools are factors 
such as who own the schools, how they are managed, which resources are available and how 
those resources are used, what are the student’s demographic and socioeconomic characteristics 
who attend such schools, what is the school and community climate in these schools, and so on. 
Considering all these factors and making it possible to account for these differences will again 
raise the question: do private school students really perform better than the public school 
students? This chapter will try to explore this issue in the case of a developing country, Nepal 
using SLC level data provided by the Ministry of Education of Nepal.  
 This chapter is organized in the following way. First, a theoretical framework is 
presented with an introduction to the educational production function and the related literature on 
this topic. The chapter then reviews some previous studies concerning the evidence surrounding 
student performance in developed and developing countries. This is followed by a discussion on 
the relevant literature concerning the evidence related to student performance in Nepal. The 
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subject of private tutoring is also dealt with briefly. Finally, the chapter presents the models and 





 This chapter employs an educational production function approach to estimate the impact 
of school type on student performance. An education production function is defined by a 
relationship that constitutes all combinations of inputs that produce a given set of outputs. In 
education, outputs are typically measured by achievement score/graduation rates and inputs 
usually are school, teacher and student relating factors that influence outcomes. Mathematically, 
this could be expressed as follows (Harris, 2010): 
(4.1) Yit = f (Sit, Sit -1, …..Fit, Fit -1, ….Ii, εit)      
 
 where Yit is educational output for individual student i at time t.; Sit denotes school inputs for 
individual student i at time t; Fit includes family inputs for individual student i at time t; Ii = fixed 
student contribution (called as innate ability by economists) and εit is a random disturbance term 




Evidence on Developed Countries 
One of the most famous studies that uses a production function approach is the Coleman 
report (1966).  Coleman and others believed that both school resources as well as the family 
background contributes significantly to student achievements in a given year. Thus, their 
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specification can be written as: 
 
(4.2) Yij = α Sij + β Fij + εij, 
 
where Yij is outcome of student i in school j, Sij is a vector relating to school/teacher inputs and 
Fij is a vector representing the family background of student i in school j. The main finding of the 
Coleman Report (1966) was that school resources account for a very tiny proportion of the 
variance of student achievements. Although the study was heavily criticized on statistical 
grounds, this voluminous report spurred an interest on the topic that went far beyond the 
technicalities embedded on it. The subsequent research in this field was to examine input-output 
relationships in school by using longitudinal panel information. There is a substantial amount of 
research in this field of study. Reviews by Hanushek (1989) summarize existing empirical results 
on the education production function while showing evidence from his vote counting analyses. 
The main idea of vote counting is that the category with the most results is generally taken to 
represent the true state of the relation in question. He summarizes 187 empirical specifications 
that focus on input and output relationships that estimate the education production function in 
public schools of the United States. His study evaluates the impact of seven measures as inputs 
of education production function: teacher-pupil ratio, teacher education, teacher experience, 
teacher salary, expenditures per pupil, administrative inputs, and facilities. He concludes that 
there is no strong or systematic relationship between school expenditures and student 
performance. This study was criticized by some, especially on methodological grounds that drew 
opposite conclusions (see Hedges, Laine, and Greenwald, 1994). 
The above research estimates traditional education production functions, such as a Cobb-
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Douglas production function that assumes constant elasticities of substitution and scale. 
However, Figlio (1999) using national student-level data to estimate an education production 
function that does not employ the restrictive assumptions of homotheticity and additivity (trans-
log) and finds statistically significant evidence that school inputs (e.g., teachers’ education, 
teachers’ salaries, student-teacher ratios etc.) are associated with student achievements. Based on 
his evidence, Figlio(1999)  argues that traditional education production functions may understate 
the magnitude of the effects of school factors on student achievements.  
The empirical results mentioned above measure students’ achievement by test scores as a 
dependent variable in education production function. However, Card and Krueger (1996) 
summarize the results of twenty-four estimates of the effect of school expenditures on earnings 
from eleven different studies. According to them, all the estimates show a positive effect of 
additional school expenditures on subsequent earnings, graduation rates, and years of educational 
attainment. In addition, they point out that test scores are not strong predictors of student’s 
success in the labor market. In fact, they find that there is a significant relationship between the 
quality of educational inputs and earnings.  
However, existing databases providing labor market data on young workers (NLS-Y, 
HSB etc.) have potential problems: many determinants of labor market performance are only 
revealed with experience. In addition, samples of young workers tend to under-represent 
individuals of a given age with higher education. For example, the NLS-Y sample used by Betts 
(1995) to estimate the wage equation used 23 year-old workers on average. The small sample 
sizes of the datasets make it potentially difficult to avoid self-selection bias. 
In light of these data problems, it is interesting to compare the estimated wage equation 
from the student-level (micro-level) datasets to the estimates in the other literatures. Hanushek, 
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Rivkin, and Taylor (1996) argue that many of studies that find positive and significant 
relationships between school inputs and student achievements use aggregate data that will bias 
the coefficient estimates upward. They show that when only studies employing student-level data 
are considered, the evidence supporting a link between measured school inputs and student 
achievements becomes more tenuous. On the other hand, Ferguson and Ladd (1996) analyzed 
achievement scores for students in grades four, eight and nine of 131 districts in Alabama and 
found that empirical results do not change whether using aggregate or disaggregated data.   
In any case, according to the evidence from developed countries, research surrounding 
the estimation of education production functions says that there is no clear, systematic 
relationship between resources and student outcomes. However, the latest research into the 
determinants of student achievement strongly indicates that teacher-quality differences are the 
most significant part of differences across schools (Hanushek, 2010). In the case of developing 
countries, the targeted outcome in most of the cases is the increase in the enrollment rate. There 
are others that advocate the learning process. However, there are very few effective studies that 
evaluate what actually is effective learning. Randomized evaluations are the latest trends in 
evaluating the effect of various educational interventions (Glewwe & Lambert, 2010). 
The education production function approach is not without issues. The major issues 
related to estimating educational production functions can be highlighted as follows: 
Functional form of education production function 
The first debate is about the functional form of the educational production function.  
Normally, the educational production function is assumed to be linear, additive and homothetic.   
 




where Y is educational outcome, S, school input variables, F, family variables, P, peer variables, 
and g(·) is assumed as homothetic. In other words, the education production relationship is 
 
(4.4) Yt = m (h(St-1, Ft-1, Pt-1, Yt-1)) 
 
where m (·) is monotonic and h (·) is homogeneous of degree one. Furthermore, the education 
production function is also additive, so that: 
 
(4.5) Yt = m1 (St-1) + m2(Ft-1) + m3(Pt-1) + m4(Yt-1) 
 
In more detail, “additivity” means that the educational production function is additive in 
the inputs of production. Some studies (such as Summers & Wolfe, 1977) allow the interaction of 
inputs variables but this relaxation of additive assumption is very rare. In addition, the 
“homothetic” assumption means that the marginal rate of substitution among inputs of education 
production depends only on the proportions of the inputs and not on the scale of production. 
However, if the effects of school inputs on student achievement are sensitive to variation in the 
scale of education production, these assumptions may not be appropriate and it may reduce 
precision of estimates (Figlio, 1999). In fact, Figlio (1999) estimates an educational production 
function that does not hold the assumptions of additivity and homotheticity by using 
translogarithmic functional form (translog). He finds evidence of a systematic relationship 
between school inputs and the changes in student performance, although the estimated marginal 
productivities of school inputs seem rather small (elasticity values of 0.1 and 0.2). Figlio 
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concludes that traditional specifications of education production function are overly restrictive 
because they fail to capture potentially nonlinear effects of school resources. Hence his results 
suggest that traditional education production function may underestimate the effects of school 
inputs on student achievement. In addition to overly restrictive assumptions of additivity and 
homotheticity in traditional specifications of education production, Pritchett and Filmer (1999) 
also criticize the traditional education production function because the assumption that resources 
are allocated to maximize education output under an optimizing theory is grossly inconsistent 
with their evidence. 
Choice of input/output variables  
When estimating education production function, which input/output variables should be 
chosen is still controversial. Education may have unmeasured outcomes, such as joy, pleasure, 
and satisfaction of students and external benefits to societies as a whole. Furthermore, education 
does not produce a single output but multiple outcomes at the same time. Thus, it is not easy to 
specify and measure outcomes of schooling. Most studies examining the input-output 
relationships in school use immediate output measures of schools, such as measured cognitive 
achievement or continuation to further schooling as a dependent variable of education production 
function. The use of these measures is justified on the grounds that they relate to important 
subsequent outcomes for individuals (e.g., Hanushek, 1989; Ferguson & Ladd, 1996). However, 
some researchers question educational outcome measured by standardized test scores or other 
simple measures of student achievement (e.g. Card & Krueger, 1996).    
Burtless (1996) points out that the choice of educational inputs varies from study to study, 
but these variables are classified as school inputs or non-school inputs. School inputs include 
teachers’ characteristics such as academic backgrounds, experiences, and starting salaries, and 
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classroom inputs such as class sizes, facilities, and administrative expenditures. Non-school 
inputs include family inputs (e.g., parental education, income, and family size), peer inputs (e.g., 
peer’s demographic characteristics), and district or community factors (characteristics of the 
areas where individuals attended school). On many occasions these educational inputs are 
unobserved variables that are difficult to measure quantitatively, such as student’s and peer’s 
abilities, relationship between students and teachers, and teaching skill differences (Hanushek, 
1986). In general, previous researchers have used a proxy that is observable to capture the 
unobservable, in particular, IQ as a proxy of student’s and peer’s abilities. However, of course, 
there are still controversies as to whether IQ is a good measure of ability. 
Levels of aggregation 
In previous literature, education production functions have been estimated at various 
levels of aggregation, such as across individuals, schools and school districts (or a similar 
geographical classification in other countries). Controversy exists in relation to the level of 
aggregation of school quality measures. In particular, Hanushek (1997), Hanushek, Rivkin and 
Taylor (1995, 1996) and Betts (1995) suggested that studies that measure school inputs using 
higher levels of aggregation overstate the positive effect of school inputs. They suggest that the 
level of aggregation does matter and that as level of aggregation increases, the probability of 
finding positive and significant results for school influence also increases.  
Correcting econometric biases 
Multicollinearity: There are several econometric problems in estimating an education production 
function. Multicollinearity may appear if two or more independent variables are highly (but not 
perfectly) correlated. However, since multicollinearlity violates none of the assumptions for 
establishing the absence of bias in OLS estimation, the problem is not really well-defined 
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(Wooldridge, 2009). In practice, in the United States, since school expenditures are funded by 
property taxes at the local level, it is to be noted that spending per student and family income 
might be correlated.  
Self-selection: One of the econometric issues of the Coleman’s report was the self-selection 
problem. It is pointed out that the Coleman’s report examined just a snapshot in time (not a 
longitudinal picture) and thus its conclusions might reflect what is known as self-selection bias: 
Blacks and low-income students in racially and economically integrated schools might just be 
more motivated than those in segregated schools. But numerous subsequent studies sought to 
correct for this bias, looking longitudinally at the growth in achievement over time, and 
confirmed that middle-class schools provide a better educational environment than poverty-
concentrated schools. 
Omitted variable bias: Estimated relationships between school inputs and outputs may reflect the 
influence of omitted factors, rather than true effect of school resources. In Card and Krueger’s 
(1996) view, the most important omitted variables are likely to be measures of family 
background and characteristics of the areas where individuals attended schools. Another 
important omitted variable might be student’s abilities (ability bias).  
Publication bias: This problem was first addressed by Hedges et al. (1994). It refers to the fact 
that most of the results usually published by journals are those with statistically significant 
results, either negative or positive. In such a case, the actual effect is buried due to tendencies to 
make research reports favorable for purposes of publication (also see Pritchett & Filmer, 1999). 
Measurement errors: If input or output variables contain measurement errors, for instance in 
educational attainment or achievement estimates caused by underreporting/misreporting of the 
educational level, this may bias the OLS estimations in any direction. In general, earnings-
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education equations usually entail a 10 percent underestimation of rates of return due to 
measurement error bias (Card, 1999). Krueger and Lindahl (2001) evaluated the attenuation bias 
due to measurement error by using the reliability ratio. 
 
Evidence on student performance in developing countries 
One of the notable studies that combines data from both developed as well as developing 
countries is by James (1987) who conducted regression analyses so as to explain variations in 
size of the private sector across states within several countries: the U.S, Japan, Holland and 
India. Her results show that excess demand leads to a large private sector at the secondary and 
university levels in developing countries, while differentiated demand leads to more private 
education at the primary and secondary levels in advanced industrial countries. On the supply 
side, the results show that the availability of religious (nonprofit) entrepreneurship plays an 
important role in both cases. The problem with her study, however, is that her sample size is very 
small. In addition, the four countries that she has considered differ greatly in terms of stage of 
development, political system, cultural values and size of private educational sector. Therefore, 
the external validity of the results from this study is questionable. 
A similar attempt of combining data from both developed and developing countries to 
study the determinants of student performance was done by Heyneman and Loxley (1983). The 
controversial results from Coleman Report (1966) had suggested that school inputs had a 
negligible effect on the student performance and that family socio- economic characteristics of 
students were more important in determining academic achievement. However, Heyneman and 
Loxley (1983) criticized the report because the U.S. data are not representative of most countries. 
Rather, they used data from 29 high and low income countries from the Second International 
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Mathematics and Science Study (SIMSS) and concluded that the predominant influence on 
student learning can be attributed to the quality of the schools and teachers to which children are 
exposed, and that this relationship is stronger in developing countries than developed countries. 
More studies on developing countries later found a strong relationship between a number of 
resource variables and student outcomes (Fuller & Clark, 1994; Hanushek 1995; Scheerns, 
2004).  
 
Evidence on student performance in Nepal 
Taking this as our departure point for the case of Nepal, the literature suggests a huge 
difference between public schools and private schools in Nepal in terms of quality and hence 
academic achievement (Carney, 2003; Caddell, 2006; Bhatta, 2004; Bhatta, 2005; Carney and 
Bista, 2009). An example of the striking difference between government and private schools is 
that in 2004, only 29 percent out of 171,440 government school students passed the School 
Leaving Certificate Exam, while 80 percent out of 44,863 private school students passed the 
exam (MOES, 2005a). As a result of poor performance of public schools, the demand for private 
schools in developing countries is rising rapidly, and private schools are seen to assume huge 
role in catering to the educational needs of the poor (Tooley & Dixon, 2005). For example, based 
on their in-depth study in India, Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya, Tooley and Dixon (2005) point out 
several reasons to explain the mushrooming of private schools in developing countries. The 
reasons they claim are: the deterioration of government schools, the lack of government schools, 
and (in India) the desire of parents for instruction in English. Moreover, the authors argue that 
the deterioration of government school standards can be attributed to the lack of teacher 
accountability, strong unions, poor facilities, high pupil-teacher ratios, and poor management. 
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But, private schooling as a solution to failing public schools in developing countries is not as 
straightforward as put by Tooley and Dixon (2005).  There are a lot of complexities involved. 
For example, Colclough (1996) finds that cost recovery policies would be harmful to both 
efficiency and equity if significant resources were to be generated by these means. So, the case is 
surely multi-dimensional in the case of developing countries and needs careful study.  
In the case of Nepal too, the low performance of public schools amidst extremely disturbing 
political environment on one hand, and the adverse effect of neoliberalism on the other hand 
makes the study of public versus private schooling multi-dimensional and hence challenging. So, 
performing additional comparative studies on public and private schools is very useful. Further, 
finding the presence of any such linkages and mutual impact between public and private schools 
is very important for future policy goals. Unfortunately, in Nepal, there are not many studies in 
this area, however, below is a discussion of some of them known to the author. 
A study by The New ERA (1995) used data from 126 schools in 8 districts and found that 
parental education and student’s regularity of school attendance had a positive impact and gender 
(being female), and time spent household chores had a negative impact on students’ academic 
achievement. Among the school/teacher characteristics, the study found that classroom 
overcrowding, head teacher competency and teacher qualifications were factors that influenced 
student performance. Another research study that identified numbers of the potential 
determinants of student performance is by METCON (1995). The study highlighted that the 
delay faced by the majority of the students in receiving the full set of textbooks each academic 
year was one of the most influencing factors in explaining students’ achievement. Interestingly, 
the study points out that 50 percent of the sample students did not have all the textbooks even at 
the mid point of the academic session. In addition to this, the study suggests that among the other 
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factors that influence student’s attainment are the distance students travel to school daily, class 
repetitions, and the loss of school days. 
The CERID (2002a), which used multivariate statistical methods, analyzed school 
conditions and the cost per student to examine the relationship between these factors and the 
achievement of primary school students at the individual subjects. The study found that both of 
these factors affected student performance as well as enrolment, promotion and repetition rates 
for students. However, the study did not control for student’s personal characteristics and family 
background which are very important for accessing student achievement. Hence, although the 
findings of this study seem quite contextual in the Nepalese context, the results are, no doubt 
biased. The same institution performed another qualitative study analyzing the impact of the 
classroom environment. The findings of this study suggested that an inadequate amount of time 
spent by teachers on classroom instruction, their inability to effectively apply the knowledge 
gained from teacher training programs, and their emphasis on rote learning were some of the 
major factors that have a negative impact on student learning (CERID, 2002b).  
METCON and ECL (2000) evaluated the Secondary Education Project (SEP) using a 
qualitative study to examine the potential determinants of student’s academic performance. The 
study, using review of documents, structured interviews and informal discussions with head 
teachers, teachers, parents and students found that the unavailability of qualified subject teachers, 
the lack of educational materials, and the shortage of textbooks were some of the important 
factors for low quality of schooling in rural areas of the country. In addition, the study found a 
positive impact of teacher training on the teachers as well as students’ performance. Moreover, 
pointing out the large gap in the performance between public and private schools, the study 
argues that poor physical facilities, shortage of resources, and ineffective management are the 
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most important factors marking the stark difference between public and private schools in the 
nation. 
There are basically two major problems related to the studies summarized above. First, 
all of them focused on the primary level. One cannot generalize the findings to secondary and 
higher secondary levels because the teaching and learning methods are quite different at the 
higher levels. Second, these studies do not provide any empirical models and hence are not 
statistically sound. There are only few others which are relatively better in terms of statistical 
strength in their analysis. I summarize three such studies identified so far in the Nepalese 
context.  
First, studies by EDSC (1997; 1999; 2001; and 2003) on three national student 
achievement surveys used multiple regression techniques by utilizing data from nationally 
representative random samples of students. The EDSC (1997) and EDSC (2001) used the case of 
grade three students and EDSC (1999) and EDSC (2003) used the case of grade five students to 
analyze the relationships between subject-wise student achievement and various sets of 
determinants. The findings from all the above four studies suggested statistically significant 
relationships between a number of school factors and student performance. Similar to the 
findings of the METCON and ECL (2000) study, these studies also found that the unavailability 
of the required textbooks and the distances of the school from the district headquarters were 
some of the significant factors related to students’ performance. Interestingly, the studies point 
out that the farther the school was located from the district headquarters, the greater was the 
students’ of that school likelihood of having lower test scores. The results of these studies also 
indicate a positive effect of expenditure per child in explaining student performance. At the 
student level, the variables that are significant as found by these studies were gender, age, class 
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attendance, grade repetitions, and reading habit of students. At the family level, the occupation of 
the parents was found to be more influencing to their child’s achievement. These studies too 
however are confined to primary school. Also, there is no control of important school factors. 
Hence, the studies definitely suffer from omitted variable bias.  
A second study of more statistical rigor by Subedi (2004) used Hierarchical Linear 
Modeling (HLM) method to study the impact of class size, the availability of resources and the 
use of resources by teachers on the average classroom achievement scores in high schools 
(grades 9 and 10) in Nepal. The target population of this study included all the teachers teaching 
grades 9 and 10 in high schools (16 public and 14 private schools) of the Lalitpur district, which 
is in the Kathmandu Valley. The outcome variable for this study was the average classroom 
achievement score, which was derived from the mean classroom student achievement for 
individual classroom score in which a specific teacher taught. According to the author, multiple 
classrooms are nested within a specific teacher and, hence the justification of the use of the HLM 
method. In the study, classroom level was taken as level 1 and teacher level as level 2. The 
findings from the study suggest a positive effect of resources and a negative effect of class size 
on average classroom achievement. The results of the study show that teachers who used the 
available resources effectively in the classroom were able to increase students’ achievement. 
Further, the results showed a negative effect of class size indicating that a classroom with a large 
number of students decreases the average level of student achievement. Moreover, the study 
found significant variations in average classroom achievement and class size effect across the 
teachers. Although this study made a good attempt to use technique like HLM in the case of 
Nepalese data, one of the major drawbacks of this study was that the sample size was too small, 
and the study was limited to only one district, and that too was located in the Kathmandu Valley. 
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A study of schools that are within the Kathmandu valley is not at all representative of the schools 
located in different parts of the country, especially compared to the schools in remote and rural 
areas of the country. Hence, the external validity of this study is highly questionable.  
The third study is by Bhatta (2005). Using a large-scale nationwide survey data set under 
the sponsorship of Ministry of Education, the study attempted to explore the determinants of 
student performance on  the SLC examination using OLS and logistic regressions. The study 
found statistically significant differences in student performance across school types (public 
versus private), genders, ethnicities and school locations. In particular, the study found that after 
controlling for student, family, school and community characteristics, the SLC scores and pass 
rates for public schools were relatively low compared to private schools. However, although the 
study incorporated all the necessary variables, the study still suffers from a selection bias 
problem. The private school students are significantly different from public school students. The 
study ignored this serious issue, and hence results are most likely biased. 
 
Evidence on Private Tutoring 
 
Private tutoring is a supplementary service provided by private agencies and financed by 
the student/family using the service. It is supplementary because the tutoring service covers the 
same subjects that have already been or supposed to have been covered in school. There is a 
huge literature on private tutoring covering both developed as well as developing countries (for 
example, see Stevenson & Baker, 1992; Baker, Akiba, LeTendre & Wiseman, 2001; Assaad & 
El-Badawy, 2004; Kim & Lee, 2004; Baker & LeTendre, 2005; Dang, 2007; Kim, 2007; Bray, 
2009). In general, the literature suggests that the demand for private tutoring could be basically 
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motivated by enrichment or remediation. Private tutoring is also called shadow education as 
these services are assumed to shadow the requirements of the schools that a student goes 
(Stevenson & Baker, 1992). According to Bray (1999), shadow education is characterized by the 
following elements: i) the existence of private tutoring depends on the existence of a formal 
school education process ii) the size and shape of private tutoring changes with those of the 
formal school education process iii) public attention focuses mostly on the formal school 
education process, rather than on its shadow, and iv) the shadow education has less distinctive 
features than the formal school education process. In most of cases, private tutoring is either 
offered on a one-to-one basis or provided in small groups or in large classes. Studies around the 
world show that private tutoring is prevalent in most countries that are diverse in economic, 
geographic or cultural contexts. In some countries such as Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, South 
Korea, Greece and Turkey, the scale of private tutoring is so extensive that it runs parallel to 
formal schooling (Baker & LeTendre, 2005). Below, I highlight some selected studies that are 
relevant to this dissertation.  
Using data from the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) for 41 
countries and controlling for family income, student, and community characteristics, Baker, 
Akiba, LeTendre and Wiseman (2001) show that private tutoring is used significantly more often 
by low math achievers than by high achievers in three-fourths of these countries. In contrast, 
Kim (2007), using data from South Korea shows that students from the second quintile from the 
top have a significantly higher probability of participating in private tutoring, and those in the 
fifth quintile have a lower probability of private tutoring participation.  
There are other studies that show that family background variables (such as household 
wealth, parental education and location of living) influence the use of private tutoring the most 
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(Assaad & El-Badawy, 2004; Dang, 2007; Kim, 2007; Kim & Lee, 2004; Stevenson & Baker, 
1992). These studies suggest that students from wealthier and more educated households living 
in urban areas are more likely to use and spend more on private tutoring. However, there could 
be a different scenario in countries with very poor public education system as in the case of 
Nepal. For example, Kim and Lee (2004) argue that in the case of a deficient public education 
system parents tend to resort to private tutoring to compensate for poor quality or lack of 
education opportunity. In line with this argument, Baker et al. (2001) find that higher public 
education expenditure as a share of GNP and gross enrollment rates predict lower use of private 
tutoring. Further, studies also point out that low pay levels and weak monitoring of teachers in 
the public system could motivate teachers to impose tutoring on students (Buchmann, 1999; 
Silova & Bray, 2006). Besides the school quality, studies also suggest that the student’s grade 
level could be an influencing factor in the use of private tutoring. For example, Assaad and El-
Badawy (2004) in the case of Egypt, and Dang (2007) in the case of Vietnam find that students 
in the last year of their current school spend more on private tutoring. In addition, Dang (2007) 
also finds that private tutoring expenditure is positively related to the share of people with an 
upper secondary education or higher in the community. Another interesting determinant of use of 
private tutoring relates to the cultural values (Bray, 1999). For example, Baker and LeTendre 
(2005) point out that students in countries with an extensive shadow education system often 
attend private tutoring because their friends do so.  
In the context of Nepal, I have not found any significant empirical study regarding 
private tutoring. However, there are few noteworthy observations regarding private tutoring in 
Nepal. For example, Carney (2003) argues that the demand for different tiers of education for 
lower, middle and high income families in education sector is influenced by the interplay of neo-
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liberalism, fiscal constraint and weak public governance. We can thus view the emergence of 
private tutoring as a by-product of this dynamics in the education market of Nepal.  Another 
supportive observation by Caddell (2007) was made during her field-visits to Nepal’s 
government-funded public schools. She found that public schools offered a private stream for 
those who could afford, and students were taught in English using English medium textbooks. 
Moreover, the author found that the students were taught in the same building and by the same 
teachers as those in the ‘non-private’ stream. As there are insufficient numbers of studies on 
private tutoring in the case of Nepal, below I discuss the case of two countries from South Asia, 
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka that come close to Nepal in terms of size and socioeconomic 
composition, and hence are relevant in the context of this study. In Bangladesh, a study by 
Ahmed and Nath (2005) of 8212 households in 10 diverse locations found that an average of 
43.2 percent of primary school students receive private tutoring. They found that the proportion 
receiving private tutoring in the lowest and the highest grade was 33.9 percent and 54.7 percent, 
respectively. Further, the study showed that boys received more tutoring than girls, with 
respective averages in the lowest and highest grades of 45.6 percent and 40.7 percent 
respectively. In Sri Lanka, a study done in 1990 found that the proportions receiving private 
tutoring in Sri Lanka in year 6 and 11 are 80 percent and 75 percent respectively.  In year 13, the 
proportions were 62 percent for arts students, 67 percent for commerce students, and 92 percent 
for science students (de Silva, 1994). 
 
 
Models and Identification Strategy 
 
 
The Basic Empirical Model 
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As discussed above, this dissertation uses the theory of the educational production 
function in estimating the effect of school type on student’s SLC performance. The approach to 
this section is to test the hypothesis that a student from a private school performs better on the 
SLC examination than a student from a public school, holding other things constant. 
Symbolically, the model postulates that the performance of a student i, in school j is given by the 
following reduced form expression: 
 
(4.6) Yij =  ∞0   + ∞1 S(i)j + ∞ 2X'ij + µij  
 
where Yij is the aggregate SLC Test Score
22 of student i in school j, S(i)j is the key independent 
variable of interest that represents school type23 (which is a dummy variable, private if it takes 
value 1, and 0 if public), Xij is a vector of control variables representing student, family, school 
and teacher characteristics as well as exam context variables, and  µij is random disturbance with 
mean zero and constant variance. The dependent variable in this case is the aggregate SLC score 
of the student, which is a continuous variable. The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
method is used to estimate equation 4.6. 
 
Probit Model for SLC Result 
In equation 4.6, when the dependent variable is changed to a categorical variable equal to one if 
the student passed the SLC exam and zero otherwise, the model can be stated as follows: 
                                                 
22 Note that generally the SLC Score is comprised of 8 subjects- 6 compulsory (Math, Science, English, Nepali, 
Social Studies, Health & Population studies) and 2 optional subjects. But, for this dissertation, only 6 compulsory 
subjects are used. However, I do report results using the aggregate score to compare across the models. The score is 
converted to a scale of 100. 





(4.7) Y*ij =  β0+ β1 S(i)j + β2X'ij + ʋij 
 
where Y*ij is SLC test outcome of student i in school j, and  ʋij is a random disturbance with 
mean zero and constant variance. Since the SLC test outcome variable in this case is a 
categorical variable, a probit model is used, where a set of explanatory variables, including 
school type, is postulated to affect the probability that a student passes the SLC exam, as follows: 
 
(4.8) Pr (Y*ij = 1| S(i)j , Xij)  = Ф (β0+ β1 S(i)j + β2X'ij + ʋij) 
 
where Ф is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
The coefficients of these regressions indicate how a change in each of the explanatory 
variables is associated with the probability of passing the SLC exams, assuming all the other 
factors remain constant. In addition to these empirical models for analyzing private versus public 
performance, I also develop two supporting probit models as follows. The first focuses on the 
SLC exam, and the second is on private tutoring. 
 
Probit Model for The Medium of Exam  
Since there are two mediums for writing SLC exam (English and Nepali)24, I postulate 
another probit model to explain the medium of exam. In other words, in equation 4.6, I change 
the dependent variable to medium of exam, which is also a categorical variable that takes the 
value one if the medium of the SLC exam that student took is Nepali and takes the value zero if 
the medium is English or mixed (Nepali and English). The model can then be stated as follows: 
                                                 




(4.9) Mij =  γ0+ γ1 S(i)j + γ2X'ij + Ɛij  
 
where Mij is the SLC test outcome of student i in school j, and  Ɛij is random disturbance with 
mean zero and constant variance. Since the medium of the SLC exam variable in this case is a 
categorical variable, a probit model is used, where a set of explanatory variables, including 
school type, is postulated to affect the probability that a student passes the SLC exam, as follows: 
 
(4.10) Pr (Mij = 1| S(i)j , Xij)  = ϕ (γ 0+ γ 1 S(i)j + γ2X'ij + Ɛij) 
 
where ϕ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
 
Probit Model for Private Tutoring 
In the Nepalese education system, private education seems to be a dominant factor in 
explaining student’s SLC performance. Hence, I also postulate a probit model to examine the 
factors that explain a student’s behavior about private tutoring. To do this, I change the 
dependent variable to private tutoring in equation 4.6, which is a categorical variable that takes 
the value one if student took private tutoring for the SLC exam and takes the value zero if the 
student did not take private tutoring. The model can then be stated as follows: 
 




where Tij represent whether or not a student i in school j took private tutoring for the SLC exam, 
and  uij is a random disturbance with a mean of zero and constant variance. Since the private 
tutoring variable in this case is a categorical variable, I again postulate a probit model, where a 
set of explanatory variables, including school type, is believed to affect the probability that a 
student takes private tutoring for the SLC exam, as follows: 
 
(4.12) Pr (Tij = 1| S(i)j , Xij)  = φ (δ 0+ δ1 S'(i)j + δ2X'ij + uij) 
 
where φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
 
Empirical Issue: Self Selection 
The key issue to tackle when estimating the impact of school type on educational 
outcomes is self-selection bias. Self-selection bias arises because private school students can 
differ fundamentally from public school students: they self-select. Therefore, one cannot 
determine what would happen to public school students if they go to private schools, just looking 
at the student, family and school characteristics (or vice versa).  
For example, private school students are generally from wealthier and more educated 
families who might also be likely to possess more academic skills and learning aptitude, thus 
performing better in the SLC exam (what is called “positive selection”). However, the selection 
cannot be observed in advance and contains the error term as unobserved characteristics that are 
correlated both with the school type and educational outcome. 
 




There are techniques to account for the selection bias problem, which is one of the most 
common in econometric analysis. One of the popular methods used to deal with selection issue is 
the Heckman–Lee correction. This method, originally developed by Heckman from 1976 to 1979 
is a two-step statistical approach that offers a means of correcting for non-randomly selected 
samples (Heckman, 1979; Lee, 2001). This correction method is easy to implement and has a 
firm basis in statistical theory. Two of the characteristic features of Heckman’s correction 
method are that it involves a normality assumption and that it provides a test for sample selection 
bias and formula for bias corrected model (Heckman, 1979). However, if this assumption of 
normality fails, the estimator is generally inconsistent and can provide misleading inference in 
small samples. Also, identification in this method will be tenuous unless there are many 
observations in the tails where there is substantial nonlinearity in the Inverse Mills Ratio 
(Puhani, 2000). Further, in this method an exclusion restriction is generally required to generate 
credible estimates: there must be at least one variable which appears with a non-zero coefficient 
in the selection equation but does not appear in the equation of interest, essentially an instrument. 
If no such variable is available, it may be difficult to correct for sampling selectivity (Puhani, 
2000). If these problems are very evident, semi-parametric and other robust alternatives can be 
used in such cases. Another correction strategies that address the selection biases in making 
estimates is the Propensity Score Matching, which was first proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983). This method employs a predicted probability of group membership, such as a treatment 
versus control group, based on observed predictors, usually obtained from logistic or probit 
regressions to create a counterfactual group. It may be used for matching or as covariates alone 
or with other matching variables or covariates. This method has been increasingly popular in 
medical trials and in economic policy evaluation studies. The basic objective of this method is to 
construct a counterfactual, which is the outcome that participants would have experienced, on 
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average, had they not participated in the treatment. It then estimates the average treatment effect on 
treated (ATT). In other words, this method estimates each individual’s propensity to receive a binary 
treatment as a function of observables and matches individuals with similar propensities (Rosenbaum 
& Rubin, 1983).  
The preference for matching methods over other methods, such as the Heckman-Lee 
correction method, is that the matching methods have the advantage of making comparisons that 
are used for statistical identification transparent as they make the fewest parametric assumptions. 
For example, we don’t have to specify the multi-dimensional relationship between the outcome 
(Y) and the covariates (X) in the propensity score matching method. Although we do have to 
specify the equation that estimates the propensity scores, this is merely a “means to an end” and, 
in theory, we can check if it is doing its job with balance diagnostics. Simulation studies 
demonstrate that treatment effect estimates are fairly robust to misspecification of the propensity 
scores (see Drake, 1993).  
Moreover, matching is most practical in cases where the causative variable is binary, as 
in the school type in this study. In this study, the propensity score matching enables us to find 
students who are in private schools and students who are in public schools but received similar 
“propensity scores” and non-parametrically estimate the effect of school type on educational 
outcomes. Therefore, this study, using data from MOES (2005b) adopts the propensity score 
matching to correct for the selection bias problem. This is the first study on private and public 
school performance in Nepal using the propensity score matching method and hence making this 
a unique study. 
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The propensity score matching, however, is not free of problems and criticisms. For 
example, as pointed by Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (2002) the requirement of large samples 
and substantial group is one of the serious problems of this method. The second problem as 
pointed by the authors relates to unobservable factors. The authors argue that hidden biases may 
remain because matching only controls for the observed variables to the extent that they are 
perfectly measured. Likewise, Michalopoulos, Bloom and Hill (2004) argue that although the 
propensity score matching method can help reduce large biases, significant biases may still 
remain. This method is also criticized on the grounds that it can be sensitive to choices such as 
the propensity score specification. After admitting these potential drawbacks of the method well 
beforehand, I next present a brief review of a few examples of the use of propensity score 
matching as found in the literature. 
After the propensity score matching method was formally introduced by Rosenbaum and 
Rubin in 1983, LaLonde (1986) attempted to evaluate the performance of observational methods 
to test the efficacy of a variety of econometric techniques. He started with data from a 
randomized field experiment (National Supported Work) and constructed an observational study 
by using the treatment group from this experiment. He then added comparison groups created 
from contemporaneous survey data from Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and Current 
Population survey (CPS). In this way, he showed that observational estimates can be evaluated 
using the experimental estimate as a reliable benchmark of the “truth”. This study was repeated 
by Dehejia and Wahba (1999) using propensity score approaches. The work by Dehejia and 
Wahba (1999) was successful overall, but ignited a lot of controversy. Nonetheless, this concept 
of the “constructed observational study” has since been used more broadly. In this, randomized 
experiments (where the true treatment effect is “known”) are generally used as the starting point, 
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but then the control group is replaced by a control group constructed from another survey, 
another location or cohort in the same experiment, and so on.  Then observational methods are 
used to see how close they can get to the experimental benchmarks. In two such cases (Dehejia 
& Wahba, 1999; Hill, Reiter & Zanutto, 2004) propensity scores were found to replicate 
experimental estimates well in settings where regression failed. In a few other studies, the results 
were more mixed. In those cases, they were criticized for not being well-constructed studies 
making the results difficult to interpret. Hence, there are few such success stories regarding the 
use of the propensity score matching method. However, as discussed earlier, there are lots of 
critics of this method, and the method is hotly debated among evaluation researchers.  The next 
discussion relates to the mechanics involved in the propensity score matching method as applied 
to this dissertation. 
Suppose we would like to know the effect of private schooling on student’s SLC score. 
That is, for each student, we imagine that there are two potential outcomes, Y(0) and Y(1), where 
Y(0)=Y(Z=0) is the outcome if treatment is not received, and Y(1)=Y(Z=1) is the outcome if 
treatment is received. So, in our case, Y(0) is the SLC score of the student who goes to public 
school, and Y(1) is the SLC score of the student who goes to private school. We use these 
potential outcomes (Y(0), Y(1)) to define a causal effect for subject i as a comparison of 
potential outcomes, most often defined as 
 
(4.13) τi = Yi(1) – Yi(0) 
 





(4.14) g(Yi(1) – Yi(0))=1 if Yi(1) >Yi(0)  
 
However, the fundamental problem of causal inference is that we never observe both 
Yi(0) and Yi(1).   
Suppose we are interested in estimating the effect on the treated,  
 
(4.15) E[(Yi(1) – Yi(0)| Z=1]=1 = E[(Yi(1)| Z=1 – E[Yi(0)| Z=1] 
 
Even though we have observational study, if the covariates in X are the only 
confounding covariates (ignorability holds) and we stratify on all the covariates X, 
 
(4.16)  E[(Yi(0)| Z=1,X]=1 = E[(Yi(0)| Z=0,X] 
 
We can unbiasedly estimate 
 
(4.17) E[(Yi(0)| Z=1,X] with ῩZ=1, X and 
 
(4.18) E[(Yi(0)| Z=1,X] with ῩZ=0, X 
 
But, if X includes many covariates this becomes a difficult task to perform. Propensity 
score matching provides a potential solution in this case. Propensity score theory says that rather 
than controlling for (stratifying on, regressing on, matching on) all the variables in X, it is 
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sufficient to control for just the propensity score, e(X), which is just a unitary summary of X. In 
other words, as shown in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), full control for the observed covariates 
can be obtained by controlling solely for a particular function of Xi called the propensity score, 
which is simply the conditional probability of treatment, 
 
(4.19) e(X) = Pr (Z=1|X)   ( = E[Z|X])  
 
We can estimate e(X) with standard software using logistic or probit regression. 
Therefore, if ignorability holds, and if we properly control for (e.g. match, stratify, regress) on 
our estimate of e(X), we get unbiased treatment effect estimates. Suppose we want to estimate 
the effect on the treated, as stated in equation (4.15) above. If ignorability holds (i.e., the 
covariates in X are the only confounding covariates) and we match on the propensity score, then 
equation (4.16) can be rewritten as 
 
(4.20) E[(Yi(0)| Z=1,e(X)]=1 = E[(Yi(0)| Z=0, e(X)] 
 
Now we can unbiasedly estimate  
 
(4.21) E[(Yi(0)| Z=1, e(X)] with ῩZ=1, e(X)  and 
 




There are three important issues that arise while implementing matching. The first, is 
about whether or not to match with replacement. The second is on how many comparison units 
to match to each treated unit, and finally the choice of the appropriate matching method (Dehijia 
& Wahba, 2002). Matching with replacement minimizes the propensity score distance between 
the matched comparison units and the treatment unit. In this method, each treatment unit can be 
matched to the nearest comparison unit, even if a comparison unit is matched more than once. 
Researchers claim that this method helps in reducing the bias. In contrast, in matching without 
replacement, the control group member once used for matching is removed from the control 
reservoir and cannot be chosen again. In this case, the researcher will be forced to match treated 
units to comparison units that are quite different in terms of the estimated propensity score. This 
is why it is believed to increase bias, however, it could improve the precision of the estimates. In 
addition, in matching without replacement, the results are potentially sensitive to the order in 
which the treatment units are matched (Rosenbaum, 1995).  
The question of how many comparison units to match with each treatment unit is closely 
related. By using a single comparison unit for each treatment unit, we ensure the smallest 
propensity-score distance between the treatment and comparison units. By using more 
comparison units, one increases the precision of the estimates, but at the cost of increased bias. 
One method of selecting a set of comparison units is the nearest-neighbor method, which selects 
the m comparison units whose propensity scores are closest to the treated unit in question. 
Another method is caliper matching, which uses all of the comparison units within a predefined 
propensity score radius (or “caliper”). A benefit of caliper matching is that it uses only as many 
comparison units as are available within the calipers, allowing for the use of extra (fewer) units 
when good matches are (not) available (see Cochran & Rubin, 1973). 
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The third issue deals with the type of method to select in practice. Generally, we find the 
following four variants of propensity score matching used by researchers: nearest neighbor 
matching, radius matching, kernel matching, and interval matching (see Morgan & Harding, 
2006). For example, in kernel-based matching, suppose we associate the outcome yi of treated 
unit i. A matched outcome is given by a kernel-weighted average of the outcome of all non-
treated units, where the weight given to non-treated unit j is in proportion to the closeness 
between i and j (see Heckman, Ichimura & Todd, 1998) Another matching technique is the 
Mahalnobis distance matching which is based on Mahalnobis distance that is a useful way of 
determining similarity of an unknown sample set to a known one. However, the literature on this 
is not very clear on which of these matching algorithms works best for which analytics. The 
answer depends crucially on the substantive application (see, Becker & Ichino, 2002; Becker & 
Caliendo, 2007 for more recent discussions on matching algorithms). Nevertheless, in general 
the choice of method depends on the data in question, and in particular on the degree of overlap 
between the treatment and comparison groups in terms of the propensity score (Dehejia & 
Wahba, 2002). For example, when there is substantial overlap in the distribution of the 
propensity score between the control and treatment groups, the results from most of the matching 
algorithms are almost similar. But, when the treatment and controls are very different, finding a 
satisfactory match by matching without replacement can be very problematic (Dehejia & Wahba, 
2002). The choice of the method also depends on whether a single or multiple treatment 
framework is used. For example, the Mahalnobis distance matching method is useful in 
particular for multiple treatment framework (see Rubin, 1980). 
This study using data from MOES (2005b) adopts matching with replacement for single-
nearest neighbor matching. This is due to the fact that there is minimal overlap between the 
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treatment (private school students) and comparison groups (public school students) in Nepal. As 
discussed earlier, when there is minimal overlap, matching with replacement emerges as a better 
choice. Also, since the study has one treatment framework, nearest neighbor matching is suitable 
and not the Mahalnobis distance matching. Therefore, this method uses matching with 
replacement for nearest neighbor matching. 
The idea in the nearest-neighbor matching is that for each control unit a weight is 
assigned equal to one for the nearest comparison unit in terms of the balancing score, and zero to 
all the other comparison observations. More specifically, following Becker and Ichino (2002) a 
nearest neighboring matching estimator is obtained as follows:  
Let T be the set of treated units and C the set of control units, and let YiT and Y
j
C be the 
observed outcomes of the treated and control units, respectively. C(i) denotes the set of control 
units matched to the treated unit i with an estimate value of the propensity score of pi. Nearest-
neighbor matching sets:  
 
(4.23) ||||)( min ji
j
ppiC −=  
 










= , if j ∈ C(i) and wij = 0, otherwise. 
  















τ   
 
where the number of units in the treatment group is denoted by NT and wj are defined as  
 
(4.26) ijj ww Σ= . 
  
In this study, the treatment variable is school type (going to private school), and the 
outcome variable is the SLC score. Matching is done on student characteristics, family 
background, school and teacher characteristics and exam context variables. Among the student 
characteristics, the variables included are age, gender, caste/ethnicity, peers, expected division in 
the SLC exam, use of private tutoring and student absenteeism in grade 10. Among the family 
characteristics, variables included are family size, number of SLC graduates in the family, 
language spoken at home, distance to school from home and having computer at home. Among 
the school and teacher characteristics, variables included are school size, school having a library, 
school having science and computer labs, number of days taught in school year, percent of girls 
in higher secondary grades, student-teacher ratio, teacher qualification and teacher experience. 
Finally, matching is also done on exam context variables such as medium of writing the SLC 
exam, student preparing food by self during the SLC exam, SLC year 2002 and SLC year 2003.  
 
Chow Test 
For this study, I perform the Chow test to examine whether the parameters (slopes and 
the intercept) of private school students are different from those of the public school students. 
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The Chow test, developed by economist Gregory Chow (Chow, 1960) is a statistical and 
econometric test of whether the coefficients in two linear regressions on different data sets are 
equal. In econometrics, the Chow test is most commonly used in time series analysis to test for 
the presence of a structural break. The Chow test is also often used in program evaluation to 
determine whether the independent variables have different impacts on different subgroups of the 
population. Suppose we have the following model which represent the overall pool of data set. 
 
(4.27) Yt =  a   + b X1t + cX2t + ε  
 
If we split our data into two groups (the first for public school students and the second for private 
school students), then we have: 
 
(4.28) Yt =  a1   + b1 X1t + c1X2t + ε1     
 
(4.29) Yt =  a2   + b2 X1t + c2X2t + ε2   
 
The null hypothesis of the Chow test asserts that a1 = a2, b1 = b2, and c1 = c2. 
Let SC be the sum of squared residuals from the combined data, S1 be the sum of squared 
residuals from the first group, and S2 be the sum of squared residuals from the second group. N1 
and N2 are the number of observations in each group and k is the total number of parameters (in 














The test statistic follows the F distribution with k and N1 + N2 − 2k degrees of freedom. 
 
 
Estimation and Results 
 
 
Specification and Diagnostic Analysis 
 
As I use cross-sectional applications for this study, first, I perform a diagnostic analysis 
to check the six classical linear model assumptions25. In the regression model, the error term µ is 
the sum of many different unobserved factors, either student and family related or school or other 
context related, affecting student’s educational outcome. Therefore, I use the central limit 
theorem to conclude that µ is normally distributed approximately. In order to do this, I plot the 
histogram of the residuals, and the following figure 4.1 show that the residuals follow an 
approximate normal distribution.  
 
                                                 
25 This includes all Guass-Markov assumptions , and also the assumptions of a normally distributed error term. 
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Next, I check if there is heteroskedasticity in the OLS regression. If there is 
heteroskedasticity, then the OLS estimates are no longer considered BLUE (Best linear Unbiased 
Estimator). In other words, the presence of heteroskedasticity means that OLS does not provide 
the estimate with the smallest variance. To check this, I plot residuals against the fitted values 
and visually inspect for heteroskedasticity. Figure 4.2 shows the plot of the residuals against the 
fitted values, which shows that the residuals are almost near the zero mean. In addition, the graph 
also shows that distribution of the residuals do not narrow or widen as most of them are 







































An examination of outliers or extreme values is important for regression analysis. To 
check on the outliers, I plot leverage against residual squared. Figure 4.3 shows that there are no 
points in the right upper side of the graph indicating the presence of no significant outliers in the 




























Finally, I examine mulitcollinearity in my regression using the variance inflation index (VIF) 
that measures the impact of collinearity among the variables in a regression model (see 
Wooldridge, 2009). The common rule of thumb is that if VIF > 10, then there is a problem of 
multicollinearity. The results as shown in table 4.1 show that all the independent variables have 
VIF that are less than 10. The variable that has the highest VIF is school status with the value of 
2.37. Further, I also examine the correlations between the independent variables and find no 
multicollinearity problem among the independent variables.  
 
Initial Results 
I begin by reporting a simple OLS model that regresses the SLC score (aggregate) with 
school type (if private) controlling for student, family, school and teacher characteristics, and 
exam context variables. The summary of the estimates, along with the standard errors are 
reported in Table 4.2, and the detailed results are presented in Table 4.3. As can be seen in the 
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tables, school type (if private) is positive and statistically significant26 with a coefficient of 7.47. 
This means that holding other things constant, a student going to a private school is associated 
with 7.47 percentage points increase in the SLC test score. The variables that are significant with 
positive relationship are the number of friends who passed the SLC exam (peers), expected 
division in SLC exam, annual family expenses, numbers of SLC graduates in the family, 
language spoken at home (if Nepali), family having computer at home, school size, school 
having a science and a computer lab, number of school days in the school year, and percent of 
girls in higher secondary grades. The variables that are significant with a negative relationship 
are: age, gender (female), student belonging to the lower caste, the ethnic groups or the other 
caste,  the use of private tutoring, school absenteeism, family size, student-teacher ratio, the 
medium of the  exam ( if Nepali), preparing food during SLC exam, being sick during SLC 
exam, and SLC year 2003.  
Column two reports results from model 2, which is the SLC score using only compulsory 
subjects (English, Nepali, Mathematics, Science, Social Studies and Health and Population). 
Removing two optional subjects from the aggregate SLC score reduces the variability in the 
student performance. Hence, this is believed to be an improvement on the first model that uses 
all eight subjects for SLC score. The results from this model suggest that school type (private) is 
positively significant with a coefficient of 7.82. Compared to the model before, in terms of 
statistical significance and type of relationship with student performance, the result remains 
almost intact with very slight changes (mostly increases) in the coefficients and standard error of 
the covariates. The changes are that the percent of girls in higher secondary grades is no longer 
significant, and SLC year 2002 is now significant with a negative relationship to student 
performance. It is interesting to note that in both the models the coefficient of private tutoring is 
                                                 
26 Variables that are significant only at 5% or lower are termed significant in this study. 
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significant and has a negative sign. Although the standard logic is that private tutoring helps 
student learn better and hence should have a positive relationship with student performance. 
However, as also discussed in the literature on private tutoring, most of the students who take 
private tutoring belong to low performing students from public schools, hence a possible 
explanation of the negative sign.  
The third model is derived from the second model by adding the interaction terms. The 
interactions are included for the following variables: school type, caste (ethnicity), private 
tutoring, school size, student-teacher ratio, teacher qualification, teacher experience and the 
medium of the SLC examination. In this model, school type is positive and statistically 
significant with coefficient of 9.50. Compared to models 1 and 2, the estimate is much larger. 
Interestingly, teacher qualification is now significant and positively related to student’s SLC 
performance. Student-teacher ratio, as expected, has a negative sign and is statistically 
significant. The interaction terms yield few interesting results. For ethnic groups, public school 
favors, and for other castes the private school is favored in terms of student performance. The 
interaction of private school with the medium of the exam shows that if students belong to 
private schools but take their SLC exam in Nepali, their score is lower by around seven 
percentage points. The private tutoring is not significant in this model. However, if public school 
students take private tutoring then it adds to their SLC score by 1.74 percentage points. Further, 
higher teacher qualification seems effective when the student-teacher ratio is lower. Moreover, 






As discussed in the methodology section, I perform the Chow test to examine whether the 
parameters (slopes and the intercept) of private school students are different from those of the 
public school students. For example, I suspect the impact of school size on student’s SLC 
performance varies across school type. In that case, the slope of school size of public school 
students will be different from the slopes of private school students. The null hypothesis is that 
the two types of schools have equal parameters for school size and intercept; deviations of the 
slope and intercept are not statistically discernible from zero. Computing calculated values of the 
F test and then comparing these with the tabulated value suggests rejection of the null 
hypothesis. This indicates that private schools and public schools do not share the same intercept 
and slope of school size. In other words, private and public schools differ in terms of school size.  
I conduct Chow test for all the covariates as described in the basic model above, and 




Table 4.2. Summary of estimates of the effect of school type on student’s performance in SLC Exam 
 
 SLC Score 
(Aggregate) 







1 = Took 
private 
tutoring 
 OLS OLS OLS PSM in 
OLS  
Probit Probit  PSM in 
Probit 
Probit Probit 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 


















Student Characteristics √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Family Characteristics √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
School & Teacher  
Characteristics 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Exam and National 
Context 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Interaction terms   √   √  √ √ 
R2 /PseudoR2 0.512 0.524 0.537 0.500 0.220 0.225 0.308 0.298 0.055 
Number of observations 19897 19897 19897 5104 19896 19896 5113 18961 18961 
Notes: (1) In case of OLS models, the estimates represent the OLS coefficients, and in case of probit models, the estimates represent the marginal effect which is 
for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1; (2) robust standard errors are in parenthesis; (3)* denotes statistically significant at 10%, ** statistically 






Blinder- Oaxaca Decomposition 
One of several techniques used to study labor market outcomes by groups (for example, 
by sex, race, education) is the Blinder–Oaxaca Decomposition method (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 
1973). In this approach, mean differences in log wages is decomposed based on regression 
models in a counterfactual manner. This procedure divides the wage differential between two 
groups into a part that is “explained” by group differences in productivity characteristic (such as 
education, work experience or training) and a residual part that cannot be measured, hence that 
cannot be accounted for by such differences in wage determinants. This “unexplained” part is 
taken as a measure for discrimination, but it also subsumes the effects of group differences in 
unobserved predictors. Though most applications of this method can be found in the labor 
market and discrimination literature27, the technique has also been used in other areas. For 
example, the technique was used by O’ Donnell, van Doorslaer, Wagstaff and Lindelow (2008) 
to study health inequities by poverty status. In a general sense, this method has been used to 
study group differences in any (continuous and unbounded) outcome variable (Jann, 2008).  
I employ this technique to study the differences in student performance in SLC 
examination by school type (whether student belonged to private school or public school). Group 
1 in my analysis consists of public school students and group 2 belongs to private school 
students. The covariates used in regression for this decomposition are the usual student, family, 
school, teacher and exam context variables. Table 4.5 summarizes the result from Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition. The first section of the table relates to decomposition outputs that reports 
the mean predictions by school type and their difference. According to the results, for this 
sample data, the mean of the SLC score28 is 60.30 for private schools and 43.25 for public 
                                                 
27 For example, see meta studies such as  Stanley and Jarrell (1998); Weichelbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005) 
28 Note that the total SLC score for this study is 100.  
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schools. The gap between private and public schools in terms of the SLC score is 17.05. In the 
second section of the table, the SLC score is divided into three parts. The first part reveals that 
the mean increase in public school students would be 13.12 if they had the same characteristics 
as private school students. In other words, this suggests to us that the differences in the 
endowments account for almost two thirds of the performance gap between private and public 
school students.  The second part reflects the change in public school students’ performance 
when applying the private school students’ coefficients to the public school students’ 
characteristics. If this is done, public school students will be able to gain 9.61 percent more score 
points. The third part is the interaction term that measures the simultaneous effect of differences 
in endowments and coefficients, which is 5.68 percentage points.  
 
Table 4.5. Estimates from Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition 
 
  Coefficient Robust  
Std. Error 
Differential 
Public 43.25*** 0.08 
Private 60.30*** 0.18 
Difference - 17.05*** 0.19 
Decomposition 
Endowments - 13.12*** 0.45 
Coefficients - 9.61*** 0.27 
Interaction 5.68*** 0.48 
Explained - 9.23*** 0.22 
Unexplained - 7.82*** 0.26 
Source: Author’s calculation using MOES (2005b) data. 




Results from Propensity Score Matching 
 
Although the OLS results are consistent with findings from previous studies (for e.g., 
Bhatta, 2005), it must be noted that this is an estimate unadjusted for the selectivity as discussed 
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in the methodology chapter. Therefore, I apply the propensity score matching to account for 
selectivity bias. By employing this method, I attempt to estimate average the treatment effects on 
the treated group (ATT). In other words, I am trying to create a counterfactual to reduce the 
selection bias in the estimation of treatment effects with observational datasets. The treatment 
variable is ‘private schooling’ and the outcome is student’s SLC score. The ATT is estimated 
within the common support region and the standard errors are calculated by bootstrapping with 
1000 replications. Balancing propensity scores are estimated in OLS regression by using the 
same set of observable covariates (student, family, school and teacher characteristics, and exam 
context) as those used in the previous OLS model. However, as seen in tables 4.2 and 4.3,  the 
use of propensity score matching reduces the sample size from 19,897 to around 5,100. This is 
due to the fact that the public school students are very different from the private school students.  
We see very few cases where public school students share resemble private school students in 
terms of the characteristics mentioned above. Therefore, when matched on student, family, 
school and teacher characteristics, the best we could get were only 5,100 such cases. This is a 
significant drop in the sample size and is not an encouraging situation. However, the good thing 
is that we are better able to match the distribution of the propensity scores of the treated units at 
least among these 5,100 cases.  
As shown in table 4.6, the ATT of nearest-neighbor matching is 3.96 percent with 2.69 
standard errors (confidence interval of -1.306 and 9.236), and is statistically significant at the 5 
percent level.  In other words, the mean score of the controls after matching increases from 43.25 
to 56.34. Comparing this with the results from the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition results as 
shown in Table 4.5, we can see that the mean difference in SLC score reduces from 17.05 to 3.96 




Table 4.6. Average Treatment Effect on the Treated Estimated by Nearest Neighbor 
Matching 
 
  SLC Score (OLS) SLC Result (Probit) 




[ -1.31, 9.24] [- 0.02, 0.17]        
Source: Author’s calculations 
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors of the difference between a treatment and a control group which are calculated by 
bootstrap techniques with 1000 replications are in parenthesis; (2)The confidence interval associated with the 
standard errors are in brackets; (3)* denotes statistically significant at 10%, ** statistically significant at 5%, and 
*** statistically significant at 1%. 
 
 
Table 4.3, Column 4 reports the OLS estimates after matching. This estimate is 5.33 with a 
standard error of 1.03, which is slightly lower than the previous models. Many of the variables 
that are significant in Model 2 are not significant in this model. For example, regarding variables 
with positive relationship, annual family expenses, language spoken at home, family having a 
computer at home and school having a science and a computer lab are no longer significant in 
this model. Regarding variables with negative association with student performance, lower caste, 
private tutoring, family size, and distance to school from home are no longer significant.  
 
Results from Probit Models 
Table 4.4 reports marginal probabilities evaluated at the sample mean along with standard 
errors from the probit model, where the dependent variable is whether the student passed the 
SLC exam or not. As before, the variable of interest is school type (if private), and the model is 
controlled for student characteristics, family characteristics, school and teacher characteristics 
and exam context variables. The estimates show that school type (private) is positive and 
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statistically significant with a marginal effect of 0.20 and a standard error of 0.20. This means 
that students who are in private schools are 20 percent more likely to pass the SLC exam than 
students from public schools. Looking at the marginal effects of variables other than school type, 
I find that most have the expected signs. For example, variables representing peers, expected 
division, annual family expenses, number of SLC graduates in the family, school size and school 
having a science and a computer lab have a positive sign and are statistically significant. On the 
other hand, variables such as age, gender ( if female), belonging to ethnic groups and other 
castes, private tutoring, being absent from school, family size, student–teacher ratio, the medium 
of exam (if Nepali), preparing food during exam and being sick during the exam are negative and 
statistically significant. Compared with the OLS results, I find that most of the variables are 
consistent in terms of statistical significance in explaining student’s SLC performance.  
Next, I introduce interaction terms to this probit model, estimates of which are reported in 
Column 2 of Table 4.4. The interactions are included for the following variables: school type, 
caste (ethnicity), private tuition, school size, student-teacher ratio, teacher qualification, teacher 
experience and the medium of SLC examination.  The estimates show that school type (if 
private) is positive and statistically significant with marginal effect size of 0.302 and a standard 
error of 0.02. After the use of the interaction terms, the probability of a private school passing the 
SLC exam has increased by another 10 percent. The interaction terms also show interesting 
results in terms of caste/ethnicity of the student. For example, the effect of private school student 
is lower for students belonging to a lower caste. Teacher experience also seems to have a 
negative impact for lower caste students. As seen in earlier models, even students from private 
schools seem to score lower on the SLC exam if the medium of the exam is Nepali. The impact 
of private tutoring on student score is positive, but when it comes to private school students and a 
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higher student teacher ratio, the impact seems to have a negative relationship. This makes good 
sense because most of the students who take private tutoring seem to be low performing students 
in classes that have higher student-teacher ratio. Also, the private school effect is lower for those 
schools with a larger school size.  
Finally, as in the OLS case, I also apply the propensity score matching method to the 
above probit model to estimate the effect of the treatment on the treated (ATT). As before, the 
treatment variable is ‘private schooling’ and now the outcome is student’s SLC result (if passed). 
The ATT is estimated within the common support region and the standard errors are calculated 
by bootstrapping with 1000 replications. However, this time balancing the propensity scores are 
estimated in the probit regression by using the same set of observable covariates as in the 
previous models. As reported in Column 2 of table 4.6, the ATT of nearest-neighbor matching is 
0.77 with 0.05 standard errors (confidence interval of -0.019 & 0.173), which is, however, not 
statistically significant. Column 7 of Table 4.4 reports the marginal effect of school type after 
matching is done. The estimate now is 0.079 with standard error of 0.02.  This means, that the 
students from private schools are now only 7.9 percent more likely to pass the SLC examination 
than their public school counterparts, keeping other things constant. This shows that even after 
adjusting for selection bias, the effect of school type on student’s SLC performance is 
substantial. However, the estimate is much lower than that obtained from the OLS regression. 
Looking at variables other than school type, it is interesting to note that only in this model are 
teacher variables significant. Both teacher qualification and teacher experience have statistically 
significant and positive association with student performance. Also, teacher experience squared 
is negatively significant which means that a longer teacher experience has a negative impact on 
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student performance in the SLC exam. Further, as expected, the results show that the marginal 
effects in most of the covariates are slightly increased with robust standard errors. 
Column 8 of Table 4.4 reports estimates from another probit model, where the dependent 
variable is the language medium of the SLC exam. The variable takes the value 1 if the medium 
of the SLC exam that the student took is Nepali and takes the value 0 if the medium is English or 
mixed (Nepali and English). The variable of interest is school type, and the control variables are 
student, family, school and teacher characteristics, and exam context variables. The estimation 
results show that school type (private) is negative and statistically significant. The marginal 
effect of the school type variable is – 0.158 with a standard error of 0.05. This shows that the 
students in private schools are 15.8 percent less likely to use Nepali as their language medium of 
examination than students from public schools. In addition, the results also show that those 
students who speak Nepali at home are likely to use Nepali as their language medium for the 
SLC examination.  
Results from the interaction terms show that although private school students have a 
negative relationship with the medium of the exam, students from other castes seem to use the 
Nepali medium even if they are in private schools. The teacher experience is positively related to 
the medium of the exam. However, for the lower castes, the ethnic groups and the other castes, 
for schools with higher student-teacher ratio, and for larger schools, teacher experience is 
negatively related to the medium of exam. Students taking private tutoring and with higher 
student-teacher ratio are more likely to use Nepali as the medium of exam. The interaction 
results further show that students exposed to higher teacher qualification but with larger student- 
teacher ratio are likely to use Nepali as the medium of the exam. However, private school 
students being taught with higher qualified teachers are more likely to use English or mixed 
  
121 
language as medium of exam. Also, public schools larger school sizes are more likely to use 
Nepali as their language medium for the exam.  
Finally, Column 9 of Table 4.4, reports estimates from the probit regression that models 
private tutoring for the SLC exam. The dependent variable is private tutoring that takes the value 
one if the student took private tutoring for the SLC exam and zero otherwise. As before, the 
variable of interest is school type, with a similar set of control variables. The results indicate that 
school type (private) is negative and significant. The estimate of the marginal effect is – 0.170 
with a standard error of 0.02. This means that students from private schools are 17.0 percent less 
likely to take private tutoring for the SLC exam as compared to the students from public schools, 
keeping other things constant.  
 The significant interaction terms show that among the private school students, students 
belonging to the ethnic groups and the other caste are more likely to take private tutoring. 
Teacher experience seems to have a negative relationship with student taking private tutoring if 
students belong to the other castes, private schools and in bigger schools. Students in classes 
with a higher student-teacher ratio are more likely to take private tutoring. However, if students 
are exposed to teachers with higher qualifications, they seem to be less likely to take private 
tutoring. Finally, those students who use Nepali as the medium for the exam are more likely to 
take private tutoring. And, this effect seems to be more pronounced for private students who use 
Nepali as the language medium for the SLC exam. This analysis shows that students in public 
schools are most likely to use private tutoring. The results show that students belonging to ethnic 
groups are more inclined not to take private tutoring. The medium of the exam seems to play a  
significant role in explaining which students take private tutoring. Those students who use 
Nepali as the language medium for the SLC exam also seem to be associated positively with 
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private tutoring. At the same time the results show that families with more SLC graduates and 
with good family resources are also likely to send their children for private tutoring.  Further 
students from schools having library, science and computer labs are also likely to go for private 
tutoring.  Hence, there seem to be two groups of students who are more likely to go to private 
tutoring. The first group belongs to the low performing students from public schools, and the 
second group belongs to students from the well-to-do families who aspire to perform better than 
the average. However, the percentage from the first group is suspected to be far bigger than the 
second group, and is an interesting topic for further research. Also, the findings seem to be 
consistent with the literature of private tutoring in developing countries that the demand for 
private tutoring is motivated either by enrichment or remediation. In the case of Nepal, the 





 In this chapter, I analyze the private and public school performance in Nepal using 
various empirical models, the summary of which is presented in table 4.2. First, I use the 
Ordinary Least Squares regression method to model private school and public school 
performance. I performed diagnostic checks and show that the data fulfills Gauss-Markov 
assumptions for linear regression. Next, I add interaction terms and observe that the relationship 
of the variables is explained more fully. For example, the school and teacher related variables 
become more meaningful in explaining their relationship to student’s SLC performance when 
interacted with caste/ethnicity, school type and student-teacher ratio. The estimated coefficient of 
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school type on student’s SLC score from this model is 9.50. This finding suggests that school 
type matters significantly in student’s SLC performance in Nepal.  
Next, the Chow test is performed on the pooled data and then separately for private and 
public school students. The tests on each of the covariates controlled in the regression and 
logistic models suggest that they vary significantly by school type. In addition, a Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition approach that is performed for private and public school students indicates that 
there is a gap of 17.42 percentage points in SLC score between private and public school 
students. Moreover, according to the results from the decomposition, public school students 
would have their SLC score increase by 9.17 percentage points if they were provided the same 
endowments as private school students. 
 In order to tackle the selection bias problem above estimations, I use the propensity score 
matching technique where the treatment is the student going to private school and the outcome is 
student’s SLC performance. The propensity score model reduces the coefficient of school type to 
5.33 and makes the standard errors more robust. Next, I use probit regression to study the impact 
of school type on student’s SLC performance. The results from both the baseline and the model 
with interactions are mostly consistent with the OLS results in determining the impact of school 
type on school performance as well as the impact of other covariates on student’s SLC score. 
The marginal effects from the probit model suggest that public school students are 30.2 percent 
more likely to pass the SLC exam than the public school students. After adding the interactions 
to this model, the relationship between the covariates becomes more meaningful. I also use the 
propensity score matching method to the probit model where the treatment is student going to 
private school and the outcome this time being SLC result (whether student passed in SLC 
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exam). The marginal effect of school type reduces to 7.89, and standard errors are much more 
robust by the use of the matching technique.  
In addition to modeling student’s SLC results, I also perform probit models for the 
medium of the exam and the status of private tutoring. Both the models bear interesting results. 
The findings suggest that public school students are more likely to use Nepali as the medium of 
the SLC exam, and also more likely to use private tutoring compared to the students from private 
schools. In the conclusion, although the study finds that private school students perform better 
than the public school students; the study likes to point out the importance of unobserved factors 
in making the interpretations.  For example, private schools have more resources and students in 
those schools are from families with higher socio-economic status. Therefore, private school 
students are exposed to better peer effects. Thus, it is very likely that these differences account 
for the overall differential in achievement between public and private schools rather than the 














Table 4.1 Variance Inflation Factor 
 
Variable VIF  
PRIVATE 2.37  
EX_MEDIUM 1.55  
SC_COMP_LAB 1.44  
PEERS 1.37  
ST_RATIO 1.37  
SLC_GRADS 1.34  
LIBRARY 1.27  
S_SIZE 1.21  
OTHERS 1.21  
TEACHER_EXP 1.20  
PCT_GIRLS 1.19  
COMPUTER 1.19  
LANG 1.18  
EXP_DIV 1.17  
FAMSIZE 1.16  
SCH_DAYS 1.15  
ETHNIC_GRPS 1.13  
LN_FAM_EXP 1.11  
SLC02 1.10  
AGE 1.10  
SLC03 1.10  
FEMALE 1.08  
P_TUTORING 1.06  
DIST_SCH 1.06  
SCH_ABS 1.05  
TEACHER_QA 1.05  
LOWER_CASTE 1.03  
Source: Author’s Calculation 
Note: The VIF is an indicator used to check the severity of multicollinearity in regression analysis and measures 
how much the variance of an estimated regression coefficient is increased because of collinearity. The formula for 
obtaining the VIF is given by 1/(1-Rj
2) where Rj
2 is the R-squared for jth covariance on other covariates. Generally, if 




















SLC Compulsory subjects 
  




























































































Family Characteristics     
















































School & Teacher  Characteristics     


































Percent of girls in higher secondary -0.005 0.006 0.02*** 0.03 
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grades (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.03) 
































Exam Context     








































Interaction terms     
Ethnic groups*Private school   -1.04** 
(0.43) 
 
Other caste* Private school   1.24** 
(0.45) 
 
Private school* Medium of Exam   -7.17*** 
(0.41) 
 
Private School*Private Tutoring   -1.75*** 
(0.31) 
 
Private School* School size   0.27*** 
(0.03) 
 
Student teacher ratio*Teacher 
qualification 
  -0.23*** 
(0.044) 
 
R2  0.5128 0.5244 0.5367 0.5001 
Number of observations 19897 19897 19897 5104 
Notes: (1) robust standard errors are in parenthesis; (2)* denotes statistically significant at 10%, ** statistically 



















Table 4.4. Probit Estimates of the Effect of School Type on Student’s SLC Result 
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Student Characteristics      



























































































Family Characteristics      




























































School & Teacher  Characteristics      


































































































Exam Context      










































Interaction terms      
Lower caste * Private school  - 0.25** 
(0.09) 
   
Ethnic groups* Private school     0.10*** 
(0.01) 




Lower caste* Teacher experience  - 0.008** 
(0.003) 
   




Student teacher ratio* Teacher  
qualification 




Student teacher ratio* Teacher 
experience 




Student teacher ratio* Private 
tutoring 
 - 0.01*** 
(0.004) 
 - 0.02*** 
(0.004) 
 
Private school* Teacher 
qualification 




Private school* Teacher 
experience 
    - 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Private school* Medium of exam  - 0.26*** 
(0.02) 
  0.17*** 
(0.02) 
Private school* School size  0.007** 
(0.003) 
 - 0.01*** 
(0.002) 
 
School size* Teacher qualification     0.004** 
(0.001) 









Pseudo R2  0.2204 0.2253 0.3081 0.2982 0.0553 
Number of observations 19896 19896 5113 18961 18961 
Notes: (1) robust standard errors are in parenthesis; (2)* denotes statistically significant at 10%, ** 














The idea of competition in economics has been discussed since the time of Adam Smith. 
In this regard, the concept of competition as discussed by Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations 
(1776), was later applied by various economists in the context of the idea of allocating 
productive resources to their most highly-valued uses and encouraging efficiency. Later, 
microeconomics theory distinguished between perfect competition and imperfect competition, 
concluding that no system of resource allocation is more efficient than perfect competition. 
Competition, according to the theory, causes commercial firms to develop new products, services 
and technologies, which give consumers a greater selection and better products. The greater 
selection of products typically lowers the prices for the products, compared to what the price 
would be if there was no competition (monopoly) or little competition (oligopoly)29 (see Pindyk 
& Rubinfeld, 2009). Competition plays a significant role in many areas, not only in business and 
economics, but also in areas such as law, politics, literature, sports, and so on. This dissertation, 
and specifically this chapter, deals with competition in the education field within the private 
sector.  The purpose of this chapter is to explore the second research question of this dissertation: 
keeping other things constant, does private school competition have any impact on public school 
performance in the case of Nepal?   
                                                 
29 A Monopoly arises in the case when a market has a single seller (producer), and an oligopoly occurs in the case 
when a market has few sellers (producers). For example, see Pindyk and Rubinfeld (2009) for a discussion on 
markets in microeconomic theory. 
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This chapter is organized in the following way. Following the discussion on the 
theoretical framework, the background on education market and competition is presented. The 
chapter then reviews some previous studies concerning the evidence surrounding private school 
competition in developed countries. Finally, the chapter presents the models and methods used 




 In the same spirit of chapter 4, this chapter also employs the method of the education 
production function to the present analyses. However, this time I estimate the effect of private 
school competition on public school performance. The dependent variable is the SLC score of 
the public school student. As in the earlier chapter, the SLC score includes only six compulsory 
subjects and is converted into the scale of 100. The variable of interest is private school 
competition, which is given by the number of private schools in the vicinity of the sample 
school. The controls include the same set of variables as used in chapter four, which are student, 
family, school and teacher characteristics, and exam context variables. 
 
Background on Education Market and Competition 
 
Before describing the literature that deals with the evidence related to competition and its 
impact on educational outcomes, it appears more meaningful to first discuss the theoretical 
concepts of ‘educational markets’ and ‘competition’.  An education market is said to exist when 
parents have a feasible choice set of alternative provisions. The choice set has three domains 
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where parents may choose i) between public and private schools, ii) among public school 
districts, and iii) among public schools within a given district (Levin & Belfield, 2002). 
However, the identification of a feasible set in this context is not simplistic, and since the costs 
involved with regard to parents choice differ across the variants, private and public schools may 
not represent a ‘single market’ (Levin & Belfield, 2002; Couch & Shughart, 1995).  
James (1987) puts forth a theory that explains the size of the private sector in education 
as depending on three variables: i) excess demand, stemming from a political coalition, which 
limits government production below full enrollment levels; ii) differentiated demand, arising 
from deep-seated religious or linguistic diversity, in the face of a relatively uniform government 
product; and iii) the supply of nonprofit entrepreneurship, often religious, to start the private 
schools. Levin (1991, 1998, 1999, 2002) sets out a framework for evaluating market reforms 
based on four criteria and three policy instruments. According to him, the four criteria are i) 
freedom of choice; ii) productive efficiency; iii) equity; and iv) social cohesion, and the set of 
three policy instruments  are i) finance, ii) regulation, and iii) support services. All educational 
arrangements, including the market approaches, face a conflicting set of goals, and they involve 
trade offs among these goals (Levin & Belfield, 2003).  Their study argues that any movement in 
the educational market (for example between public and private) faces this trade-off, and it 
points out the ‘voucher program’ as a way to introduce markets into the education system. 
With regards to competition, discussing three aspects of an organization or state: exit, 
voice and loyalty, Hirschman (1970) attributes this economic or market mechanism as an exit 
mechanism. According to Hirschman (1970), those producers who are not able to survive this 
market competition automatically exit the market leaving behind only the efficient performers30. 
                                                 
30 According to Hirshman (1970), the other feature that signals to management its success or failure is the “voice of 
its clientele. In this discussion on public versus private education, the emergence of another type of school called 
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On the concept of competition as a construct, Levin and Belfield (2002) refer both to the 
existence of multiple education suppliers within the choice set, and to how these suppliers 
behave strategically. However, this competition could be either demand-induced or supply-
driven. In the literature we can find many ways in which competition is measured. One of the 
ways is the use of the Herfindahl Index (HI) which is the sum of the squares of per-unit 
enrollments over total enrollments typically relating to public school choices, either inter-district 
or intra-district (Borland & Howson, 1992). A second way to measure competition is the private 
schooling enrollment share. This share may represent competition, but may also be determined 
by other factors, such as regional religiosity, or community wealth levels (Belfield & Levin, 
2002). However, according to Hoxby (1994), neither measure of competition is able to capture 
how or whether schools or districts compete because schools and districts also have the tendency 
to show monopolistic and oligopolistic behavior.  
The next question is what kind of impact does competition have on the educational 
outcomes. Levin and Belfield (2002) believe that market competition improves both technical 
and allocative efficiency in the use of resources. According to the authors, due to competition 
suppliers must strive to be efficient, and demanders will have more choices. However, it is less 
clear whether this can be generalized across all markets and countries. The next section discusses 




                                                                                                                                                             
“community managed schools” can be seen as a ‘voice’ that is taking public schools in a newer direction. In this 
study, I have included community managed schooling within the public schooling system. 
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In his seminal work, Friedman (1962) in “Capitalism and Freedom” advocates the 
introduction of the market mechanism into public education. In connection with the system of 
providing educational vouchers for both public as well as private schools, Friedman says that the 
competition between private and public schools would make the education systems more 
effective. The argument has been a topic of debate for a long time.  For example, Levin (1968) 
argues that the replacement of the publicly operated schools by a market of private ones-
supported by government vouchers would generate mixed results. He explains that on the one 
hand, some parents would have greater choices among schools and some schools would have to 
be productive in order to survive in the competitive framework. On the other hand, he argues that 
the market approach to schooling would do poorly in fulfilling certain social functions such as its 
tendency to increase racial and social stratification of students among schools.  
Empirical results on this hypothesis are mixed.  To start with, let us take the case of how 
charter schools influence the performance of public schools. Charter advocates argue that charter 
schools are more innovative and more responsive to students than public schools. In addition, 
they claim that charter schools, apart from improving educational outcomes of charter students, 
also improve student outcomes at neighboring public schools through increased competition. 
Bettinger (1999) uses data from Michigan’s standardized testing program and estimates the 
effect of charter schools on both students attending them and students at neighboring public 
schools. The paper exploits the factor of exogenous variation created by Michigan’s charter law 
that allows state universities to approve charter schools to identify the effects of charter schools 
on public schools. The study uses the proximity of a public school to one of these state 
universities as an instrument for the likelihood that one or more charter schools were established 
nearby. The results, using both the OLS and instrumental variables approaches show that charter 
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schools have little or no effect on student achievement in neighboring public schools. However, 
there is a serious concern that the instrument he has chosen (proximity of public school to one of 
the authorizing state universities) is very likely to be correlated with the error term, which in turn 
will cause results to be biased. Additionally, the results in this study were estimated in the midst 
of the rapid growth of charter schools in the U.S (short run), and this might differ with the long 
run equilibrium of charter schools.  
Coming to the more specific issue, there are many studies that have conducted a literature 
review on the effect of private school competition on public school performance. Rouse and 
McLaughlin (1998) provide a review of the literature on the effects of school competition on 
performance of public schools and show that the evidence is mixed. Similarly, Levin and 
Belfield (2002) carry an impressive review of 42 studies on the effects of greater market 
competition on academic outcomes. They show that over one –third of the studies report a 
statistically significant positive association between increased competition and higher public 
school achievement. The study also points out that very few studies show more competition 
having a negative impact on public school achievement, and there are few studies with no effect 
at all.  In summarizing the evidence of competition on educational outcome, I have borrowed the 
same approach as Levin and Belfield (2002), where I group the literature according to the 
measure of competition used in various studies.   
 
Evidence Using Herfindahl Index 
 As discussed earlier, one of the ways to measure competition is by using the Herfindahl 
Index (HI). Using this measure, most empirical articles report only weak or null effects on 
academic outcomes (Borland & Howson, 1992, 1995; Hanushek & Rivkin, 2001; Marlow, 
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2000).  One of the frequently citied studies is by Henry and Gordon (2003) who also adopt the 
Herfindahl index as a measure of competition. Using longitudinal data from a probability sample 
of children who participated in Pre-K during the 1996-1997 school year, the study estimates the 
effects of naturally occurring variations in institutional structures on students’ outcomes after 
four years of schooling. Their results show that competition results in lower retention rates, and 
improves third grade reading and math test scores, but does not significantly affect teachers’ 
readiness during elementary school. However, this study seems to suffer from missing data since 
33 percent of the children lacked data on their test scores. Also, the results are likely to be biased 
because of the use of test scores of the on-grade children.  
Greene and Kang (2004) employ two measures relating to the degree of competition: the 
percent of private school enrollments in a county where the public school district is located, and 
the Herfindahl index of school district concentration. The study uses a data set on an upstate 
New York school district to test whether competition from private schools and competition 
within the public school sector positively affect public school output and again whether different 
types of expenditures affect output differently. In general, the study finds significant positive 
effects of private competition for some measures of school output, but little if any on measures 
such as the percent of students receiving high quality statewide Regents diplomas. The study, 
however, seems to suffer from measurement error because some variables measured at the 
county level are mismatched to the dependent school output variables that are measured at the 
district level. Also, the use of aggregated data has a high likelihood of inflating the coefficients 
through omitted variable bias.  
There are other studies that use HI for categorization of markets. For example, studies 
that categorize markets into high or low levels of competition mostly find positive and more 
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significant results (Borland & Howson, 1993; Zanzig, 1997) except for Figlio and Stone (1999) 
who find no clear positive effects across the US. Finally, there are other studies that use 
interaction of HI with other process measures. For example, Hanushek and Rivkin (2001) 
interact their HI scores with the percentage of different teachers across 1,140 schools and 832 
districts in Texas. Their results show that more competition leads to a smaller between cohort 
variance in school average value-added test scores.  
 
Evidence using Private School Enrollment 
a) Using district/country/school level data 
Many studies have used private schools enrollments as a measure of competition and across 
districts and counties. These studies have shown mixed results for the effect of private school 
competition on public school outcomes. Couch, Shughart, and Williams (1993) present empirical 
estimates that indicate that public schools in North Carolina counties with higher levels of 
private school enrollment also had higher grades on the End of Term Test for Algebra I. Their 
results are based on OLS estimates that treat private school enrollment as an exogenous variable. 
But, there is a high chance of endogeneity between private school enrollment and public school 
performance, and hence the OLS results can be highly biased. Newmark (1995) replicates the 
work of Couch et al. (1993) and also estimates equations using alternative standardized exams, 
various measures of private school competition, and various combinations of control variables. 
Newmark’s findings show that Couch et al. (1993)’s results are not robust and demonstrate that 
the estimated effect of private school competition is not significant. Geller, Sjoquist, and Walker 
(2001) investigate whether increased private school competition results in enhanced performance 
of public schools using a pooled data set from the Georgia school systems between 1980 and 
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1990 for third and tenth grade for reading and math test scores. They address the endogeneity 
between private school enrollment and public school performance by using lagged private school 
enrollment as the instrument for private school competition. Their results suggest very little 
evidence that current levels of private school competition increase public school performance in 
Georgia. Simon and Lovrich (1996), using data on districts in Washington state find neutral 
effects, and Sander (1999), using school level data finds no significant effect on Math scores 
within the State of Illinois. On the other hand, there are studies which show counter results. For 
example, studies of Smith and Meier (1995) and Maranto, Milliman and Stevens (2000) show 
that competition has an adverse effect on public school performance.  
b) Using Student level data  
McMillan (1998) uses NELS data and finds weak negative effects on public school 8th 
grade scores. Arum (1996) using High School and Beyond data, finds a positive effect for 
individuals’ 12th grade test scores. Hoxby (1994) uses the instrumental variables (IV) approach 
in a nationwide study to show that public schools perform better in areas where they face more 
competition from private schools. She uses density of Roman Catholics as an instrument for 
private schools, and finds that public high schools’ outcomes are better in areas with more 
competition. Jepsen (1999) using NELS and NLS72 data finds that the effect of competition is 
mostly insignificant for standardized mathematics scores.  
 
 Evidence Using Other Measures of Competition 
 There are studies that use proxy measures for competition typically for different levels of 
choice and are somewhat related to Herfindahl index values. For example, Marlow (1997) uses 
number of districts/schools per 1000 students, and finds a strongly positive statistical effect on 
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Math SAT and 8th grade scores, but weaker effects on Verbal SAT scores across the 50 states. 
Blair and Staley (1995) use the number of neighboring districts and find no effect on district-
level achievement test scores in Ohio. Geller, Sjoquist and Walker (2001), using the same proxy 
measure find no positive effects on academic scores in Georgia. Husted and Kenny (2000) use a 
proxy for government (monopoly) intervention and show mixed results. Hammons (2001) uses 
two measures of choice: i) proportion of town-tuitioned students and ii) distance to all tuition 
towns within a seven mile radius and finds a positive effect. On the other hand Hoxby (2000) 
uses the share of a district’s enrollment in a particular metropolitan area as a measure of school 
choice with an instrumental variable based on the natural boundaries to the formation of school 
districts. In this study, the author finds a positive effect of competition on academic scores. 
 Overall, the evidence from the literature suggests that the effect of competition on public 
school performance is mixed. Some studies suggest positive effects of private school competition 
and others find no effect. But, more find large effects. Many studies account for the endogenity 
between private school enrollment and public school performance using the instrumental 
variable method. Even after dealing with this identification problem, the evidence is mixed, and 
hence the issue demands more rigorous studies. From a critical viewpoint, there are chances of 
having the mis-measurement of variables representing competition and, hence, results might be 
misleading. Also, these studies which use instrumental variables, rely on the quality of the 
instrument used.  Furthermore, many of the above studies also suffer from omitted variable bias 
where the key variables are omitted from the model especially due to data unavailability or 
missing data problems. In addition, some of the above studies are also crippled due to 
publication bias, where only studies that find statistically significant effects are submitted and 
recommended for publication. As Levin and Belfield (2002) point out, publication bias is of 
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serious concern in areas of research where there are a large number of small-sample studies; 
where fewer randomized trials are conducted; and where research is ideologically motivated. 
Finally, these studies might not have good external validity. For example, Hoxby’s (1994) 
primary explanatory variable is the percentage of the local population that is Roman Catholic. So 
her results may not generalize to all private schools. Besides, most of the studies discussed so far 
are based on the U.S educational system, and generalization to developing countries might not 
hold true. We need to gather more empirical evidence from both developing as well as developed 
countries, especially more from the former.  
 
Evidence on Nepal 
In the case of Nepal, I have not found any study related to private school competition. A 
study that comes close is by Bhatta (2005), where he attempts to explore the determinants of 
student performance in the SLC examination using OLS and logistic regressions.  Although the 
main results of the study suggest statistically significant differences in student performance 
across school types (public versus private), genders, ethnicities and school locations, the findings 
also indicate that the number of private schools in the vicinity of the sample school has a 
negative effect on student SLC score. However, this is statistically significant only at the10 
percent level. Further, like many studies of this kind, the paper is very likely to suffer from an 
endogenity problem which is not accounted for in the study. For example, as highlighted in an 
earlier section there is a high chance of a correlation between the number of private schools in 
the vicinity and private schools enrollment. Besides this, to the best of my knowledge, there is no 




Models and Identification Strategies 
 
As shown in the literature review section above, there are many studies of private school 
competition on public school performance in developed countries. However, there is little 
evidence on less developed countries such as Nepal. This dissertation attempts to provide 
empirical evidence of the impact of private school competition on pubic school performance in 
the case of Nepal.  
 
The Basic Empirical Model 
The approach to this section is to test the hypothesis that a student of a public school that 
faces private school competition performs better on the SLC examination than a student from a  
public school that does not face private school competition, holding other things constant. 
Symbolically, the model postulates that the performance of a student i, in public school p is 
given by the following reduced form expression: 
 
(5.1) Yip =  π0  + π1 C(i)p + π2X'ip + ηip  
 
where Yip is the SLC Test Score
31 of student i in public school p, C(i)p represents private school 
competition32, given by the number of private schools in the neighborhood of public school p, 
Xip  is a vector of control variables representing student, family, school, teacher, and community 
                                                 
31 Note that the SLC Score is computed only for compulsory subjects (Math, Science, English, Nepali, Social 
Studies and Health & Population studies), and is converted to a scale of 100 (total score =100). 
32 The subscript i within the parenthesis denotes that although private school competition is a school level variable, it 
is applied to i th student. 
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characteristics, and exam context variables, and  ηip is random disturbance with mean zero and 
constant variance.   
 The dependent variable in this case is the SLC score of public school students, which is a 
continuous variable. The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression method is used to estimate 
equation 5.1. 
 
Identification Problems & Strategy 
With regards to the correlation between competition measure and educational outcome, 
there are two major estimation problems (Dee, 1998). First is the problem of simultaneity. In our 
context, the demand for private school will increase when public schools do not perform well. 
This creates a negative relationship between public school quality and private school enrollment. 
The second problem is related to omitted variable bias. This means, when factors that confound 
the relationship between public school quality and private school supply are omitted from the 
analysis, the results will be biased. Besides these two major problems, there could be other biases 
while estimating this relationship (Levin & Belfield, 2002). For example, when private school 
students sort more able students (cream skimming), performance of public schools might fall. 
This will then result to the omitted variable bias. In another case, resource– omission bias may 
come into play when the higher demand for private schooling reduces taxpayer support for pubic 
schooling. Finally, when local socio-economic characteristics such as community income and 
educational levels influence the demand for private schooling, then could lead to socioeconomic-
omission bias. 
In equation 5.1, the identification problem exists due to endogeneity between private 
school enrollment and public school performance (Geller et al., 2001). In addition, both the 
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competition effect, as discussed before, and a “cream skimming” effect might be operating 
simultaneously. In order to address this endogeneity problem, the literature suggests the use of 
the instrumental variable approach.  In such a case, if the measure of competition is private 
school enrollment, then the supply is identified through a source of variation that is held to be 
uncorrelated with schooling quality (Levin & Belfield, 2002).  
Identification strategies based on instrumental variables can be thought of as a scheme 
for using exogenous filed variation to approximate randomized trials, and are hence used to 
remove any such bias. This is possible if the researcher has access to an instrumental variable Z, 
which is correlated with private school competition (C), but is otherwise independent of the SLC 
performance of public school student (S). The identifying assumption in this case is that the 
instrumental variable, Z, is independent of educational outcomes, which means that Z is 
uncorrelated with η (Cov(Z, η) =0), and Z is correlated with C (Cov(Z, C) ≠ 0).  These 
assumptions serve to indentify the parameter π 1. Identification of π 1 in this context means that I 
can write π 1 in terms of population covariances. The covariance between Z and S is: 
 
(5.2) Cov (Z, S) = π 1 Cov(Z, C) + Cov (Z, η) 
 
Since by assumption, Cov (Z, η) =0,  & Cov(Z, C) ≠ 0, I can solve for the IV estimate of π 1 as 
 




Equation (5.2) is typically estimated using 2SLS by substituting the fitted value from a 
first-stage regression on Cp on Xip and Zp, which is also called the reduced form equation.  The 2 
SLS equations can be stated as follows: 
 
2nd stage: 












)( '' pippipi XZC ξλλλ +++=  
 
where, Z is an instrument for private school competition, ξ p is a random error term associated 
with the reduced form equation, and ^ represent predicted values. 
 
The most serious challenge of the IV strategy is the validity of the instrument because 
the choice of instrument for private school competition is critical for properly identifying any 
existing bias. Again, the major assumptions of this method are that a) instrumental variable (Z) 
should have no partial effect on student’s SLC score (S) and, b) the instrumental variable should 
not be correlated with the unobserved factors that affect student’s SLC score. These assumptions 
of instrument validity can be tested. A simple way to check is to look for an association between 
Z and other variables that should not be affected by private school competition (C). Another 
useful check is to look for an association between the instrument(s) and educational outcomes in 
samples where there is no reason for such a relationship.  
Instruments that we find in the literature relating to private school competition are lagged 
private school enrollment to instrument for concurrent year’s percentage of students in private 
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schools (Geller et al., 2001), and the density of Roman Catholics as the instrument for private 
schools (Hoxby, 1994), and so on. In this study I use the presence of a motorable road to a 
walking distance from the sample school as an instrument for number of private schools in the 
neighborhood. The idea behind this instrument is that having a motorable road provides a high 
chance of having more private schools in that locality, but it does not have any direct relation to 
the student’s test score. In other words, my claim is that presence of a motorable road is 
correlated with private school competition and not correlated with the SLC score of the public 
school student.  
 
Estimation and Results 
 
Specification and Diagnostic Analysis 
 
 Similar to the diagnostic analysis performed in chapter four, I check the six classical 
linear model assumptions33 for ordinary least square models relating the impact of private school 
competition on public school competition. First, I check if the error term, η follows an 
approximate normal distribution. The plot of the histogram of the residuals as shown in figure 
5.1 suggests that residuals follow an approximate normal distribution.  
 
 
                                                 
33 This includes all Guass-Markov assumptions , and also the assumptions of a normally distributed error term. 
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Next, I check if there is heteroskedasticity in the OLS regression. I check this by plotting 
residuals against the fitted values and visually inspecting for heteroskedasticity.  Figure 5.2 
shows that the residuals are almost near the zero mean. The graph also shows that the 
distribution of the residuals do not narrow or widen as most of them are reasonably evenly 































Next, I examine outliers or extreme values by plotting leverage against residual squared. 
Figure 5.3 shows that there are no points on the right upper side of the graph indicating no 
significant outlier evident in the chosen variable set.  
 





















Finally, I examine multicollinearity in my regression using the variance inflation index (VIF) 
that measures the impact of collinearity among the variables in a regression model. The VIF 
values as presented in table 5.1 show that all the independent variables have VIF values that are 
less than 1.43, suggesting no case of multicollinearlity among the independent variables. Further, 
examining the correlations between the independent variables confirms the absence of 
multicollinearity in the regression analysis.  
 
Validity Check for Instrument Variable 
 As mentioned in the methodology section, I use an instrumental variable to correct for the 
endogeneity problem in estimating the impact of private school competition on public school 
performance. The instrument that I choose is the presence of a motorable road within an hour’s 
walking distance from the sample school. The idea is that having a motorable road increases the 
chances of private school competition in the area, but has no direct impact on the public school 
student’s SLC performance. But, one can always argue that if there is a motorable road near the 
school, the student will have access to better educational facilities, and that more educated 
parents might choose the area for their residence, thereby contributing to student’s outcome. 
Therefore, it is necessary to control for some measure of population density in order to capture 
the effect of urbanism. Due to data limitations, I use the information that describe whether the 
school is located in the district headquarters as a proxy for a measure of population density. The 
choice of this variable relies on the idea that more people tend to live and crowd in district 
headquarters than other parts of the district. 
 The validity of the chosen instrumental variable depends on it having a high correlation 
with the number of private schools in the neighborhood of the school (measure of private school 
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competition for this study), and a smaller or zero correlation with the SLC performance of public 
school student. As shown in Table 5.2, the first- stage equations shows that the coefficient of 
motorable road is positive and significant at the 1 percent with a coefficient of 3.13 and a 
standard error of 0.07. Even after adding the covariates in this equation, the variable is 
significant at the 1 percent level. This confirms that there is a statistically significant correlation 
between the instrument variable (motorable road) and private school competition. Next, I check 
the correlation between the instrument and the outcome variable ( the SLC score) and find that 
there is almost a zero correlation between them (0.08). This fulfills both conditions as discussed 




Table 5.2. First-stage equation of 2SLS 
 




Motorable road 3.13*** 1.40*** 
  (0.07) (0.05) 
 R2 0.0975 0.2398 
 Obs 19921 19900 
 F statistic  2152.5 235.14 
Notes: (1) The dependent variable is private school competition, given by the number of private schools in the 
vicinity of the sample school; (2) robust standard errors are in parenthesis; (3)* denotes statistically significant at 





 With the above mentioned instrumental variable, this dissertation employs the 2SLS 
(Two Stage Least Squares) method to obtain the IV estimators. The study performs a Hausman 
test (general as well as the Wu version) to check the superiority of using a 2SLS over an OLS 
method. The null hypothesis is that the OLS estimator is consistent. If the null hypothesis is 
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accepted, it indicates that OLS method is better than the 2SLS method. The Wu version makes 
use of the original OLS version where it adds the OLS predicted values of all the (suspected) 
endogenous variables. In the case of this study, it is the predicted value of private school 
competition. Therefore, the Wu version of the Hausman test is the standard significance test for 
the coefficients on these added variables (see Greene, 2008). The two Hausman tests give 
identical information. The general version is in chi-square form, and equals 6.91 with p-value of 
0.008.  The Wu version gives a t-statistics, t = 2.67, which is approximately the square root of 
6.91. They have the same p-value of 0.008, indicating rejection of the consistency of the OLS, 
and hence providing support for using the 2SLS over the OLS method.  
 
Power Check of the instrument  
 To test the power of the instrument variable, I first set the hypothesis that the coefficient 
of motorable road variable is zero. Then, I perform F-test for the 1st stage equation. The 
calculated value of F statistic for the first stage without covariates for 19921 observations and 1 
degree of freedom is 2152.54. With covariates, F statistic for the first stage for 19900 
observations and 31 degrees of freedom is 235.14. In both the cases, the calculated value is much 
higher than the tabulated value (6.61) at 1 percent critical value. Hence, I reject the hypothesis 
and conclude that motorable road is significant in predicting private school competition, hence 
confirming the presence of the power of the instrument used. 
 
Empirical Results 
Continuous Measure of Private School Competition 
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The measure of private school competition in this study is the number of private schools 
in the vicinity of the school. Although the focus of this chapter is on public school students, I 
begin by reporting the OLS estimates of the effect of private school competition on private 
school student’s SLC score controlling for student, family, school, teacher and community 
characteristics, and exam context variables. The results as presented in column 1 and 2 of Table 
5.4 show that private school competition is not significant in explaining private school 
performance in both the models, with and without the interaction terms.  
Table 5.3 gives the summary, and Table 5.4 (columns 3 through 7) gives the detailed 
estimates of the effect of private school competition on public school performance, To start with, 
Column 3 of Table 5.3 gives the OLS estimates of the effect of private school competition on 
public school student’s SLC performance. The results show that private school competition is not 
significant with a coefficient of 0.01 and a standard error of 0.03. Regarding variables other than 
private school competition, variables those are significant with a positive relationship are: peers, 
expected division, annual family expenditure, number of SLC graduates in the family, language 
spoken at home (if Nepali), having a computer at home, school size, school having a library, 
school having a science and a computer lab, numbers of school days in the school year, and 
percent of girls in higher secondary grades. On the other hand, variables that are significant and 
show a negative relationship are: age, gender (if female), student belonging to lower caste, ethnic 
groups and other castes, number of days absent in grade 10, family size, student-teacher ratio, 
student preparing food during the SLC exam, student being sick during the SLC exam, and the 




Table 5. 3. Estimates of Private School Competition on Public School Student’s SLC score 
 
 Measure of  Competition 
 Continuous  
(Number of Private Schools) 
Binary Measure 
1 = Competition 
 OLS OLS IV OLS IV 













Student Characteristics √ √ √ √ √ 
Family Characteristics √ √ √ √ √ 
School & Teacher  
Characteristics 
√ √ √ √ √ 
Community and  Exam 
Context 
√ √ √ √ √ 
Interaction terms  √ √   
R2  0.299 0.304 0.258 0.298 0.289 
Number of observations 15643 15643 15643 15643 15643 
Notes: (1) The dependent variable is the SLC score of the pubic school student, which is converted to the scale of 
100. (2) The continuous measure of competition is given by the number of private schools in the neighborhood of 
the school, and for binary measure of competition, it is coded as 1 if there is more than one private school in the 
vicinity of the school, and 0 otherwise; (3) robust standard errors are in parenthesis; (4)* denotes statistically 
significant at 10%, ** statistically significant at 5%, and *** statistically significant at 1%. 
 
 
Column 4 of Table 5.4 presents the estimates when the interactions between the 
covariates are included in the previous model.  The results show that private school competition 
is still not significant, with coefficient of 0.13 and a standard error of 0.03. The statistically 
significant interactions are among caste/ethnicity, student-teacher ratio and school size with 
teacher qualification; and between the school’s location (district headquarter and school size). 
Higher teacher qualification seems to have a negative relationship with public school student’s 
performance if the student is from an other caste and when the student-teacher ratio is higher in 
public school, whereas, higher teacher qualification has a positive impact on student’s 
performance if the school size if larger. Unlike the earlier model, whether or not the school is 
located in the district headquarter seems to matter. For example, a school being in the district 
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headquarter has a positive impact on public school student’s performance. On the other hand, 
even if the school is located in the district headquarter, but has a larger size, this has a negative 
impact on student performance.  
In column 5 of Table 5.4, estimates from the instrumental variable regression method are 
reported. The outcome variable is the SLC score of a public school student, the treatment 
variable is private school competition, and controls include a similar set of covariates as in the 
previous models. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the instrument for private school 
competition is the presence of a motorable road to an hour’s walking distance from the school.  
The IV method shows interesting results as presented in Column 5. The estimate of private 
school competition is now positive and statistically significant with a coefficient of 0.81 and 
standard error of 0.38. Variables other than private school competition show expected signs 
while explaining their relationship with public school student’s performance. For example, 
variables that are significant with positive relationships are: peers, expected division, annual 
family expenditure, number of SLC graduates in the family, language spoken at home (if 
Nepali), school having a library, school having a science lab and a computer lab, number of 
school days at school, and percent of girls in higher secondary grades. And, variables that are 
significant with negative relationship are: age, gender (if female), student belonging to lower 
caste, ethnic groups and other caste, number of days absent from school, family size, student 
preparing food during SLC exam, student being sick during exam, and SLC years 2002 and 
2003. The results also show that teacher qualification by itself is not significant in determining 
student performance. However, the interaction between teacher qualification and student-teacher 
ratio indicates that higher teacher qualification with lower student-teacher ratio has a positive 




Binary Measure of Private School Competition 
Note that I have been using private school competition as a continuous variable in earlier 
models, which is given by the number of private schools in the vicinity of the public school 
under study. I also construct another measure of competition that is binary in nature. If there is 
more than one private school in the vicinity of the school, then private school competition is 
coded as one; otherwise it is coded as zero. Column 6 of Table 5.3 shows the results from the 
OLS regression using private school competition in binary form.  The variable of interest, as 
before, is private school competition and the regression controls for the same set of covariates as 
in the preceding models. The OLS results show that private school competition is not statistically 
significant in determining public school student’s SLC exam outcome with a coefficient of – 
0.09 and a standard error of 0.16.   
Next, I use the instrumental variables method using the same instrument (motorable road) 
for private school competition. The only difference this time is that the treatment variable is 
dichotomous (whether or not the school faces private school competition). The results, as 
presented in column 7, show that private school competition is statistically significant in 
explaining public school student’s SLC score. The coefficient has drastically improved to 2.18 
with standard error of 0.83. In other words, if a school faces private school competition, then, 
findings of this study suggest that the SLC score of a student in that school increases by 2.18 






 In this chapter, the effect of private school competition on public school performance is 
analyzed. The measure of private school competition in this study is given by the number of 
private schools in the vicinity of the school under study. First, I estimate the effect of private 
school competition on private school performance. The results (both baseline and with 
interactions) suggest that private school competition is not statistically significant in explaining 
the performance of private schools for this study. Next, I construct a model on public schools 
where the dependent variable is the SLC score of public school students. The results from the 
OLS models suggest that the private school competition is not significant in explaining public 
school performance, the coefficient of private school competition merely being 0.12. In addition, 
the OLS results seem to give biased results because public school performance is believed to be 
correlated to private school enrollment, what we call the endogeneity problem. As an 
identification strategy to tackle this problem, I use presence of a motorable road within an hour’s 
walking distance to the school as an instrument for private school competition. The assumptions 
of the instrument variable seem to be valid for the instrument chosen. Also, to make the 
instrument meaningful and to capture any other effect of urban concentration, I control for a 
measure of population density. For this, I use the information concerning whether the school area 
is in the district headquarters as a proxy for a measure of population density. I also perform the 
Hausman’s test and find that the 2SLS model is better than the OLS. The IV method gives 
interesting results as the coefficient of private school competition (2.04) becomes significant 
(even at the 1 percent level of significance). Finally, I use a binary measure of competition where 
I code competition to take the value one if there is more than one private school in the vicinity of 
the public school, and zero otherwise. The OLS results using this measure indicate that private 
school competition is not statistically significant in explaining public school performance. 
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However, the IV method shows that the coefficient of private school competition is 2.45, and is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  Using two measures of competition reaffirms the 
consistency of the statistically significant OLS estimates, and statistically significant IV estimate 
of private school competition. Therefore results from the IV methods suggest that private school 
competition does have a positive impact, though not large, on the public student’s performance 
in the case of Nepal.  
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Table 5.1. Variance Inflation Factor 
 
Variable VIF  
PRIVATE_NUM 1.62  
S_SIZE 1.49  
HQRT 1.42  
LANG 1.29  
OTHERS 1.27  
LIBRARY 1.25  
SLC_GRADS 1.23  
SC_COMP_LAB 1.23  
ETHNIC_GRPS 1.19  
PCT_GIRLS 1.19  
PEERS 1.17  
ST_RATIO 1.17  
FAMSIZE 1.14  
TEACHER_EXP 1.13  
TEACHER_QA 1.11  
SLC02 1.10  
EXP_DIV 1.09  
SLC03 1.09  
FEMALE 1.09  
AGE 1.07  
DIST_SCH 1.06  
LN_FAM_EXP 1.05  
SCH_ABS 1.04  
SCH_DAYS 1.04  
LOWER_CASTE 1.03  
P_TUTORING 1.03  
COMPUTER 1.02  
EX_MEDIUM 1.02  
Source: Author’s Calculation 
Note: The VIF is an indicator for checking the severity of multicollinearity in regression analysis and measures how 
much the variance of an estimated regression coefficient is increased because of collinearity. The formula for 
obtaining VIF is given by 1/(1-Rj
2) where Rj
2 is the R-squared for jth covariance on other covariates. Generally, if the 






Table 5.4. Estimates of Effect of Private School Competition on Student’s SLC 
Performance by School Type 
 
 Private Schools Public Schools 
 Continuous Measure Continuous Measure Binary Measure 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS  IV OLS IV 


















































































































































































































































School & Teacher  Characteristics 
























































































































































































































EX_MED * P_TUTOR  -2.58*** 
(0.79) 
     







ST_RATIO * EX_MED  -2.15*** 
(0.31) 
     
OTHERS *TCH_QA    -1.09** 
(0.35) 
   
S_SIZE* TCH_QA    0.18*** 
(0.03) 
   
HQRT*S_SIZE    -0.40*** 
(0.04) 
   
R2  0.4387 0.4487 0.2978 0.3037 0.2580 0.2978 0.2885 
Number of observations 4254 4254 15643 15643 15643 15643 15643 
Notes: (1) The dependent variable is the SLC score of the pubic school student, which is converted on the scale of 
100. (2) The continuous measure of competition is given by the number of private schools in the neighborhood of 
the school, and for the binary measure of competition, it is coded as 1 if there is more than one private school in the 
vicinity of the school, and 0, otherwise; (3) robust standard errors are in parenthesis; (4)* denotes statistically 



























Summary of Findings 
 
 
This dissertation seeks to answer two research questions using data from the Ministry of 
Education, Nepal (MOES, 2005b). The first question is whether public school students perform 
better than private school students, controlling for student, family, school, teacher and exam 
context variables. Chapter 4 of this dissertation addresses the first question using the Ordinary 
Least Squares regression method to model private school and public school performance. The 
findings show that school type (private) is positive and statistically significant in explaining 
student’s SLC performance. For example, the estimated coefficients of school type on student’s 
SLC score obtained from final OLS model is 9.50. This indicates that a student from a private 
school has 9.50 points higher score in her SLC exam as compared to a student from public 
school, keeping other things constant. Next, the Chow test is performed on the pooled data, and 
then separately for private and public school students. The tests on each of the covariates 
controlled in the regression and logistic models suggest that they vary significantly by school 
type. In addition, the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition performed for private school and public 
school students indicate a gap of 17.42 points in SLC score between private and public school 
students. According to the results from the decomposition, there would be an increase of 9.17 
points in the SLC score of public school students if they were provided the same endowments as 
private school students. 
 The OLS results are likely to be plagued by the selection-bias problem. In order to tackle 
this issue, the study uses the propensity score matching technique, where the treatment is going 
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to private school and the outcome is student’s SLC performance. The average treatment effect on 
the treated (ATT) derived from propensity score matching is 3.96 with a bootstrapped standard 
error of 2.68. Also, as a result of taking into account the presence of selection bias, the 
coefficient of school type after propensity score matching is only 5.33. 
Seeking the answer to the first research question, the study also uses a probit regression 
to examine the impact of school type on student’s SLC performance. The results from the probit 
estimations are mostly similar to the OLS results in determining the impact of school type as 
well as other covariates in explaining the student performance. The marginal effects from the 
probit model suggest that public school students are 30.2 percent more likely to pass the SLC 
exam than the public school students. As in the case of the OLS, the propensity score matching 
method is also applied to the probit model; this time the outcome variable being categorical (1 if 
the student passed the SLC exam). After performing the matching, the marginal effect of school 
type reduces to 7.89. Finally, besides using the probit model with SLC as the dependent variable, 
the study also applies probit models for the language medium of the exam and private tutoring.  
Interestingly, the results suggest that public school students are more likely to use Nepali as the 
language medium for the SLC exam and take private tutoring compared to students from private 
schools.   
Chapter 5 of the dissertation deals with the second research question, and attempts to 
explore the impact of private school competition on public school performance. The measure of 
private school competition is given by the number of private schools in the vicinity of the sample 
school. The results from the OLS regressions show that private school competition is not 
statistically significant in explaining public school performance. Moreover, the OLS results seem 
to give biased results due to the endogeneity between private school enrollment and public 
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school performance. This study uses the presence of a motorable road within an hour’s walking 
distance to the school as an instrument for number of private schools (private school 
competition) to account for this problem. To ensure the validity of the instrument, the study also 
controls for the information if the school area is located in the district headquarters as a proxy for 
a measure of population density. Further, Hausman’s test performed for the instrument confirms 
that the 2SLS model is better than the OLS model. Interestingly, the findings from the IV method 
show that the coefficient of private school competition is 2.04 and this is statistically significant 
even at the 1 percent level of significance. Finally, binary measure of competition is also 
constructed where competition is coded taking the value one if there is more than one private 
school in the vicinity of the public school, and zero otherwise. As in the continuous measure, the 
private school competition variable is not statistically significant in OLS but is significant in the 
IV method. For example, the coefficient of private school competition using the IV method is 
2.18 with standard error value of 0.83.  Therefore, the final results from the IV method suggest 
some evidence of a positive impact of private school competition on the public student’s 






The study of private versus public schooling is of great interest at the present time. The 
topic is more interesting in the case of developing countries where the demand for a better 
education system is rising day by day. In such a situation, a study on linkages between private 
and public education becomes crucial to both education researchers and policy makers. In 
addition, as the wave of privatization of education in developing countries is taking huge strides, 
this study is of even more importance. This study is one of the first empirical studies on the 
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impact of private school competition on public school performance in a developing country 
setup. 
One of the major strengths of this study is the use of data on the SLC (School Leaving 
Certificate) examination from the Ministry of Education which is one of the most comprehensive 
data sets collected so far in Nepal relating to the SLC examinations. The SLC examinations are, 
by far, the most important school-level exams for the majority of Nepalese.  Hence, the use of 
data incorporating the SLC variables and outcomes is very appropriate for this study. In addition, 
this study adopts the propensity score matching and the instrumental variable method as an 
identification strategy to address the selection bias/endogeneity problem. Therefore, this makes 
the study richer as compared to those that do not account for these serious problems, and hence 
contributes to the literature of private versus public schooling in developing countries. 
With regards to limitations, the first concerns the unobservable factors that the data does not 
capture. There could be factors that cannot be measured but enter the equations in both the 
analyses. In that case, the study will also be likely to suffer from the omitted variable bias. The 
second concern relates to the missing data problem, with the rate of missing data being quite 
high for some variables. In this study, only those variables with a rate of missing rate of below 
25 percent are considered. In addition, the study adopts regression and multiple imputation 
method to address the missing data problem. In spite of these steps, the drawbacks of using data 
imputation are always there. In addition, the data is cross-sectional, and therefore I am not able 
to measure the value-added in students’ performance over a period of time. Furthermore, 
nationally representative school surveys generally involve multistage, stratified random sampling 
designs. The data resulting from such surveys have complex hierarchical structures which might 
lead to biased results. This study does not take account of this as well. The third limitation 
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concerns the measure of competition. For example, this dissertation uses the number of private 
schools in the vicinity of the sample school as the measure of private school competition. This 
might not be an ideal measure of competition. A better measure of competition would rather be 
the Herfindahl index as discussed in the literature review section of chapter 5. However, given 
Nepal’s poorly organized education system, it is difficult to identify market share of educational 
units in the district or zonal level.  As a result, this study makes no attempt to construct a 
Herfindahl index. The fourth limitation relates to the analysis of private school competition on 
the public school performance. The present analysis is at the overall level, and includes both 
urban and rural districts of the country. However, it is very likely that many districts, especially 
in the rural areas of Nepal, could have very few private schools or no private school at all. In 
such a case, it is ideal to make the analysis based on only the urban districts of the country. 
Finally, the limitation could be related to the methodology as well. In estimating the effect of 
private school competition on public school performance, this study uses the presence of a 
motorable road within an hour’s walking distance from the sample school as an instrument for 
the number of private schools in the neighborhood. Here, I am assuming that the presence of a 
motorable road is not correlated with the error term. But, one must admit that this is a strong 




This study, using the SLC data from Nepal and using the latest empirical techniques 
presents two major findings. First, analysis performed in Chapter 4 shows that controlling for all 
observed characteristics in student, family, teacher and school levels, students from private 
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schools perform better than students from public schools. However, it is important to take 
account of the fact that private schools have more resources and certainly have students from 
families with higher socio-economic status for peer effects.  These are omitted variables or non-
observables.  Thus, it is very likely that these differences account for the overall differential in 
achievement between public and private schools rather than the sponsorship. Secondly, analysis 
conducted in Chapter 5 shows that private school competition in Nepal has a positive impact on 
public school performance. Although the impact found is not so large, the analyses using the 
instrumental variable method for both continuous and binary measure of competition 
consistently show a positive impact of private school competition for the case of Nepal. Hence, 
this study finds some evidence that private school competition seems to work for Nepal. Again, 
due to unobserved factors in the estimation process, a definite conclusion cannot be reached at.  
Table 6.1 presents a summary of variables that are statistically significant in explaining 
student’s SLC performance in most of the models analyzed in chapter 4 and 5. Among student 
related variables, those that can be influenced by policy intervention are gender and 
caste/ethnicity. Taking the case of gender, the lower performance of girls could be directly 
related to the gender discrimination prevalent in the Nepalese society. This gender discrimination 
is more rampant in rural areas of the country, and can exist at all levels: home, school and 
community. Likewise, people from the lower caste and ethnic groups are under-privileged in the 
society. Students from the lower caste and ethnic groups do not get as many educational 
opportunities as the higher caste students get due to the discriminatory treatment they generally 
receive in the society. Hence, findings from this study suggests that the government needs to 
come up with targeted policies and goals to help female students and students from 
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disadvantaged castes in order to bridge the huge gap in their performance level compared to the 
other groups.  
Among the family related variables, there is not much room for policy intervention. 
However, family expenditures for children’s education is an influencing factor in student’s 
academic performance. Policies that help in giving subsidies or financial assistance to low 
income families for educational expenses could be very effective in helping the poor students 
perform better. 
Among the school variables, variables found to be statistically significant and subject to 
policy intervention are school type and school resources, such as school having a science lab and 
computer labs. These variables also serve as proxy for per-student expenditures, and evidence 
from the international literature implies that school resources do matter in student achievement. 
Moreover, a country’s social and economic development depends greatly on the educational 
levels of its citizens (see Krueger & Lindahl, 2001). Hence, no matter how constrained the 
national budget is, the government of Nepal should make sure it allocates enough funds to the 



















Table 6.1 Variables that are consistently significant in explaining student’s SLC 
performance 
 
Student Family  School & 
Teacher 
Exam Context 






























exam (- ) 
Peers (+) Annual 
family 
expenses (+) 
 SLC year 
2003    (-) 
Expected 
division in SLC 
exam (+) 
     




The analysis of chapter 5 provides us with one of the major findings of this study, which 
relates to the impact of private school competition on public school performance.  In fact, not 
everyone views private school competition as a good thing. However, using comprehensive data 
and the latest methodology, this study shows that private school competition is associated with 
increased public school performance in the case Nepal. In spite of the possibility of unobservable 
factors in the estimation methods and other limitations of this study, the findings of this study are 
useful and quite thought provoking. The explanation of this finding on competition can be rooted 
on two main aspects. First, private schools might be more competitive and efficient. As 
discussed in chapter 2 of this dissertation, this could be due to various reasons such as better 
administration and management, better teacher quality, better school climate and better 
  
168 
motivated students in private schools as compared to public schools. As a result of competition 
itself, it could be that private schools are getting better. Moreover, following Hirschman’s (1970) 
idea of ‘exit’, competition could also be forcing the inefficient private schools to exit, and as a 
result making the educational market more efficient. Further, following Friedman’s (1962) idea 
that presence of competition raises the overall educational productivity, it could be that even the 
public schools are evolving to be better performers in the market. We could take this as a ‘spill-
over effect’ too. The second effect is related to the sorting mechanism. Private schools, endowed 
with better resources and better promises are capable of attracting higher achieving students from 
the pubic schools. As a result of this cream skimming and selection of good students, their 
performance is very likely to be better. In practice, both of these effects could be functioning 
simultaneously, thereby raising private school performance to a higher level. The study of 
private school competition demands more empirical evidence to reach any particular conclusion. 
However, the analyses of this study lead the author to conclude that private school competition 
work’s in the Nepalese context.  
As a policy recommendation, this study thus suggests that the government should consider 
using a policy of private school incentives to stimulate competition and better educational 
results. The government should also make policies easier that support towards handing over 
public schools to communities in a simplistic and systematic manner. Further, the government 
should provide more basic infrastructure (like roads) and give incentives to open low cost private 
schools in the rural areas of the country so that market competition effects can come into play 
and give rise to higher efficiency.  
In this regard, analyzing the effect of private school competition using Levin’s (2002) four 
criteria for evaluating an educational system is contextual. The four criteria for evaluating an 
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educational system are: freedom of choice, productive efficiency, equity and social cohesion 
(Levin, 2002). More private school competition will surely provide better access to the general 
public. Parents from the rich and middle income families will be more likely to have a higher 
freedom of choice with more private schools to choose from in the community. However, one 
cannot guarantee that poor students too will have more freedom of choice unless the government 
adopts a system such as the voucher scheme (see Friedman, 1962). With a stringent educational 
budget and heavy dependence on foreign aid for education, adoption of such scheme in near 
future is challenging in case of Nepal. The productive efficiency, already discussed before, is 
more likely to improve with private school competition. However, from the equity and social 
cohesion aspect, the impact of competition could be mixed. For example, if the government is 
unable to make provisions for the necessary financial assistance to marginalized students to 
attend the school they like, a mere increase in the number of private schools will not do any 
good. This might rather increase the gap between the rich and the poor, with the middle class 
shifting towards the private school system. Nevertheless, as the access to modern education 
increases, modern and secular ideas will also be propagated in the communities. This could help 
reduce the discrimination based on caste, ethnicity and religion, and hence schools and 
communities could be more socially cohesive. Based on these arguments, this study suggests that 
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Table A.1. Agencies under the Ministry of Education, Nepal 
 
SN Types Agencies 
1 Central Level 1. Department of Education (DOE) 
2. National Center for Educational Development (NCED) 
3. Curriculum Development Center (CDC) 
4. Office of the Controller of the Examinations (OCE) 
5. Non-formal Education Center (NFEC) 
6. School Teachers’ Record Office (STRO) 
7. Education Review Office (ERO) 
2 Regional  Level 1. Five Regional Education Directorates (REDs) 
3 District Level 1. Seventy-five district Education Offices (DEOs) 
4 Local Level 1. One thousand fifty-three Resource Centers (RCs) 
2. Thirty-two thousand one hundred and thirty Schools and twenty-
nine thousand eighty-nine ECD/PPC centers 
5 Commissions 1. University Grants Commission (UGC) 
2. Teacher Service Commission (TSC) 
3. Nepal National   commission for Education, Science and Cultural 
Organization (NATCOM)  
6 Universities 1. Tribhuvan University (TU) 
2. Nepal Sanskrit University (NSU) 
3. Kathmandu University (KU) 
4. Purbanchal University (PU) 
5. Pokhara University (PoKU) 
6. Lumbini Buddha University (LBU) 
Just approved to open 
7. Agriculture and Forestry Science University 
8. Mid-Western University 
9. Far-Western University 
7 Councils/Boards 1. Council for Technical Education and Vocational Training 
(CTEVT) 
2. Higher Secondary Education Board (HSEB) 
8 Libraries 1. Kaiser Library (KL) 
2. Nepal National Library (NNL) 
3. Dilliraman Kalyani Regmi Memorial Public Library (DKRMPL) 
9 Others 1. Janak Education Material Centre Limited (JEMCL) 
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